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In the preface to The Fate of Wonder: Wittgenstein’s Critique of Meta-
physics and Modernity, I singled out Hubert Dreyfus and Cora Diamond 
for special thanks for much of the philosophical inspiration behind that 
book. The present work will make evident that I am still much indebted 
to them, whatever distances there may be between their views and mine. 
Some of my institutional debts remain unchanged since the time of the 
publication of the earlier monograph. This is not surprising since, as the 
Introduction makes clear, much of the work for the two publications 
overlapped. Thus, thanks once again to the Department of Philosophy at 
the University of California, Berkeley, where I was a Visiting Scholar for 
the 2005–2006 academic year; Professor Carla Frecerro, Director of the 
Center for Cultural Studies at U.C. Santa Cruz, for her hospitality dur-
ing my stay as Resident Scholar for Winter and Spring Quarters, 2009. 
I would also like to express my gratitude to Professor Paul Roth, then 
chair at the Department of Philosophy at U.C. Santa Cruz for being a 
welcoming host for my research stay as a Visiting Scholar during the 
Winter and Spring Quarters, 2011. Finally, I owe a special thanks to Pro-
fessor Mark Risjord at the Department of Philosophy, Emory University, 
for hosting my stint as a Visiting Scholar for the 2019–2020 academic 
year. Risjord was generous in the extreme with the time he set aside for 
philosophical discussions, which I  hugely enjoyed and profited from. 
Finally, I would like to thank my colleague Dr. Rolf Scott of the Depart-
ment of Social Anthropology at the University of Bergen. In addition 
to years of lively discussions, there is one incident that deserves special 
mention. My earliest conception of the third essay in this volume was 
that it would primarily be an exploration of Cavell’s views on skepti-
cism in terms of comparative epistemology. During a presentation of my 
main ideas for the essay many years ago, Scott pointed out to me that 
the project would be better framed in terms of the comparative ontology 
of the subject. This suggestion ended up being a turning point for that 
work. Much of the Appendix has already appeared as in Mark Bevir and 
Andrius Galisanka, eds. Wittgenstein and Normative Inquiry (Leiden: 
Brill, 2016) 174–191. I am grateful to the publisher for permission to 
reprint this material. 
Introduction
Kevin M. Cahill
I. An Uneven Start
The impetus for this book comes from the last chapter of my disserta-
tion, The Moral Dimension of Wittgenstein’s Thought, defended at the 
University of Virginia in August of 2001. In the fourth and final chapter, 
called “The Disengaged View and ‘The Darkness of this Time’ ”, I argued, 
based on both textual and extra-textual support, that the remarks on rule-
following in Philosophical Investigations constituted a kind of cultural 
critique of modernity qua critique of what Charles Taylor has termed “the 
disengaged view” of human practice.1 Part of my aim there was to make 
plausible that Wittgenstein saw the problems of Western metaphysics in a 
substantially historical light. Accordingly, my discussion involved a critique 
of Stanley Cavell’s view that for Wittgenstein, the impulse to skepticism 
(for Cavell synonymous with metaphysics) is part of the human condition. 
Especially relevant for the chapter was Cavell’s essay “Declining Decline: 
Wittgenstein as a Philosopher of Culture”, where he in effect claimed that 
by concluding that Wittgenstein saw philosophical problems as primarily 
rooted in our way of life, historicist oriented commentators such as G.H. 
von Wright had given short shrift to universalist strains in Wittgenstein’s 
anthropology. Von Wright had claimed that for Wittgenstein,
Because of the interlocking of language and ways of life, a disorder 
in the former reflects a disorder in the latter. If philosophical prob-
lems are symptomatic of language producing malignant outgrowths 
which obscure our thinking, then there must be a cancer in the Leb-
ensweise, the way of life itself.2
In reasserting his signature humanist interpretation of Wittgenstein, 
Cavell distinguished between what he called an “ethnological” or “hori-
zontal” sense of Lebensform in Wittgenstein’s work and what he termed 
a “vertical” or “biological” sense of that expression.3 Responding specifi-
cally to the previous passage, Cavell writes,
Given my sense of two directions in the idea of a form of life, von 
Wright’s appeal here to “a cancer in the way of life” makes me 
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uneasy. “Way of Life” again to me sounds too exclusively social, 
horizontal, to be allied so directly with human language as such, the 
life form of talkers.4
Without going into detail, in the final chapter from my dissertation 
I defended a view close to von Wright’s by arguing that Cavell had (char-
acteristically, I  now think) given short shrift to the “ethnological” or 
cultural, both in regards to his reading of Wittgenstein and as a philo-
sophical matter more generally.
Unfortunately, soon after handing in the dissertation the embarrass-
ing fact dawned on me that my arguments against Cavell had more or 
less failed to distinguish between two clearly different questions: 1) Is 
Cavell’s view of Wittgenstein correct? and 2) Is Cavell’s view about the 
relation between metaphysics and human nature correct? (I am probably 
not the first interpreter of Wittgenstein who has failed to see that ques-
tions like these are in fact different.) I have addressed the former question 
elsewhere.5 The years it has taken me to address the latter question are 
no doubt partly attributable to the special obligations I incurred by mov-
ing to Norway immediately after my dissertation defense, but also to the 
usual pressures to publish. The latter exigency in particular inclined me 
to stick to writing about what I knew best, i.e. Wittgenstein, rather than 
taking up new projects. But these externalities only really account for 
part of the story of why this book has been so long in the making. The 
truth is, I had also vastly underestimated what was involved in approach-
ing the second question, both as a matter of intellectual difficulty and as 
a function of anthropological and philosophical trends.
II. “Cultural” Anthropology?
The original hunch that motivated “Skepticism and the Human Con-
dition” was that there was something implausible with Cavell’s claim 
for the universality of skepticism, both in its everyday and philosophical 
modes. Even before I had begun my investigation, my untutored intel-
lectual instincts (which admittedly have always inclined towards relativ-
ism and anti-realism), inclined me away from such universalism. Once 
I had liberated my criticisms of Cavell from exegetical questions in Witt-
genstein scholarship, the road forward seemed fairly straight: all that 
remained for me to do was to gather some data by reading some relevant 
cultural anthropology and then to throw them at Cavell in a way that 
would undercut his essentialist claim. Naturally, it wasn’t that simple.
I had naively assumed that the occasional sympathetic references to 
concepts such as “thick description” or the “hermeneutic circle” in the 
writings of some of my early philosophical heroes such as Hubert Drey-
fus or Charles Taylor reflected the stature enjoyed by these ideas and 
their associated thinkers in anthropology generally. Unfortunately, my 
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first tentative discussions with colleagues in my university’s own Depart-
ment of Social Anthropology promptly revealed that the state of that 
discipline was nothing like what I had assumed. For one thing, I quickly 
learned that the word “culture” was, if not exactly taboo, certainly 
passé. My initial references in these conversations to interpretivism in 
general, and to the work of Clifford Geertz in particular, were met with 
polite frowns and wrinkled noses.6 In some cases, it became apparent 
that this was as much due to politics as to methodology. I  recall for 
instance, being abruptly confronted by a graduate student with the 
assertion that the interpretivist approach in anthropology was wrong 
because, and I’m quoting from memory here, thick description “does 
nothing to help empower marginalized groups”.7 This early exposure 
to the activist turn in anthropology turned out to be a harbinger of 
more to come. The particular episode was also especially off-putting, 
as I was already familiar with the accusation that Wittgenstein’s widely 
misunderstood declaration that “philosophy can only describe the 
actual use of language, and leaves everything as it is” was some kind of 
expression of political reaction.8 As things turned out, the activist turn 
taken by many in ethnography was not the only development of which 
I was ignorant. There was an apparent rejection of most things German 
(Critical Theory perhaps excepted) and the embracing of many things 
French. At one point someone even referred me to Badiou as someone 
from whom I could learn about the “real” Wittgenstein. My colleagues 
were gracious and patient with me, but traversing this road took time. 
I plodded away.
III. Naturalism
Shortly after my stumbling start with the anthropologists, I made a hope-
ful foray into the philosophy of the social sciences. Surely, these phi-
losophers hadn’t succumbed to French obsessions. While this was mostly 
true, here again my philosophical starting point proved to be like relying 
on an outdated edition of “Let’s Go Europe”. Once more, my sheltered 
life in Wittgenstein scholarship had left me unprepared for the real world, 
such as it was. In particular, after my earliest exposure to the Ameri-
can philosophy of social science community I had the distinct impres-
sion that the field had been colonized by a tight-knit cadre of reformed 
and not so reformed Quineans. The self-assertive scientific naturalism 
I encountered there, even in its pluralist guises, seemed (almost) as alien 
to me as references to Deleuze. I was a bit shaken when arguments that 
invoked the concept of “meaning” were liable to be met with accusations 
of apriorism or provoke incredulous questions about the role “meaning 
entities” were supposed to play in the causal structure of nature.9 I was 
also wholly ignorant of the fact that, as a matter of philosophical soci-
ology, naturalism’s debate with the Verstehen tradition had long ago 
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been relegated to side-show status. It was more unsettling still to dis-
cover how culture was routinely depicted in mainstream philosophy 
of social science textbooks, as though it were a mysterious membrane 
fabricated by romantic nationalists to envelope imagined islands of his-
tory that most likely never existed. It sometimes felt as though the very 
concept of culture was regarded by mainstream naturalists as an obscu-
rantists’ postulate that explained nothing and excused everything. It did 
no “work”.
A further point of frustration for me in this milieu was that any refer-
ence to Wittgenstein’s thought seemed only to provoke a knee-jerk reac-
tion to Peter Winch, as though nothing of relevance had happened in 
Wittgenstein scholarship since the appearance of The Idea of Social Sci-
ence and its Relation to Philosophy in 1958. Further, to the extent that 
Winch’s work was mentioned independently of Wittgenstein, it seemed to 
serve mainly as a poster boy for what was wrongminded with the inter-
pretivist tradition. Despite finding many problems both with Winch’s 
Wittgenstein interpretation and with some of his own arguments, I had 
always believed that he had initiated a worthwhile conversation about 
the relationship between science and the critique of culture. So, it was 
dispiriting when my former advisor Cora Diamond published several 
papers roundly attacking some of Winch’s most famous conclusions as 
incoherent.10 Worse still, I realized that the substance of her attacks was 
fundamentally sound.
IV. “Back” to “Wittgenstein”
Like many narratives, the one I am giving here about the genesis of the 
three essays in this volume falsifies matters to a certain extent. To under-
stand why Diamond’s criticisms of Winch were so decisive not only for my 
view of Winch but more importantly for how I would go on to use ethno-
graphic material, it will help if I turn “back” to Wittgenstein. The scare 
quotes are due to the fact that my reading and thinking about anthropol-
ogy, philosophy of the social sciences, Wittgenstein, and Cavell, far from 
constituting a continuous progression, instead substantially overlapped 
in irregular ways. At any rate, in the years immediately after I handed 
in my dissertation, much of my philosophical attention was taken up by 
the debates over the so-called “New Wittgenstein”, in particular over the 
merits of the resolute reading of the Tractatus fronted originally by Dia-
mond and James Conant and subsequently elaborated by several other 
philosophers.11 This is not the place to explicate, let alone adjudicate, the 
many facets of that debate. But one idea that I drew from those discus-
sions is central for each of the three essays included here, and so is worth 
making explicit. The idea is that we don’t know what an a priori criterion 
of meaning would be.12
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In order to fill in some historical background for this strange sounding 
claim, consider what Wittgenstein writes at TLP 5.473:
Logic must take care of itself.
A possible sign must also be able to signify. Everything which is 
possible in logic is also permitted. (“Socrates is identical” means 
nothing because there is no property which is called “identical”. The 
proposition is senseless because we have not made some arbitrary 
determination, not because the symbol is in itself unpermissible.) In 
a certain sense we cannot make mistakes in logic.13
At TLP 5.4733 we read further,
Frege says: Every legitimately constructed proposition must have 
a sense; and I  say: Every possible proposition is legitimately con-
structed, and if it has no sense this can only be because we have given 
no meaning to some of its constituent parts. (Even if we believe that 
we have done so.) Thus “Socrates is identical” says nothing, because 
we have given no meaning to the word “identical” as adjective. For 
when it occurs as the sign of equality it symbolizes in an entirely 
different way – the symbolizing relation is another – therefore the 
symbol is in the two cases entirely different; the two symbols have the 
sign in common with one another only by accident.14
I take the upshot of these remarks to be that attempting to identify an 
utterance or string of signs as meaningless or nonsensical out of all con-
text, lands us in a dead end. If we have yet to indicate that the sign 
“identical” has an adjectival use, then the reason “Socrates is identical” 
says nothing is not that the already-grasped meaning of the individual 
word “identical” doesn’t fit in the schema “Socrates is x”. Rather, things 
don’t even get that far, because outside of any context of use in a propo-
sition, there is as of yet no symbol at all, and so no symbol that fails to 
fit into anything. There is only an isolated sign, “identical”. Lacking any 
such symbolic adjectival use, the occurrence of “identical” in “Socrates is 
identical” means that the sign there, in fact the whole string, could mean 
anything, and so in fact means nothing. Imagining that we have some 
grasp of what the symbolic use of “identical” might have meant in the 
schema, even if it couldn’t mean anything, in effect requires us to imagine 
the sense that such a string or utterance made, while simultaneously rul-
ing out that sense as unthinkable. This sort of trick is precisely what Witt-
genstein warns against in an oft-cited passage from the book’s preface.
The book will, therefore, draw a limit to thinking, or rather – not 
to thinking, but to the expression of thoughts; for, in order to draw 
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a limit to thinking we should have to be able to think both sides of 
this limit (we should therefore have to be able to think what cannot 
be thought). The limit can, therefore, only be drawn in language and 
what lies on the other side of the limit will be simply nonsense.15
Much of Diamond’s criticism is focused on Winch’s 1964 article “Under-
standing a Primitive Society”. Winch argued in that article that practices 
and forms of discourse are immune to criticism from “outside” of the 
logically closed world of possibilities that are circumscribed and under-
written by those very same practices.16 In particular, he claimed that the 
person who, from within the confines of his or her own form of life, 
attempts to criticize the concept of reality internal to an alien grammar, 
is liable to have committed a category mistake, and thus to have spo-
ken nonsense. This is precisely because, as being different, the grammars 
are incommensurable.17 Such a critic is therefore trying to say something 
that cannot logically be said. Hopefully, my brief foray into the resolute 
reading of the Tractatus makes evident that in order to argue that cer-
tain kinds of criticism, that is to say certain forms of language use, are 
logically out of bounds, Winch must take himself to have some grasp 
of just what is being forbidden, long enough at least for him to see that 
this impossible something cannot in fact be said. Put in the Tractarian 
terms just sketched, Winch’s argument attempts the equivalent of rul-
ing out a priori an adjectival use of “identical”. Now the context of his 
paper, following as it did his 1958 book, makes it clear that for Winch, 
it is the later Wittgenstein’s thought on grammar that he takes to provide 
the basis for his argument. Nevertheless, while Diamond’s criticisms of 
Winch do not draw explicitly from her own work on Wittgenstein, and 
while I believe those criticisms can rather easily be formulated in terms 
drawn from ways of reading Philosophical Investigations, I  think the 
considerations from Wittgenstein’s early work that I have been discuss-
ing here not only form the philosophical heart of her critique of Winch, 
they also bring out clearly why his arguments for the limits of intelligible 
criticism are unconvincing. Those arguments rely on imagining ourselves 
as occupying a position where we can discern the limits of a domain of 
discourse or system of thought based on our taking our current grasp of 
a system’s logical expressiveness for an unspecified notion of logical limit 
per se. Diamond’s point is that Winch in effect tries to rule out an unex-
plored use of “reality” and that this doesn’t work.
This section of my genealogy has two main points. The first is to make 
clear that the philosophical considerations behind Diamond’s criticisms 
of Winch are an essential part of the framework for each essay in this 
volume. In other words, I want to ward off and reject any impression 
that I am trying to do something akin to what Diamond, rightly I believe, 
takes Winch to be attempting. This is why none of my conclusions, if 
that’s the right thing to call them, take the form that “x cannot be said” 
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or “x is meaningless”. Abandoning the illusory idea of an a priori crite-
rion of meaning, however, should not by any means be taken as a sur-
render of my ordinary language orientation to scientific naturalism; as 
will be made evident, “meaning” remains a critical term for me. This 
shows itself in key moments of each essay, particularly where I describe 
some (metaphysical) thesis as incomprehensible or deeply unclear. My 
making this sort of declaration is, moreover, accompanied by a strong 
suspicion, based on prior experience with relevantly similar word forms, 
that this incomprehension is not due to any lack on my part, intellectual 
or otherwise. It expresses instead the belief that efforts made to reshuffle 
our current conceptual deck in search of a meaningful articulation of an 
unintelligible formulation will be futile. This is because I also suspect, 
even while insisting that I cannot prove, that behind the thesis is the false 
imagination characteristic of the metaphysical impulse: the aspiration to 
a “view from nowhere”.
Accordingly, my conclusion in each essay is negative. In the first essay, 
“Lost in the Ancient City: Pluralist Naturalism in the Philosophy of the 
Social Sciences”, I claim that while there is no conclusive argument show-
ing that the normativity of ordinary language and social life cannot be 
treated in natural scientific terms, no criterion for what would count as 
such a successful treatment has been so much as gestured at in the work 
I discuss. In the second essay, “The Grammar of Conflict”, I claim that 
while there is no conclusive argument showing that distinct systems of 
thought cannot converge into one mutual logical space in which their 
differences might be adjudicated, I see no conclusive argument for think-
ing that they must find such convergence. In the third essay, “Skepticism 
and the Human Condition”, I  claim that while there is no conclusive 
argument showing that skepticism as Cavell understands it cannot be 
formulated within the systems of thought that I canvas, it is nevertheless 
entirely unclear to me what insisting on skepticism’s universality would 
amount to in such cases.
The second main point connects with the story with which I began this 
introduction, the story about Cavell’s dual claims about skepticism and 
Wittgenstein on the one hand, and skepticism and the human condition 
on the other, and how it took time for me to distinguish those claims 
after having conflated them in my dissertation. The point is that in the 
current volume, philosophical exegesis and philosophy have once more 
come apart. I certainly put to use the things I take myself to have learned 
in reading Wittgenstein and several contemporary commentators whose 
work I hold in high esteem. Moreover, it is also true that the topics dealt 
with in these essays, naturalism, relativism, and skepticism, were of cen-
tral concern to Wittgenstein and have also received much attention in the 
secondary literature on Wittgenstein. But the essays here do not in any 
way depend on any particular interpretation of Wittgenstein being the 
correct one. (The appendix is a different story, but what I present there 
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should be taken as supplementary to one essay only and by no means as 
its primary focus.)18 Even if all of the interpretations that have influenced 
these essays were based on bad readings of Wittgenstein, the philosophi-
cal outlook that I have extracted from them would still have to be reck-
oned with. The arguments themselves stand or fall independently of any 
genetic reliance they may have on Wittgenstein exegesis. So, these essays 
are not works of Wittgenstein scholarship.
V. The Ambit of Culture
Already by 1966, Clifford Geertz could record that
The term “culture” has by now acquired a certain aura of ill-repute 
in social anthropological circles because of the multiplicity of its ref-
erents and the studied vagueness with which it has all too often been 
invoked. (Though why it should suffer more for these reasons than 
“social structure” or “personality” is something I  do not entirely 
understand.) In any case, the culture concept to which I adhere has 
neither multiple referents nor, so far as I can see, an unusual ambi-
guity: it denotes an historically transmitted pattern of meanings 
embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed 
in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, 
and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life.19
I remain agnostic about the validity of the contextual definition of culture 
that Geertz offers in the second half of this passage. It certainly has not 
prevented the concept from falling under ever greater critical suspicion 
during the more than 50 years since he suggested it. More interesting 
is how the parenthetical remark expresses a sense of unfairness in the 
treatment of the concept of culture, namely the practice of many writ-
ers who eschew “culture” (and so “cultural anthropology”) as exuding 
an “aura of ill repute”, but go on to rely on terms such as “peoples”, 
“societies”, “regions”, and “ethnic groups”, which are neither more 
nor less well defined than “culture” itself. This seems rather typical of the 
phenomenon wherein precisely which undefined terms go unchallenged 
is largely, even if not exclusively, a function of academic fashion. If then, 
someone wishes to play the game of definition mongering by attacking 
my use of “culture”, or while we’re at it, my uses of “modernity”, “the 
West”, or “modern Western culture”, as lacking defined essences, they 
should be aware that this tactic cuts both ways. Most likely, the terms 
in which they cast their own criticisms could suffer the same fate. Nat-
urally, they could avoid the problem altogether by merely making the 
demand that all concepts be defined for all eventualities. But without 
making their own entry in the discussion, this demand from the sidelines 
seems empty. Not even particle physics can meet the sophomoric demand 
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to “define everything”; and no less a nominalist  than Quine saw fit to 
employ the term “culture”.20
Geertz’s characteristic use of textual imagery in the previous quotation 
could partly explain why the culture concept came to be so widely dis-
trusted, especially in his hands. It seems to blur the distinction between 
the ethnographer and the “mere” reader, and so perhaps between the 
human sciences and the humanities. A famous passage from the classic 
essay “Thick Description” makes this even more vivid:
Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs 
of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, 
and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in 
search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning.21
The imagery invoked here must have been off-putting to many, because 
being caught up in something like a web of symbols naturally calls for a 
hermeneutic approach, with its unending “circle”. This makes our fini-
tude manifest in a way that is not only deeply at odds with a modern 
sensibility, it may also have led to the charge that understanding a foreign 
system of thought and life surely can’t be as easy as reading a text. Socie-
ties, so one line of criticism goes, operate primarily in terms of causal 
concepts, and these cannot be “read off” of anything. They may have 
to be teased out of the false consciousness of one’s informants, perhaps 
tallied up if one goes in for that sort of thing, and, depending on one’s 
ambitions for truth or fame, perhaps even set back into the explanatory 
framework that motivated one’s data collection in the first place.
But as a preliminary response, take an example that will reappear in 
the first essay: familiarity with what it is to go to church. I was a regular 
churchgoer for much of my early life. When I see people out of my liv-
ing room window “on their way to church on Sunday morning” (while 
I may well be settling into my favorite chair with my waffles and coffee 
to watch a football game), I have a pretty good idea of what is going 
on with them. I can read that much from the situation, less so, perhaps, 
the further away from Catholicism their denomination(s) might be (and 
there are such distances). Anyway, if I decide I want to understand these 
more distant ones better, I might have to get up off the couch, go out 
and talk to them, and even observe and participate in their lives. Possi-
bly for years. And yes, perhaps this may involve my forming hypotheses 
that involve causal notions like power, repression, and education. But if 
I want to apply the notion of “church goer” at all, or apply any concept 
meant to catch some aspect of human agency, those causal concepts will 
eventually have to be subsumed, or at the very least equilibrated, within 
a broader context of these people qua human agents who are caught up 
in webs of meaning that I must learn to read. And if my “account” is to 
be an account, and not just a series of chirps and marks about some other 
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set of chirps and marks, I must bring to bear in my account-giving activity 
my own webs. For if I  think I can so much as say anything about the 
churchgoers through so much as talking with them without bringing my 
own webs of significance into play, then I will have betrayed my own 
false consciousness, my having confused (empiricist) gawking for genuine 
learning.
This section has been largely taken up with defending the very legiti-
macy of the concept of a certain concept of culture. I now want to close 
by distinguishing between two levels at which this and related terms 
should be understood as operating in the three essays. (Perhaps this 
means that I am proposing yet two more “referents”.) The fundamental 
level is conceptual or logical. While the second level retains this con-
ceptual role, it also has the kind of identifiable empirical content one 
normally associates with the word “culture”, both in its everyday uses 
and in its social scientific contexts. To the extent we wish to describe 
the actions of an individual language animal at all, culture plays the 
logical or conceptual role as a holistic taken-for-granted background, 
both for our own work of description and in those whom we wish to 
describe. This is a point made by Hubert Dreyfus with his term “practi-
cal holism”, of which I make extensive use in the first essay. It goes by 
other names: Bildung (Gadamer, McDowell) Second Nature (Aristo-
tle, McDowell), Weltbild and Lebensform (Wittgenstein): choose your 
metaphor. If there is a “proof” that such a background is “necessary”, 
it is the incoherence we fall into when we seek to talk of human action 
without it. Where, on the other hand, we have not only the form but 
also the content of this phenomenon more or less uniformly filled out 
and predictably distributed over some population of humans, we have 
culture both in the conceptual sense and in the sense that makes ethnog-
raphy possible. Where such roughly regular distribution is lacking, the 
conceptual sense of practical holism will still be in play, to the degree 
we are dealing with human agents at all.22 Not surprisingly the more 
empirical level comes out most visibly in my use of relevant ethno-
graphic literature. In either case, culture is not some kind of logically 
impenetrable meaning miasma surrounding certain populations. Nor, 
as a critical concept, does it play an explanatory role here. Rather, as 
the home of the concept of meaning, the two-level concept of culture 
is rather a thread tying together the concept of the human in the three 
essays of this volume.
Geertz writes “that culture, rather than being added on, so to speak, to 
a finished or virtually finished animal, was ingredient, and centrally ingre-
dient, in the production of that animal itself.23 Geertz’s speaking here of 
the production of an animal brings to light that thus far I have said a 
good deal about the concept of culture, but nothing about why the essays 
in this volume are contributions to philosophical anthropology. For one 
thing, it should be obvious that I am not using the term “philosophical 
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anthropology” in a manner restricted to the thought of classical German 
philosophical anthropology in such figures as Scheler, Ghelen, or Pless-
ner. For another, despite the clear anti-scientistic thrust of these essays, 
they are not the expression of just one more disgruntled anti-naturalist. 
I mean, rather, the term “philosophical anthropology” to indicate a kind 
of philosophical criticism that initiates its reflections on philosophical 
problems from an unapologetically humanist perspective, a perspective 
that is kept alive in the very structure of any inquiry into the human, 
most notably and fruitfully from within the discipline of anthropology 
itself. Finally, Towards a Philosophical Anthropology of Culture aims to 
rejuvenate the interpretivist-hermeneutic tradition in the philosophy of 
the social sciences on a firmer critical footing, without any relativist or 
metaphysical baggage. That tradition has faced more than a generation 
of misrepresentation, whether by post-structuralists or naturalists, which 
it is high time to call out.
Notes
 1. See for example, Charles Taylor, “Understanding and Explanation in the 
‘Geisteswissenschaften’,” in Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule, ed. S. H. Holtz-
man and C. M. Leich (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), 191–210.
 2. G. H. von Wright, “Wittgenstein in Relation to His Times,” in Wittgenstein 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1982), 216.
 3. See Stanley Cavell, “Declining Decline,” in This New Yet Unapproachable 
America: Lectures After Emerson After Wittgenstein (Albuquerque: Living 
Batch Press, 1989), 41.
 4. Ibid., 52–53.
 5. See Chapter 6 of my The Fate of Wonder: Wittgenstein’s Critique of Meta-
physics and Modernity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).
 6. While “interpretivism” is frequently identified with Clifford Geertz, whose 
work I cite especially in the essay on skepticism, I am not restricting my use 
of the term to Geertz’s ideas. In addition to Geertz, I mean to include here 
also such symbolic thinkers as Marshall Sahlins, Victor Turner, E. E. Evans-
Pritchard, Paul Ricoeur, Peter Winch, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and of course 
Taylor and Dreyfus. Despite differences, I believe these thinkers can all be 
treated under the interpretivist rubric.
 7. Other more senior practitioners were similarly hostile. A  few years ago, 
I attended a seminar by a world-renowned anthropologist, where he claimed 
that according to Geertz, the Balinese cockfight merely unfolded according to 
a self-enclosed and predetermined cultural logic supposedly immune to social 
factors (read “power”). When I raised my hand and tried to say something 
about the relevance of the hermeneutic circle in anthropology, the speaker 
interrupted me and proclaimed loudly that “Anthropology is an empiri-
cal discipline!” No point in arguing, I  thought (even though his response 
appeared to presuppose that a hermeneutic approach was somehow a pri-
ori). Much more recently, I was present at a workshop when the very same 
anthropologist pronounced, much to my surprise, that “social anthropology 
has no data”.
 8. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), §124.
12 Introduction
 9. On this, see my “Naturalism and the Friends of Understanding,” Philosophy 
of the Social Sciences 44, no. 4 (2014): 460–77.
 10. See Cora Diamond, “Criticising from ‘Outside’,” Philosophical Investiga-
tions 36 (2013): 114–32; Cora Diamond, “Putnam and Wittgensteinian Baby-
Throwing: Variations on a Theme,” in The Philosophy of Hilary Putnam, ed. 
R. E. Auxier, D. R. Anderson, and L. E. Hahn (LaSalle: Open Court, 2015), 
603–39; Cora Diamond, “The Skies of Dante and Our Skies: A Response to 
Ilham Dilman,” Philosophical Investigations 35 (2012): 187–204.
 11. Chapter One of my The Fate of Wonder contains a summary of how I under-
stood the status of that debate as it stood around 2010. Chapters Two and 
Three are my own contributions to the development of the resolute reading of 
the Tractatus as it pertains to ethics. For a concise presentation of my views 
on those questions, see my “Tractarian Ethics,” in The Cambridge Compan-
ion to Wittgenstein, ed. Hans Sluga and David Stern, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge, 2018), 96–125.
 12. The sketch draws on numerous works by Diamond and Conant. See Chapter 
One, note 65 for references.
 13. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. G. K. Ogden 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983). Henceforth TLP.
 14. Ibid.
 15. Ibid., 27. At Philosophical Investigations §374 Wittgenstein writes, “The 
great difficulty here is not to represent the matter as if there were something 
one couldn't do”. And at PI §500, we read “When a sentence is called sense-
less, it is not as it were its sense that is senseless. But a combination of words 
is being excluded from the language, withdrawn from circulation”. There has 
been a recent discussion as to whether such remarks warrant the use of “res-
olute” reading to the Investigations. See James Conant and Silver Bronzo, 
“Resolute Readings of the Tractatus,” in A Companion to Wittgenstein, ed. 
Hans-Johann Glock and John Hyman (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 
2017), 175–94.
 16. See Peter Winch, “Understanding a Primitive Society,” American Philosophi-
cal Quarterly 1 (1964): 307–24.
 17. Ibid., 315. I am unsure whether Winch would have thought that every gram-
matical difference led to some degree of incommensurability and to what 
degree incommensurability might be localized or be global.
 18. As for the occasional references in footnotes to passages in Wittgensteinian 
texts, these are intended for readers who might be interested in knowing 
where I take myself to have found inspiration in his writings. They play no 
logical role in my arguments.
 19. “Religion as a Cultural System”. Reprinted in Clifford Geertz, The Interpre-
tation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 89.
 20. W. V. O. Quine and J. S. Ullian, The Web of Belief (New York: Random 
House, 1978), 81.
 21. Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, 5.
 22. This raises difficult questions about just how much regularity is required for 
the ethnographer to get a foothold. I doubt this question has a clear answer. 
It also begs the question about what to say about the humanity of so-called 
“feral children”. If such cases really do exist, then beyond relaying that 
I would of course regard them as human, I don’t really know what else to 
say. My only comfort there is that I don’t believe anyone else has any idea 
about what to say about such cases.
 23. Clifford Geertz, “The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the Concept of 
Man,” in The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 47.
1  Lost in the Ancient City
Pluralist Naturalism and 




This essay deals with questions concerning naturalism and its relation 
to the idea of philosophical anthropology. My way into these questions 
will be to take up the threads of an old debate in the philosophy of the 
social sciences, a debate many today would likely describe as quaint, and 
probably mostly settled: this is the debate about the possible “demarca-
tion” between the Geisteswissenschaften and the Naturwissenschaften. 
My half-ironic use of the antiquated terminology here signals my aware-
ness of how passé this discussion may appear to be, especially in light of 
the confident ascendancy of various naturalisms that, to me at least, now 
hardly seem to recognize that there was ever a time when their creden-
tials were respectably questioned. My route will be a bit circuitous and, 
not surprisingly for an unreconstructed interpretivist and hermeneuticist 
such as myself, begins with the question of language. Although many 
of the pieces of my story have been shaped by the thinkers whose work 
I rely on here, I have tried to rework and assemble them in a way that 
I hope casts some new light on an old question.
My starting point is some recent claims by John Dupré that concern the 
relationship between ordinary language and the language(s) of the social 
sciences.1 For many years, Dupré has offered powerful arguments for an 
anti-reductionist, pluralist naturalism in the Philosophy of Science.2 He 
has supported his position by arguing that reductionist dogmas, most 
notably physicalism, are simply unsupported by scientific practice and 
findings. Dupré’s anti-reductionism runs deep indeed: he is not merely 
a methodological pluralist, a now widespread view in the philosophy of 
science, he is also an ontological pluralist. He thinks, rightly I believe, 
that the sciences not only exhibit the legitimacy of different ways of stud-
ying nature, but that they also show that nature itself contains genuinely 
different kinds of things to be studied.3
Dupré has recently taken his pluralist naturalism to cast doubt on an 
apparent suggestion by Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations to 
the effect that there is a philosophically relevant difference between the 
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languages of the sciences and ordinary language. Dupré argues against 
this idea that not only is there no discernible sharp difference between 
the natural and the social sciences, but relatedly, there is no in-principle 
difference between the languages of the natural and social sciences on 
the one hand, and ordinary language on the other. Dupré has stated 
previously that, “[O]ne point I  share with all contemporary philoso-
phers who describe themselves as naturalists is that I assume that the 
best ways of interrogating nature can be found by looking at the empir-
ical sciences”.4 I understand him here merely to be making the point 
that the work of coming to know whatever it is we can know about 
nature should involve our best tools, and those tools happen to be the 
empirical sciences. There is nothing, or at least not much, to object to 
there.5 Yet a key element of what I will say in response to Dupré’s posi-
tion rests on the point that intractable philosophical problems intrude 
if we fail to recognize that human language users occupy one end of a 
relation to the world not well described as “knowing”, but one that in 
some sense can be said to undergird the knowing relation.6 By draw-
ing on important aspects of ordinary language that Dupré overlooks 
or mischaracterizes, I will argue here that he misses a philosophically 
crucial, even if not metaphysical, distinction between the natural and 
social sciences, a distinction that goes directly to the issues of natural-
ism and philosophical anthropology.7
After sketching Dupré’s discussion of the relationship between ordi-
nary language and the languages of the sciences in Part II, I  criticize 
his account in Part III by calling on a distinction between “theoretical 
holism” and “practical holism” that was introduced by and argued for 
many years ago by Hubert Dreyfus. Working with this distinction, which 
Dreyfus articulates by relying mainly on ideas taken from the early Hei-
degger but also from the later Wittgenstein and others, I  try to show 
that despite his frequent avowals of pluralist anti-reductionism, Dupré’s 
treatment of the relevant passage by Wittgenstein, as well as some of his 
remarks on Peter Winch’s work, betrays a subtle but deeply troublesome 
form of reductionism. In short, while Dupré certainly recognizes differ-
ences between ordinary language, the languages of the social sciences, 
and those of the natural sciences, I will argue that those acknowledged 
differences don’t go deep enough. As I’ll make evident, in his discussion 
of Wittgenstein and Winch, Dupré implicitly depicts, or at least allows 
the image to stand of, ordinary language as a kind theory. As a result, 
essential normative facets of the kinds of agents that human language 
users are, become obscured and the twin results are a distorted view 
of the social sciences and meaning skepticism. In Part IV, I  go on to 
show that despite their importance of bringing out a troubling aspect 
in the kind of naturalism Dupré stands for, Drefyus’ own arguments are 
marred by a dubious apriorism. In order to bring this point out, I refer 
briefly to a tradition of reading Wittgenstein which can be traced back to 
Lost in the Ancient City 15
Stanley Cavell, but has been brought into sharper focus by other writers 
over roughly the last 30 years by writers like Cora Diamond and John 
McDowell.8 While Dupré’s tacit treatment of ordinary language as a the-
ory blocks our view of the normativity of human conceptual life in one 
way, in Part V, I look at the issue from a different vantage point, namely, 
how or whether the kind of agents that human language users are can be 
accommodated within a scientific naturalist worldview. I show that the 
usual attempts to “naturalize” the normativity that characterizes us as 
language users, what John McDowell has called our second nature, faces 
a new version of the same problem that arose when from collapsing the 
distinction between theoretical and practical holism. In Part VI, I try to 
bring these considerations together in a way that folds the sort of natu-
ralism McDowell has defended into the overall theme of Philosophical 
Anthropology.
II
Dupré states that “[t]he central thesis of this paper .  .  . [is] that social 
science is not that different from much in the natural sciences.”9 In the 
event that the point of arguing for such a thesis has become so obscure 
in today’s philosophical climate that it might need pointing out, Dupré 
is referring to an old question in the philosophy of the social sciences, 
namely whether there is a philosophically interesting demarcation 
between the natural and the social sciences. In former times this was 
frequently cast as a debate between the supporters of Erklären (expla-
nation) and Verstehen (understanding) with those in the first camp 
maintaining that the methods (or perhaps, “the method”) of the natural 
sciences were entirely appropriate for gaining knowledge about human 
social life, while those in the latter camp countering that the social sci-
ences required a distinctly humanistic, more literary approach appropri-
ate to their objects of study.10
Let’s start with a well-known remark from The Blue and the Brown 
Books, cited by Dupré, where Wittgenstein suggests something like the 
idea that assimilating philosophical to scientific contexts is centrally 
implicated in generating metaphysical confusions:
Our craving for generality has another main source: our preoccupa-
tion with the method of science. I mean the method of reducing the 
explanation of natural phenomena to the smallest possible number 
of primitive natural laws; and, in mathematics, of unifying the treat-
ment of different topics by using a generalization. Philosophers con-
stantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly 
tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This 
tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher 
into complete darkness.11
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Dupré sympathizes with the main thrust of this remark, which points to 
the lamentable consequences of philosophers’ tendency to treat different 
kinds of problem in a one-size-fits-all manner, but at the same time he 
strongly disagrees with what he takes to be Wittgenstein’s own simplistic 
depiction of science here, something like a covering law view, perhaps sup-
plemented by the idea that chemistry and physics provide paradigmatic 
examples of the sciences. As an avowed pluralist naturalist, Dupré resists 
the idea that there is such a thing as “the method” of natural science, and 
so only distortion can arise by contrasting philosophy, or anything else, 
with a false monolith. Rather, Dupré rightly maintains that there are dif-
ferent sciences with distinct but overlapping methodologies, and so, not 
surprisingly, one finds distinct but overlapping languages of science.
With Dupré’s view of the languages of the sciences in mind, we can 
turn to his treatment of the following passage by Wittgenstein’s Philo-
sophical Investigations:
[A]sk yourself whether our language is complete;—whether it was 
so before the symbolism of chemistry and the notation of the infini-
tesimal calculus were incorporated in it; for these are, so to speak, 
suburbs of our language. (And how many houses or streets does it 
take before a town begins to be a town?) Our language can be seen 
as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new 
houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this 
surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular 
streets and uniform houses.12
Given Wittgenstein’s anti-scientism, his hostility to philosophical theoriz-
ing, and the evident significance that ordinary language plays in his later 
thought, it is entirely reasonable to read this remark as expressing sus-
picion of conflating two importantly different kinds of things: ordinary 
language and the theoretical languages of science (or the sciences, if you 
will).13 But this idea runs afoul of an important feature of Dupré’s plural-
ist naturalism, since it seems to postulate a clear break between ordinary 
language and what is only a mere caricature of science. Indeed, Wittgen-
stein’s examples of chemistry and calculus, each one a discipline with a 
fair amount of formal structure, might seem to both screen out the general 
linguistic messiness of various scientific enterprises and ignore the ways 
in which the languages of the natural sciences, social sciences, and ordi-
nary language penetrate one another. Resisting Wittgenstein’s contrast of 
an ancient city (presumably ordinary language) and new boroughs with 
straight regular streets (presumably “science”), Dupré remarks,
This charming metaphor suggests some kind of radical disjunction 
between so-called “ordinary language” and the language of science, 
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and while such a disjunction may seem plausible enough when sci-
ence is represented by these particular examples, in general, it is, 
I think, a serious mistake.14
And a bit further on we read,
I now want to argue, the complexity and diversity of both language 
and phenomena provide no more objection in principle to a success-
ful social science than they do to biological science. We need only 
avoid unrealistic and unattainable aspirations as to what any science 
can be expected to achieve.15
Thus far we have seen three critical terms, “ordinary language”, “natu-
ral science”, and “social science”. Yet the remark by Wittgenstein that 
Dupré wants to criticize only seems to invoke the first two. But Dupré’s 
main thesis is that the natural sciences and social sciences are not sub-
stantially different from one another and so it may not be clear what is 
going on and where the questions lie. In a nutshell, one might say that 
Dupré wants to criticize the following idea: since the social sciences aim 
to study entities who happen to be ordinary language users, and since 
ordinary language has some special characteristics, the languages and 
methods of the social sciences will (of necessity?) be different from those 
of the natural sciences. That is, at least, the idea that Dupré takes Witt-
genstein’s remark to support. And a bit later still, Dupré frames the main 
issue by pointing to one of the special characteristics of human social life 
that Wittgenstein is famous for foregrounding in his later writings on 
language:
The question before us is whether there is anything peculiar to the 
social sciences that makes a parallel scientific pursuit of the relevant 
questions impossible. . . . One answer does suggest itself as a quite 
general way in which deeper understanding of social facts, scientific 
or otherwise, should be provided. Wittgenstein emphasized the cen-
trality of rules in the structure of social life, and thus the idea that 
there is something normative about the social.16
Judging from the general drift of his discussion and from his expressed 
overall sympathy with Wittgenstein’s thought, Dupré seems to accept as 
basically correct the view he ascribes to Wittgenstein, namely that rules 
and norms are a central feature of ordinary language and therefore of 
much in human social life.17 At any rate, he offers two examples of what 
he thinks of as misguided arguments that purport to show that the study 
of social phenomena is different in kind from the natural sciences. The 
first comes from “normative linguistics” and involves the simple fact that 
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some descriptions of English language sentence construction are true, 
while others are false.
It is a fact, in English, that plural nouns take plural verb forms. If 
I want to inform you that cows are herbivorous, I ought to say “cows 
are herbivorous” and I ought not to say “cows is herbivorous.” And 
that’s a fact. Not a very high-level fact, or a very important one, no 
doubt. As more descriptive linguists have insisted, correctly in my 
view, there may well be dialects in which “cows is herbivorous” is 
correct, and it may come to pass that “cows is herbivorous” becomes 
generally correct English. But not yet. Are these scientific facts? 
I really do not understand this question. .  .  . Might one rather say 
that this is nonscientific? The only sense I can make of this is that the 
statement in question is not one that should or could play any part 
in a science of linguistics. And I simply have no idea what basis there 
might be for such a claim.18
For his second example, Dupré discusses an idea he finds in Winch’s The 
Idea of a Social Science, namely that while the natural scientist need only 
heed the rules of her home discipline, the sociologist must in some sense 
participate in two sets of rules, those of her home discipline and those of 
her subjects. The passage that Dupré quotes from Winch reads as follows:
If the judgments of identity – and hence the generalisations – of the 
sociologist of religion rest on criteria taken from religion, then his 
relation to religion cannot be just that of the observer to the observed. 
It must rather be analogous to the participation of the natural sci-
entist with his fellow workers in the activities of scientific investi-
gation  .  .  .  [A] historian or sociologist of religion must have some 
religious feeling if he is to make sense of the religious movement he 
is studying.19
In speaking of judgements of identity, Winch is referring to the question 
of the sociologist’s ability to make correct identifications of the things 
she aims to be studying. His point is that there is no hope of fulfilling 
this necessary condition by mere presuppositionless observation, staring, 
so to speak, and his proposal is that therefore one must have some sort 
of “religious feeling” at the outset of one’s study so as to make possible 
fruitful observation. Dupré responds,
The sociologist of religion, it appears, will face the difficult task of 
engaging simultaneously in two rule-governed social worlds, the 
world of sociology and the world of religion.
I have to confess I  find this strange. Of course, if the sociolo-
gist is investigating a system of rules, then he is engaged with two 
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systems of rules: the rules of sociological discourse and the rules he 
is investigating. But why must he participate in the latter? I mean 
no disrespect to the tradition of cultural anthropology that does 
pursue a certain kind of participation with the societies it aims to 
investigate, and there may be a particular kind of knowledge that 
requires this kind of methodology. But surely it is not the only 
kind of knowledge possible of an unfamiliar culture? As an atheist, 
I can perfectly well understand why everyone in a village goes into 
a large building on Sunday morning and recites various narratives 
together about what I take to be an imaginary being. I might sym-
pathize less with this practice than could a religious person, but 
I can understand it fairly well. And even if participatory anthropol-
ogy gains a certain depth of understanding that is not available to 
other methods of study, it surely pays a price for this in breadth, 
or generality?20
Though insisting on the continuity between the natural and social sci-
ences, Dupré makes clear that he is not asserting that there is no important 
difference between them at all. That would belie his anti-reductionism. 
He thus reassures us that he is “not, of course, suggesting that molecules 
obey rules, or have meanings.”21 However, for Dupré, the recognition of 
such a difference is best thought of as a result of a kind of empirical find-
ing, as though we discover through mere observation, say, normativity 
or meaning when we observe human subjects; these are not understood 
as constitutive features of social scientific investigation itself. Thus, the 
social sciences don’t need to employ a special method or rely on any spe-
cial presuppositions different in kind from the natural sciences.
Both of Dupré’s examples, the one about English grammar and the 
one about the churchgoers, would suffice for my purposes here. But since 
Winch’s work has had so much historical importance for the philosophy 
of the social sciences (not to mention for the reception of Wittgenstein’s 
thought in this field of study), it seems more natural for me to follow 
up the example concerning religion for pursuing my argument. Despite 
his finding Winch’s argument “strange”, Dupré does think there is value 
in an idea he finds in Winch, namely, that the findings of social science 
should be rendered in ordinary language if they are to be of any use. And 
this, in turn, requires that the sociologist’s descriptions of his subjects’ 
activities must be given in a thick language “in which central terms have 
both descriptive and evaluative content”.22 Dupré then asks,
How deep a divide does this show between the natural and the 
social sciences? I suggest that it shows a deep and familiar difference 
between the subject matters, but no obvious systematic difference 
between the epistemological standards that constitute these diverse 
investigations as scientific.23
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Against this, I will argue in the next section that the thick description that 
rightly characterizes much social science is already a mark of a significant 
“epistemological” difference from the natural sciences, and that this is so 
because of the distinct nature of the entities under investigation. In other 




As a declared pluralist naturalist, Dupré is always careful to resist any 
dogmatic insistence on the methodological or metaphysical unity of sci-
ence, since he wants to give proper due to the distinctness of various 
scientific disciplines. Still, something in his confident declarations of 
knowledge of the facts of normative linguistics and of his understanding 
of churchgoing suggest to me that something is seriously wrong with his 
overall argument that the social and natural sciences are fundamentally 
on a continuum. In this section, I’ll try to bring out what I think the main 
problem is by first imagining a case that touches on the churchgoers.
Imagine a little boy growing up in an English village in the 1950s. His 
own family is secular, but many, or perhaps even most of the villagers still 
participate in the rituals that regularly go on inside of the village church or 
churches. (Which denomination they are doesn’t seem to be very impor-
tant for the example.) When he is very young, a particular building in the 
village grabs his attention and he asks his parents “What’s that house?” 
Perhaps they merely respond, “That’s a church”. Things are likely to 
get more complicated rather quickly later when he asks what people are 
doing on Sunday morning trudging up the hill to the church. Perhaps the 
little boy’s parents, siblings, or neighbors will tell him things like “those 
people are going to church because it’s Sunday”. Because his family is 
secular, he may also hear things like “We don’t go to church, it’s all hocus 
pocus”. When he is in kindergarten or grade school, he is likely to hear 
things like “We have to go Christmas shopping soon”, “You’ll soon have 
Christmas vacation”, “Shall we go to the Christmas fair?”, “There is an 
Easter Egg hunt this Saturday”, “You get out of school early on Good 
Friday this week”. Now all of this “knowledge” about the goings-on 
inside and around a church might be imparted to him without his ever 
having set foot inside of one. More to the point, it seems he will have 
acquired this “knowledge” without having to form any hypotheses or 
conduct any empirical testing in order to get a basic handle on an impres-
sive amount of church-related terminology and behavior. That is, long 
before his secondary education has begun, a whole lot of what is meant 
by words such as “God” and “worship” and other church-related vocab-
ulary will be “known” by the boy. Yet this “knowledge” will not really 
amount to anything more than having acquired and mastered the terms 
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that go into the language he speaks and the life he shares with many of 
his co-villagers. Consequently, unless one believes it clarifies matters by, 
for instance, introducing something like a distinction between knowing- 
how and knowing-that, it seems like a mischaracterization simply to call 
the little boy’s familiarity “knowledge” and to leave things at that.
Naturally, someone could object to my use of pejorative scare quotes 
and point out that “knowledge” is an entirely appropriate expression for 
the boy’s effortless ability to make “judgements of identity” regarding 
what goes on in connection to the church, despite his never having been 
inside one. This might be fine in an ordinary context, but in a philosophi-
cal context I would want to ask what, if any, evidence the little boy is 
imagined to possess in having arrived at this supposed knowledge of the 
various church words employed in the example. (How quickly one gets 
back to Descartes’ predicament in the First Meditation: the “evidence” is 
really pretty poor.) In fact, I think it’s difficult to conceive of the supposed 
evidence as amounting to much more than the boy’s elders and others 
having told him what a church is, what the Bible is, what worship is, etc. 
And this hardly seems to count as evidence supporting any hypothesis at 
all. In particular, just staying at the phenomenological level for now, it 
seems, at the very least, rather far-fetched to assume that a child would 
treat the utterances of those around him as evidence in support of his 
“theory” of village religious life. Whether as part of his observing their 
casual conversation or as part of their explicit teaching him English, the 
boy would have had little reason to believe one way or the other that 
his elders were or were not speaking truthfully or correctly when they 
uttered words such as “church”, “Bible”, “worship”, etc. What can we 
imagine the young boy doing when his elders point at a gray stone build-
ing and state “That’s a church, some people worship God there but it’s 
all rubbish”? Do we imagine him processing this evidence, with the pos-
sibility this entails of his concluding they were perhaps mistaken about 
the name of the structure or what goes on inside? What would evalua-
tion of evidence actually look like when the boy was learning to speak? 
I want to say that such considerations of weighing evidence don’t even 
get into the game at these early stages of learning language, and through 
it, the social world, and that this is the main reason why Dupré’s claim to 
know lots of things about the church-goers without participating much 
in their practices strikes me as utterly misleading. The mere enculturation 
of the child in my example will have involved him in a massive amount 
of participant practices connected to their religion, even if he himself is 
taught to, or comes to regard, religion as delusional. Dupré rightly notes 
that the degree to which one’s participation in the actual practices of the 
religion is rather thin, as in his own case, one likely lacks an intimate 
understanding of some of the finer details of what the churchgoers are 
up to. But the fact is that the boy in my example, budding atheist or no, 
already participates rather massively in the way of life of the churchgo-
ers. And the same almost assuredly holds true of Dupré.
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I should stress that there is no inherent problem with Dupré’s use of 
the word “knowledge” to describe his ability to understand what goes on 
at church (or to understand elementary English grammar). My thought 
example was meant to make such a use seem less compulsory or attractive 
by showing that there need not be the slightest reason to regard such an 
ability as the result of an activity involving the forming of hypotheses and 
the collecting of data into a theory of church-going. Using “knowledge” 
to describe what is learned in acquiring the basic concepts of church-
going provides no reason to see it as on any obvious sort of continuum 
with the sorts of knowledge one hopes to acquire when one engages in 
any form of scientific research. On the contrary, it seems to be signifi-
cantly discontinuous at precisely this point.
Still, even if such common sense considerations make it implausible 
to conceive of the boy in my example as a kind of mini-epistemologist, 
a philosopher could dig in his heels on this point because he may see no 
alternative to casting his description of the boy’s relation to early facts of 
language learning and social life in a substantially epistemological light. 
But as I’ll argue later, doing so puts one on a very short path to skepti-
cism, not just about the existence of the “external world”, but about the 
very intelligibility of both scientific and non-scientific discourses. Now 
the insistence on a fundamentally epistemological relation might take dif-
ferent forms. Although it seems like a bizarre possibility, one could insist 
on a kind of direct and infallible knowledge of linguistic and social facts, 
on analogy with G.E. Moore’s claim to know of the existence of his two 
hands as proof of an external world.24 I think that it is hugely unlikely 
that Dupré would postulate this sociolinguistic variety of “Moorean 
propositions” merely in order to salvage the use of “know” in the con-
text of his discussion. There seems something philosophically desperate 
in characterizing our earliest relation to an unlimited number of obvious 
linguistic and social facts in terms of epistemological success as Moore 
understood this.25 I won’t pursue this particular avenue further.
Even if his paper is not explicit on this question, Dupré’s talk of conti-
nuity between ordinary language and the social sciences (and ultimately 
the natural sciences) suggests an idea already contained in germ in my 
discussion of the example of the little boy: that our primary relation to 
culture and language is one of semantic interpretation, even if this is 
not necessarily assumed to be the result of our conscious handling of 
data and hypotheses. As we just saw, this second idea seemed implausibly 
overly intellectualist, in large part I suspect, because of the way in which 
it breaks so radically with common sense phenomenology. Instead, the 
alternative, apparently more plausible, idea of interpretation here is that, 
perhaps as a result of sub-personal psychological (or neurological, it 
doesn’t really matter) processes, the child fits various uninterpreted (that 
is to say meaningless) linguistic data into his overall theory of mean-
ing and truth.26 This idea, then, might provide the support for the sort 
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of continuity between ordinary language, social scientific theories, and 
natural scientific theories envisioned by Dupré.
B
In the precious section, I  said that casting our description of the boy’s 
relation to early facts of language learning and social life in a substan-
tially epistemological manner put us on a very short path to meaning 
skepticism. To develop this idea in a direction that will make clearer what 
I take to be misleading in Dupré’s discussion, I want to (re)introduce a 
distinction made many years ago by Hubert Dreyfus between “theoreti-
cal holism” and “practical holism”.27 As Dreyfus explains it, theoretical 
holism, made familiar by Quine, Davidson, and Føllesdal, among others 
involves the idea that meaning is something we arrive at by translating 
or interpreting otherwise preliminarily meaningless linguistic items, so 
as to fit them into a semantic theory. The holism of our theory is one 
consequence of the failure of various forms of linguistic reductionism or 
meaning atomism traditionally favored by empiricists. As Quine explains 
in his classic “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”,
The dogma of reductionism survives in the supposition that each 
statement, taken in isolation from its fellows, can admit of confirma-
tion or information at all. My counter suggestion, issuing essentially 
from Carnap’s doctrine of the physical world in the Aufbau, is that 
our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense 
experience not individually but only as a corporate body.28
The corporate body is construed as our overall theory of the world and it 
is only our placing them into such a system that sentences or utterances 
acquire meaning, gain their life, as it were. In The Web of Belief, Quine 
writes in this vein,
Of course hypotheses in various fields of inquiry may tend to receive 
their confirmation from different kinds of investigation, but this 
should in no way conflict with our seeing them all as hypotheses. We 
talk of framing hypotheses. Actually we inherit the main ones, grow-
ing up as we do in a going culture. The continuity of belief is due to 
the retention, at each particular time of most beliefs.29
Elsewhere, Quine takes this view of language to argue for an erasure 
of any significant distinction between scientific theories and everyday 
language:
If, as suggested earlier, the terms ‘reality and ‘evidence’ owe their 
intelligibility to their applications in archaic common sense, why 
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may we not then brush aside the presumptions of science? The rea-
son we may not is that science is itself a continuation of common 
sense. The scientist is indistinguishable from the common man in his 
sense of evidence, except that the scientist is more careful.30
Dreyfus comments on this perspective as follows:
This view thus treats all understanding as an epistemological prob-
lem, as a question of theoretical knowledge, so, on this view, there is 
no important difference between the knowledge sought in the social 
and the natural sciences.31
We are in essence asked to imagine ourselves from birth as gathering 
and evaluating evidence pertaining to our various hypotheses in a cease-
less and bottom up attempt to see how all the aspects of the world hang 
together. The idea of continuity between ordinary language and the social 
sciences, and between these and the natural sciences, seems to follow 
naturally, as does a certain understanding of what comes to “revise” 
ordinary language, embodying as it does the crude scientific theory of 
practical common sense.
Against the primarily epistemological thrust of theoretical holism, 
Dreyfus counterpoises the idea of “practical holism”, a theme he finds 
running through the work of Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Merleau-
Ponty. A central feature of practical holism is the way in which both 
practical and theoretical activities rest for their intelligibility on a 
mostly unarticulated, pre-theoretical, substantially (though perhaps 
not exclusively) acquired background understanding of how the world 
hangs together.32 For example, in order to conduct her research, the 
experimental scientist must share with her colleagues a vast amount of 
understanding of social, linguistic, technical, and institutional norms 
and facts.33 The point is not merely that the task of making this back-
ground understanding explicit on par with a theory would be a hercu-
lean and largely pointless task. Nor is it that these difficulties point in 
turn to some underlying logical impossibility.34 The point is, rather, that 
it is deeply unclear how any theoretical scientific work could get off the 
ground at all without some common unquestioned understanding about 
what is relevant and what is not; and this pertains first and foremost 
to the facts of everyday life with language. This non-theoretical under-
standing exhibits, moreover, a kind of holistic, narrative unity wholly 
alien to the thoroughgoing contingent unity characteristic of theoretical 
holism. As Dreyfus describes it,
Practical understanding is holistic in an entirely different way from 
theoretical understanding. Although practical understanding and 
everyday coping with things and people involves explicit beliefs and 
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hypotheses, these can only be meaningful in specific contexts and 
against a background of shared practices. And just as we can learn 
to swim without consciously or unconsciously acquiring a theory of 
swimming, we acquire these social background practices by being 
brought up in them, not by forming beliefs and learning rules. A spe-
cific example of such a social skill is the conversational competence 
involved in standing the correct distance from another member of 
the culture depending on whether the other person is male or female, 
old or young, and whether the conversation involves business, court-
ship, friendship, etc. More generally, and more importantly, such 
skills embody a whole cultural interpretation of what it means to 
be a human being, what a material object is, and, in general, what 
counts as real.35
The example here of conversational distance-standing nicely illus-
trates the holism of background understanding: even holding a com-
petent mundane conversation might only work given a positioning 
of the participants’ bodies that appropriately takes account of age, 
gender, social position, etc. While Dupré notes that the holism which 
characterizes biological theory is structurally similar to that exhibited 
by the language we use to describe the actions of the churchgoers, 
the holistic understanding at issue for Dreyfus is one that affords our 
language, actions, and perceptions not merely conceptual coherence, 
but a kind of immediate or prima facie sense, without which we would 
neither understand what to do nor what to say in the shifting contexts 
of our lives.36
How, then, should we think about the relationship between the under-
standing characteristic of practical and theoretical holism generally, or 
between the different uses of languages that imbue them specifically? One 
upshot of these considerations is that there is an important sense in which 
ordinary language and the know-how which infuses it is fundamental 
(even if not foundational) to the epistemological perspective characteris-
tic of scientific theorizing. Dreyfus thus writes in this vein,
We can .  .  . use Heidegger’s distinctions to highlight the difference 
between theoretical and practical holism’s view of the interpretive 
circle. The Quinean theoretical circle results . . . from the fact that all 
verification takes place within a theory, and that there is no way out 
of the circle of holistic hypotheses and evidence. The Heideggerian 
hermeneutic circle, on the other hand, says that this whole theoreti-
cal activity of framing and confirming hypotheses takes place not 
only on the background of explicit or implicit assumptions but also 
on a background of practices .  .  . which need not and indeed can-
not be included as specific presuppositions of the theory, yet already 
define what could count as a confirmation.37
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In other words, the epistemological dependency relation of ordinary lan-
guage practices and those of the sciences is not reciprocal or symmetrical.
Someone could try to mitigate this fact by noting that the languages 
of both the natural and social sciences penetrate everyday language: 
“relativity”, “quantum leaps”, “chaos”, “genes”, “evolution”, “uncon-
scious”, “cultural capital”, “class”, are all examples we commonly 
encounter (even if such terms of art are rarely used in everyday discourse 
with the same grammar with which they are employed in their original 
theoretical contexts). Dupré could thus correctly argue both that not only 
do ordinary language practices surround and even penetrate theoretical 
disciplines but also that theoretical languages have in some sense become 
part of ordinary language and its practices. He may also be correct in his 
claim that, for example, “[b]iology . . . is actually a maze of little streets 
and squares just as intricate as ordinary language”.38
Although each of these points are valid and worth making note of, 
they fail to negate the difference in the direction of logical significance. 
The simple fact is that ordinary language permeates the intelligibility of 
every form of scientific activity much more pervasively than the other 
way around. Now it is undoubtedly true that lives led without any of 
the advantages afforded by modern scientific theories would be far nas-
tier, more brutish, and shorter than is currently the case. Still, we can 
pretty well conceive of people carrying on their lives with little or no 
natural or social science, as we currently understand these. On the other 
hand, it’s doubtful we could conduct any science at all minus the ori-
entation provided by natural language. Moreover, while it may be next 
to impossible to imagine the members of any human society speaking 
a language completely lacking the conceptual resources for engaging 
in any kind of hypothetical thinking (apart from whether this think-
ing amounted to positing explanations in terms of theoretical entities, 
as is often the case with the sciences), the fact remains that practical 
holism cum ordinary language can get along much longer and better 
without any theoretical stance, scientific or otherwise, than theorizing 
can get along without ordinary language. That does not demonstrate 
the dependence of a priori necessity (assuming we knew what that was 
supposed to mean anyway), but it does strongly suggest an epistemo-
logical dependence whose absence we would, to put it mildly, have a 
very hard time fathoming.39
I have been employing Dreyfus’ term of art “practical holism” both in 
order to elaborate on my example of the boy in the village and in order 
to suggest that basing our relation to the coherence of ordinary language 
and the social world primarily on the model provided by the idea of fit-
ting data into a theory is a kind of philosophical fantasy. Philosophers 
are of course fond of promoting these sorts of images, but I think that 
if one tries to think it through, the idea can’t really be made out. So far, 
however, these considerations haven’t really been brought to bear on the 
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issue of fleshing out the alleged essential difference between the natural 
and the human sciences, supposedly one of my main goals in this essay.
To move things along requires that I  make explicit that the practi-
cal holism embedded in ordinary language is fundamental to the natural 
sciences and social sciences in crucially different ways. To put things a 
bit crudely, with very few exceptions there is no need for the natural 
scientist to reflect on her immersion in ordinary language or the social 
world at all.40 These will naturally become relevant when the time comes 
to disseminate her results, especially in popular scientific channels. They 
may also come into play should there arise the kinds of conflicts that 
are inevitable in any human social endeavor. Nevertheless, a sensitivity 
to practical holism’s background understanding itself is conspicuously 
absent in the field of her study.41 She is free to put her scientific training 
and education to use and let her background understanding work by 
remaining invisible. Dreyfus puts it this way:
[T]he important point for the natural sciences is that natural science 
is successful precisely to the extent that these background practices 
which make science possible can be taken for granted and ignored 
by the science.42
In the study of human societies, on the other hand, taking practices for 
granted is self-confounding:
[S]uch skills and the context of everyday practices they presuppose 
are internal to the human sciences, just as the laboratory skills of sci-
entists are internal to the history and sociology of science, for if the 
human sciences claim to study human activities, then the human sci-
ences, unlike the natural sciences, must take account of those human 
activities which make possible their own disciplines.43
At one point in his discussion of Winch, Dupré seems to come tanta-
lizingly close to seeing this point. Just before he cites a passage where 
Winch speaks of the requirements for the sociologist of religion to make 
judgements of identity (see p. 18), Dupré glosses Winch’s view as one in 
which the distinct nature of the social sciences can be seen in the way the 
social scientist must participate simultaneously in two sets of rules, those 
guiding appropriate action in his home discipline and those guiding the 
action of the subjects of his study.
Winch, at any rate, argued that a crucial difference between the social 
and the natural sciences is that in the former, rules come in twice. The 
natural scientist must learn the rules that concern the practice of her 
science. She must learn, for example, when it is appropriate to say, 
“there is an electron” or “that is a kinase”. More generally, scientists 
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need to know when two situations are to be counted as belonging to 
the same kind. But, according to Winch, the social scientist must also 
have some kind of knowledge of the rules that govern the practice 
she is investigating.44
Setting aside the question of whether it is correct to frame the issue in 
terms of rules as Winch does, it is apparent that the difficulty Dupré rec-
ognizes Winch to be raising is the very same problem just described by 
Dreyfus. But Dupré misses the significance of the point because he seems 
to make the implausible assumption that his knowledge that “cows is 
herbivorous” is grammatically incorrect or that his knowledge of what 
generally goes on inside a church are products of empirical observation 
and testing. At any rate, Dreyfus concludes,
We have argued that in the human sciences the background is inter-
nal to the science while in the natural sciences it is external. . . . But 
the importance of this difference depends on a further ontological 
question, whether the background can itself be treated as a belief 
system or a set of rules, i.e., whether there can be a theory of practice. 
That there can be such a theory is the unargued assumption of the 
view that theoretical holism is the only kind of holism.45
C
I have tried to flesh out Dreyfus’ idea of practical holism in order to clarify 
why a doctrine like theoretical holism obscures an important difference, 
or discontinuity if you will, between the natural and the human sciences. 
At the same time, I briefly alluded to the idea that failing to recognize this 
difference by adopting theoretical holism is of a piece with succumbing to 
a kind of meaning nihilism. When what is at stake is not just the nature 
of the human sciences, but the intelligibility of language itself, the result 
of treating ordinary language as just one more revisable theory represents 
not merely a distorted view of science, but a fall into incoherence. What 
accounts for both sides of this ruinous coin is a largely unquestioned 
dogma in philosophy, namely that language consists primarily of, indeed 
could only be, a set of normatively inert signs that require interpretation 
to give them meaning: chirps and marks if you will that only receive the 
breath of life through a theoretically sophisticated act of interpretation.46
It is in the scientific spirit of theoretical holism that my very act of 
placing, say, an “acoustic blast” emanating from someone’s mouth into 
a theory is always revisable in light of future evidence and so subject 
to doubt.47 But in fact the doubtfulness here is of a much more radical 
nature than might be assumed. This is so because doubt would have to 
apply not only to justifying the semantic result of placing this or that 
lexical item into my theory, but to something like the very (admittedly 
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ungainly) concept: “evidence for placing an utterance into a semantic 
theory”. Consequently, things would never get as far as weighing the 
result of applying the theory of theoretical holism, since radical uncer-
tainty already creeps into the very idea of evidence itself, and so into the 
very formulation of what it means for the theory to explain anything. 
If, in other words, one already has to have some unquestioned concepts 
in order to articulate what theoretical holism amounts to, which is a 
theory supposedly accounting for how we acquire all of our concepts, it 
is entirely unclear how theoretical holism as a general theory accounts for 
very much at all.48 It may help to make this point even clearer by refer-
ring to Sellars’ term of art “The Myth of the Given”. Sellars coined this 
expression to denote the traditional empiricist assumption that the senses 
passively take in information from the environment that arrives, mythi-
cally as it were, already suitable for entering into rational relations.49 In 
the context of theoretical holism one can say the following: if, in order 
to treat some kinds (which kinds?) of acoustical blasts as evidence for 
possible interpretations or some kinds (which kinds?) of ink marks on 
paper as evidence for possible interpretations, it seems that I must treat 
these “inputs” as already suitably packaged as evidence, even if only of a 
fairly indeterminate kind. Although distinct in some respects from what 
Sellars so devastatingly critiqued, one could well describe what I  am 
drawing attention to as theoretical holism’s own version of the myth. As 
Cavell once remarked in responding to a similar case of empiricist excess, 
“What these remarks come to is this: it is not clear what such an activity 
as my-finding-out-what-I-mean-by-a-word would be”.50 In the current 
context, this is a polite way of saying that theoretical holism is, so far as 
I can see, useless (and, can one say with a clean conscience in our current 
philosophical environment: “meaningless”?) as a general theory. One 
could, I suppose, try to avoid this outcome by stipulating that whatever 
one does fits this concept of “evidence for placing an utterance” This 
saves theoretical holism by rendering it vacuous, and so again, useless.
I cannot emphasize strongly enough how important it is that my tenta-
tive rehabilitation of terms such as “meaningless” and “vacuous” in my 
analysis not be read in the wrong light. I am not drawing support from 
an antecedently held a priori principle, something like a verificationist 
theory of meaning, and then on this basis concluding that theoretical 
holism makes no sense. When I stated that theoretical holism is, so far as 
I can tell “meaningless”, that should only be taken as a provisional dec-
laration of, first, my own inability to make any sense of the theory (for 
the reasons just given) and, second, my frank suspicion that no clearer 
articulation is forthcoming from the usual philosophical suspects.51 At 
any rate, on the view of our relation to language at the core of theoreti-
cal holism, there can be no genuine questions, let alone correct answers 
to real questions about what oneself means or what others mean with a 
sentence or an utterance. The theory builds a pernicious sort of general 
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meaning skepticism or meaning nihilism into the very nature of language 
use and social interaction.52
It bears noting that however different in context and motivation, the 
unquestioned assumption at the bottom of theoretical holism, namely 
that language users must first deal with meaningless signs, is in effect 
identical with a key assumption that produces Saul Kripke’s famous (or 
infamous) reading of Wittgenstein as acquiescing in a form of meaning 
skepticism in the remarks on rule-following in Philosophical Investiga-
tions.53 Kripke takes Wittgenstein’s remarks concerning the “wayward 
child” to entail that because any sign such as “+ 2” can always be vari-
ously interpreted, it can never genuinely guide our writing out the series.54 
We then appear to be faced with a paradox that forces on us one of two 
choices: the first, commonly referred to as “Platonism” in the literature, 
requires a super intellectualist feat whereby one “grasps in a flash” the 
potentially infinite extendibility of the rule, thus arriving at an interpreta-
tion of the rule that itself cannot be interpreted.55 But, because we have 
“no model” for such a superlative fact, it can appear as though we are 
forced to look elsewhere for a solution to the question of how a lifeless 
sign such as “+2” can genuinely guide our actions at all.56 Kripke takes 
Wittgenstein in turn to maintain that the sheer regularity of outcome we 
observe with pupils is generated by our early arithmetic training, while 
the community provides a sort of faux normativity by keeping individual 
deviation in check. We are thus led to the view that “correctly” develop-
ing a simple arithmetic rule, and more generally correctly applying other 
concepts, amounts to no more than our regular responses to the presenta-
tion of otherwise normatively inert signs, accompanied we may imagine, 
by something like a crowd barking out its “agreement”.
The problem here, which Wittgenstein’s text eventually makes toler-
ably clear, yet which Kripke fails to notice, is that a) within the Krikpen-
steinian paradox of interpretation the very terms “accord” and “conflict” 
would admit of any application and hence have no application, b) the 
paradox described previously itself rests on a misunderstanding, or per-
haps better an oversight that, c) there is a way of understanding the 
expression for a rule that does not require the interpretation of otherwise 
lifeless signs.57 Having no model of the superlative act of interpretation 
we took as a requirement for understanding the meaning of a rule should 
not imply that there was ever a genuine requirement that we failed to 
fulfill. It implied rather that both the imagined requirement and the sense 
of failure that precipitated Kripke’s skeptical solution were illusory.
The previous paragraph was intended to make vivid that, whatever 
their differences, the strategic deployment that Wittgenstein makes of 
“rule”, “sign”, and related terms through the voice of his interlocutor 
in the service of developing the dialectic of his remarks on rule-following 
on the one hand, and various full-throated iterations of theoretical 
holism made by other writers on the other, actually exhibit a common 
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assumption, namely that meaning and understanding require an incred-
ible feat of mental prowess, whether of the mind or the brain seems not 
to matter much. When subjected to a theoretical gaze in the hunt for the 
“primary quality” through which we hope to explain our capacity for 
meaning and understanding, meaning itself only recedes from view and 
we are left with mere “signs”.58 We end up instead with the strange idea 
that we never really knew what we meant, said, or intended. Understand-
ing the meaning of an utterance or of a written sign thus comes to be 
regarded as analogous to the dominant understanding of perception since 
the dawn of modern philosophy: the subjective projection of a secondary 
quality on to the world, not as an activity involving a capacity to take in 
something genuine from the world or from those around us.
I have on several occasions used the term “ordinary language” in tan-
dem with terms like “social world” or “every-day world”. The conjunc-
tion was always superfluous. If there is no good reason to regard ordinary 
language as a theory, then there is equally no good reason to regard the 
everyday world as a world represented by that theory. The two may be 
notionally separable, but in fact always come as one. We learn one as we 
learn the other. This was stated beautifully over 60 years ago by Cavell in 
a passage I quote at length:
But what is troubling about this? If you feel that finding out what 
something is must entail investigation of the world rather than of 
language, perhaps you are imagining a situation like finding out what 
somebody’s name and address are, or what the contents of a will 
or a bottle are, or whether frogs eat butterflies. But now imagine 
that you are in your armchair reading a book of reminiscences and 
come across the word “umiak”. You reach for your dictionary and 
look it up. Now what did you do? Find out what “umiak” means, 
or find out what an umiak is? But how could we have discovered 
something about the world by hunting in the dictionary? If this seems 
surprising, perhaps it is because we forget that we learn language and 
learn the world together, that they become elaborated and distorted 
together, and in the same places. We may also be forgetting how 
elaborate a process the learning is. We tend to take what a native 
speaker does when he looks up a noun in a dictionary as the charac-
teristic process of learning language. (As, in what has become a less 
forgivable tendency, we take naming as the fundamental source of 
meaning.) But it is merely the end point in the process of learning 
the word. When we turned to the dictionary for “umiak” we already 
knew everything about the word, as it were, but its combination: we 
knew what a noun is and how to name an object and how to look 
up a word and what boats are and what an Eskimo is. We were all 
prepared for that umiak. What seemed like finding the world in a 
dictionary was really a case of bringing the world to the dictionary. 
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We had the world with us all the time, in that armchair; but we felt 
the weight of it only when we felt a lack in it. Sometimes we will need 
to bring the dictionary to the world. That will happen when (say) we 
run across a small boat in Alaska of a sort we have never seen and 
wonder – what? What it is, or what it is called? In either case, the 
learning is a question of aligning language and the world.59
If therefore it seems inescapable that we always start science in the eve-
ryday world opened up by ordinary language, then my interpolation of 
Dreyfus’ paired notions of theoretical and practical holism into my read-
ing of Wittgenstein’s metaphor shows that the metaphor itself may be 
not only charming, but telling. It may well be the case, as Dupré wants to 
stress in the case of biology, that some of the suburbs share a structural 
messiness with the small streets of the old city. But since those suburbs 
of scientific theories and the objects they represent were constructed by 
city-planners, they fundamentally remain epistemological accretions to 
the world of everyday language.
IV
In the last section, I  devoted considerable effort to putting Dreyfus’ 
concept of practical holism to work in arguing both why theoretical 
holism, as a view of our primary relation to language and social life, 
is profoundly unclear, and second, by implication, why Dupré’s claim 
of the continuity between ordinary language, the social sciences, and 
the natural sciences, resting as it does on theoretical holism, is equally 
unclear. On a few occasions in the midst of that discussion, I also sig-
naled that I was not, or at least should not be taken as trying to, rely 
on something like a general principle of meaning for the basis of my 
imputation of emptiness to theoretical holism. In this section, I want 
to go further in warding off such suspicions by briefly distinguishing 
my own intended use of practical holism from that of Dreyfus himself, 
whose use of this idea tends to be marred by an apriorism, similar in 
kind to other recognizable attempts to delineate the bounds of the say-
able or thinkable.
What I mean by “apriorism” in Dreyfus’ thought can be detected 
in a passage that I used previously in my explication of his account of 
practical holism (see p. 25). The relevant part of the passage runs as 
follows:
The Quinean theoretical circle results . . . from the fact that all veri-
fication takes place within a theory, and that there is no way out of 
the circle of holistic hypotheses and evidence. The Heideggerian her-
meneutic circle, on the other hand, says that this whole theoretical 
activity of framing and confirming hypotheses takes place not only 
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on the background of explicit or implicit assumptions but also on a 
background of practices . . . which need not and indeed cannot be 
included as specific presuppositions of the theory, yet already define 
what could count as confirmation.60
My concern is how we are to take Dreyfus’ use of “cannot” in this pas-
sage. One use might be in something like a purely psychological sense, 
where what he means to be pointing out is the fact that as an empirical 
matter, humans are simply not able to list off all of the things they presup-
pose for the purposes of carrying on with scientific activities. While this 
is almost certainly the case, it is also almost certainly true that Dreyfus 
does not merely wish to call attention to such a fact about our limited 
psychological capacities. In fact, the way I think Dreyfus intends to use 
“cannot” here is in something much closer to a logical sense of “can-
not”, where this word is meant to point to a limit or bound of sense, the 
transgression of which is a logical or conceptual impossibility. Some-
thing of the same “Kantian” spirit comes out later in his paper when he 
writes “the important point for the natural sciences is that natural sci-
ence is successful precisely to the extent that these background practices 
which make science possible can be taken for granted and ignored by 
the science” (italics original)61 and “if the human sciences claim to study 
human activities, then the human sciences, unlike the natural sciences, 
must take account of those human activities which make possible their 
own disciplines”.62
Indeed, this way of thinking about the logical significance of back-
ground practices runs at least as far back in Dreyfus’ work to “Holism 
and Hermeneutics” published in 1980, and all the way up to his dispute 
25 years later with John McDowell concerning the relation of practices 
and conceptuality. In the opening salvo of that debate, his 2005 APA 
Pacific Division Presidential Address, Dreyfus asserts,
[a]s Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty (as well as Wittgenstein) have 
argued, we can only relate to objects and make judgements about 
them insofar as they show up on the background of the world – and 
the world is not a belief system but is opened to us only through our 
unthinking and unthinkable engaged perception and coping.63
In a subsequent contribution to the same dispute, when discussing a dif-
ference between performing a skilled activity like fielding and throwing 
a baseball and making an assertion about that activity, Dreyfus quotes 
approvingly from Merleau-Ponty:
[I]n order to be able to assert a truth, the actual subject [i.e. the 
embodied coper] must in the first place have a world or be in the 
world, that is, sustain round about it a system of meanings whose 
34 Lost in the Ancient City
reciprocities, relationships and involvements do not require to be 
made explicit in order to be exploited.64
Yet, in seeming admonishment of Merleau-Ponty for merely making a 
factual claim about explicitness rather than a logical claim about the 
limits of conceptuality, Dreyfus immediately adds,
Merleau-Ponty should have said “can’t be made explicit if they are 
to be exploited”.
Dreyfus is apparently operating here with the assumption that what-
ever is open to concepts, whether in language or thought, must rest on 
a ground floor of something fundamentally non-conceptual, in this case 
practices, which necessarily escape the sayable or thinkable.
The problem, however, with taking practices, or anything else, to be 
the general conditions of the possibility of language, thought, or intelligi-
bility is that it is very questionable whether such a thing is necessary and 
very difficult to make out what the idea of such a condition is supposed 
to come to.65 Following a traditional reading of Immanuel Kant’s idea of 
transcendental limits beyond which we cannot know anything, we have 
perhaps a natural tendency to think of such logical limits as constituting 
an “outer” boundary of the sayable. But positing such a bounds of sense, 
whether an “outer” limit of transcendental conditions beyond which we 
cannot think or say anything, or a lower substrate of background prac-
tices that ground what we can think or say, seems inevitably to demand 
the correlative notion of there being a “something” beyond or beneath 
the limit that we manage to grasp just long enough to say we can’t think 
“it”: this seems to require us precisely to think or talk about that which 
we are said to be unable to think or talk about. And this seems to me to 
be simply an unstable idea.66
Previously, I claimed that treating ordinary language and social prac-
tices as proto-theories, as is characteristic of theoretical holism, leads to a 
quick descent into incoherence. While the fact, if that’s the right thing to 
call it, that I am pointing to here, namely that these practices are not logi-
cally sacrosanct, entails that they are subject to criticism and so are revis-
able, we should expect both criticism and revision to look different here 
than they do in the case of the sciences.67 Perhaps in some cases, criticism 
and revision are actually simpler; I suspect more often than not that they 
are more complicated. At any rate, there is no good reason to believe that 
Wittgenstein’s “ancient city” is one that we learn to navigate in virtue of, 
or as, a theory. Rather, we learn the thoroughfares of theories, whether 
straight boulevards or windy roads, subsequent to our mastery of our 
first language, not, I should reemphasize, as a matter of logical necessity, 
but as a matter of deeply intransigent fact. Of course this could be taken 
as an admission on my part that I have failed to show a metaphysical or 
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a priori difference between the social and natural sciences, a difference, 
that is, whose conceivability takes nothing for granted about us. I think 
instead that getting over the habit of insisting that only distinctions grasp-
able from a non-existent epistemological position can be philosophically 
significant distinctions is a mark of intellectual progress.
V
A
Where does this leave us with the question of naturalism, pluralist or 
otherwise, in the social sciences? Dupré’s reflections on Wittgenstein were 
my starting point and so my discussion has up to now accordingly preoc-
cupied itself with the relations between ordinary language, the languages 
of the social sciences, and the languages of the natural sciences. In resist-
ing Dupré’s continuity claim, I have been putting considerable pressure 
on a particular idea of ordinary language as well as on other related 
ideas. Specifically, I have argued that we overlook an important differ-
ence between the social and natural sciences if we fail to appreciate the 
nature of ordinary language and the everyday world that it brings in tow. 
Yet, my focus on language and theory thus far may seem to reflect an 
excessive concern with mainly epistemological or methodological issues, 
and so leave unaddressed the more ontological side of things. That is, 
to some it might seem that we are left with questions as to whether the 
very existence of normativity immanent in ordinary language practices 
is itself something that ought to be explained by the sciences, natural or 
social. Does the fact of norm-carrying creatures like us call for such an 
explanation?
In recent times, John McDowell’s Mind and World has offered the 
most significant, even if not completely unproblematic, negative rejoin-
der to the explanatory impulse embodied in this question. McDowell 
worked to preserve the idea that thought and belief must be rationally 
responsive to nature, and so to avoid the kind of coherentism he finds 
for instance in Donald Davidson, a view from which McDowell sees our 
rational capacities remaining permanent aliens in the world. McDowell’s 
way of attempting to find this balance is to argue that conceptual capaci-
ties are drawn into action in sensual perception.68 McDowell writes in his 
introduction,
The mistake here is to forget that nature includes second nature. 
Human beings acquire a second nature in part by being initiated into 
conceptual capacities, whose interrelations belong in the logical space 
of reasons. Once we remember second nature, we see that operations 
of nature can include circumstances whose descriptions place them 
in the logical space of reasons, sui generis though that logical space 
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is. . . . Conceptual capacities, whose interrelations belong in the sui 
generis logical space of reasons, can be operative not only in judge-
ments . . . but already in the transactions in nature that are consti-
tuted by the world’s impacts on the receptive capacities of a suitable 
subject; that is, one who possesses the relevant concepts. Impressions 
can be cases of its perceptually appearing – being apparent – to a 
subject that things are thus and so.69
McDowell’s reference to “second nature” here signals that he regards 
himself as a naturalist, albeit of an unorthodox variety: he refers at one 
point to his view as “naturalized Platonism” as opposed to “Rampant 
Platonism”.70 In speaking of our acquiring a “second nature”, McDowell 
is referring to the ubiquitous phenomenon of the initiation of human 
beings into a set of practices most closely associated with learning 
their mother tongue(s) and home culture(s), a process of enculturation 
McDowell refers to as Bildung.71 It is precisely Bildung that McDowell 
believes obviates the felt need for accounts of our conceptual capacities 
that would take what he calls a “sideways on” view that is typical of main-
stream scientific naturalist approaches. “Sideways on” is McDowell’s 
metaphor for the self-understanding of traditional philosophy, including 
its iterations in modern naturalism, from which the philosopher imagines 
that, while taking nothing for granted about the practices and concepts 
actually involved in making rational assessments, we can nevertheless 
somehow manage to investigate whether those same practices and con-
cepts yield independently intelligible results. What McDowell sometimes 
calls “bald” naturalism is the view that the natural sciences can be of 
assistance in such a sideways on task by “building up” the normativ-
ity found in our ordinary language activities bit by non-normative bit 
from resources provided by various sciences. Because the bald naturalist’s 
attempt to explain that normativity must imagine itself as relying on the 
illusion of a sideways on view, McDowell thinks bald naturalism itself 
is fundamentally incoherent. Bildung is his own naturalist counterpoise.
McDowell’s views in Mind and World have of course been subject 
to much debate and criticism, even by those who are best described as 
broadly sympathetic to his outlook.72 More important here, many phi-
losophers still hold that so-called “sideways on” projects are worthy of 
pursuit, under the rubric of fields such as social psychology, cognitive 
science, evolutionary psychology, evolutionary game theory, and com-
parative psychology. Some naturalists have raised specific objections to 
McDowell’s claims for the special nature of human conceptual capacities 
and the particular form of normativity they embody. Another complaint 
concerns McDowell’s relative silence on the relevance of investigating 
the evolution of human culture, and thus of creatures capable of gaining 
a second nature.73 In a related vein, others are skeptical of McDowell’s 
claims for the sui generis character of human conceptual capacities.74 
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Still others have proceeded as though Mind and World had never been 
written.75
Certainly, some criticisms of McDowell or McDowell-like positions 
can have merit. I don’t dispute, moreover, that various scientific disci-
plines, in particular those like social or comparative psychology that 
are, as it were, close to the surface of our lived experience, can provide 
interesting insights into what we might think of as the underlying neces-
sary conditions for our being the kinds of creatures we are.76 To put it 
modestly, however, no one has the slightest idea what it looks like for an 
explanatory account in psychological or neuroscientific terms (however 
intricate and detailed), to explain, as in make intelligible, the normativ-
ity in our various linguistic and scientific practices.77 It is entirely unclear 
how fields such as social psychology, comparative psychology, or infant 
psychology are supposed to provide us with any criteria for what is to 
count as a truer “match” between our concepts and practices and real-
ity, conceived independently (of what? those concepts and practices?) or 
what it would mean for such fields to provide any non-question-begging 
criteria for deciding that some concepts allow us to cope “better” with 
our environment than others. However much more humanized such 
fields may seem when compared to physics, we are still involved here 
with a pretty traditional, now just more complicated, idea of a “side-
ways on” bridging project between non-normative building blocks and 
our everyday activities. Nor is it to the point to suggest that my remarks 
here conceal a crypto a priorist agenda and that these are really “empiri-
cal” questions. In fact, if one is suspicious of traditional notions of the 
a priori, this has repercussions too for what we can call an “empirical 
question” with a straight face. Without a traditional notion of the a 
priori to push off against, claims that every idle speculation is empiri-
cal, however unmoored it might be from even the thinnest sketch of an 
actual explanatory schema, are themselves completely empty. Trying to 
fill in the massive gaps in Quine’s story of surface irritations to torrential 
output with theories from psychology, while perhaps appealing, will not 
alter this situation. (Modules or speech centers may be activated by sig-
nals describable in terms with no semantic content. Speakers, so far as we 
can imagine, respond to meaningful words.)
B
I have been portraying second-philosophical, “sideways on” ideas about 
using the natural sciences to explain or assess the normativity immanent 
in ordinary language(s) as rife with confusion. If, however, one is looking 
for a discipline that might show promise for critiquing our set of concep-
tual commitments, that discipline does not come from the natural sci-
ences, but from the social sciences, in particular, from certain approaches 
within social anthropology and sociology. At least as these used to be 
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commonly practiced up until fairly recently, these have the potential 
to provide us with a comparative view, all the while remaining clearly 
within the space of normativity. If we imagine a form of human life as 
an orientation of sense in the world that is always and inextricably a bio-
logical and cultural hylomorphism, then it seems to be the case that given 
our common biology, there can be the promise of investigating how these 
different orientations are expressed that respects both their diversity and 
commonality. (This used to be called the “psychic unity of mankind”.) 
Of course, empirical findings can lead us to revise the specific conceptual 
structures and norms we find to be most constitutive of whatever con-
ceptual capacities are required for knowledge and rationality. But, on 
pain of incoherence, such revision will be the result of starting from the 
current critical faculties we already have confidence in. These findings, 
moreover, will not speak for themselves. Finally, I should stress that see-
ing through the illusion of the demand for a “sideways on” perspective or 
for second philosophy in no way entails a kind of conservatism whereby 
we are forced to just settle for whatever conceptual commitments we find 
manifested in our ordinary language activities. These commitments can 
themselves be material for critical reflection on both everyday life and on 
the findings of science in a way that doesn’t require us to imagine any-
thing like an extra-logical space.
Next, while my reference earlier to “lived experience” should certainly 
be taken to mark the importance I attach to a first-person perspective 
when thinking about normativity and the social sciences, it should not 
be taken to suggest any affinity for subjectivism. Everything I have said 
about our inculcation into the norms of ordinary language makes clear 
that I  regard the agent’s perspective as only notionally separate from 
the public everyday world. The conception of world in which we begin 
to philosophize is thus crucial for clarifying certain key confusions in 
debates about naturalism in the social sciences. If this world is the ordi-
nary social world that we learn to navigate when we learn to speak and 
act, there is no reason to think that it can be understood either through 
the logical equivalent of chemical decomposition or in terms of formal 
structures.78 In fact, it is precisely the kind of reductionism pervading 
much naturalist thinking in the philosophy of mind that, for all of its 
pretensions to modern materialism, is no less “Cartesian” than was the 
master himself. Building up normativity bit by non-normative psycholo-
gistic bit seems fated to trying to understand the normative entirely on 
the side of the subject, leaving the context of the world out of the picture. 
Yet there is simply no good reason for believing that approaches which 
try to make sense of normativity by ignoring context would have any 
chance of working, when the only examples we have of understanding 
when actions are correctly performed or expressions are correctly used 
are shaped by the context of their performance or the occasions of their 
use. Conversely, the idea of treating worldly context itself as a subject 
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for the natural sciences, however pluralistically one conceives of them, 
strikes me as downright oxymoronic.
In my earlier discussion of theoretical holism, I suggested that treat-
ing ordinary language and its practices as a kind of theory distorts their 
nature and so blocks from view, from the top down as it were, the imme-
diacy of the normativity these instantiate. Theoretical holism over intel-
lectualizes background practices and ordinary language by viewing them 
through theoretical lenses and the result is that their immanent norma-
tivity becomes too remote to recognize. Naturalizing projects, on the 
other hand, when taken as providing anything like a full story, blot out 
the very idea of normativity, including the rationality found in scien-
tific enterprises themselves. Such “bottom-up” strategies that attempt to 
explain the very existence of such normative features of our lives in non- 
normative natural-scientific terms make any notion we might have of 
normativity, either theoretical or practical, equally unavailable to under-
standing by failing to accommodate the very idea of such a thing.79 If 
theoretical holism starts with uninterpreted chirps, bald naturalism starts 
and ends with brute chirping. Both invite the emptiness that comes with a 
refusal to acknowledge “the natural phenomenon that is normal human 
life is itself already shaped by meaning and understanding”.80
VI
In a recent introduction to the philosophy of the social sciences, we find 
the following passage in the chapter devoted to the hotly contested issue 
of norms:
For many philosophers, norms represent the last bastion in the 
defense of human uniqueness. The irreducibility of “ought” to “is” 
marks a gap between the human and natural world. Social scientific 
attempts to appeal to norms must fail if they take norms to be any-
thing but a sui generis feature of the social world.81
I am not acquainted with the author’s specific views on the subject 
broached in the quotation. Nevertheless, despite its surface neutrality, 
the passage does seem to me to embody a central strain of modern natu-
ralism’s self-understanding, namely as having excised one excrescence 
after another from our image of what was supposed to be distinctively 
human. For many who have internalized it as second nature, this con-
fidence might lend the current essay a sense of a last, desperate stand 
or rearguard action – a view of normativity close in spirit to a “God 
of the gaps” view of religion, already common after Newton and in 
many quarters plain common sense after Darwin. But this appearance 
notwithstanding, I  am claiming that the debate about normativity is 
where the fight between modern naturalism and the kind of (naturalist) 
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view that I am defending should have been fought 350 years ago. On 
behalf of those sympathetic to what I have said here, I confess it has 
taken us a while to get over the routine drubbings we have taken since 
the 17th century. Some of those beatings were no doubt well deserved. 
Still, this “last bastion” should always have been our first frontline of 
counterattack.
With some qualifications, much of the view that I have defended in 
this paper was already contained in spirit in this passage from Alasdair 
MacIntyre:
Quine’s conclusion is that . . . any genuine science of human behavior 
must eliminate such intentional expressions; but it is perhaps neces-
sary to do to Quine what Marx did to Hegel, that is, to stand his 
argument on its head. For it follows from Quine’s position that if it 
proved impossible to eliminate references to such items as beliefs and 
enjoyments and fears from our understanding of human behavior, 
that understanding could not take the form which Quine considers 
the form of human science, namely embodiment in law-like gener-
alizations. An Aristotelian account of what is involved in under-
standing human behavior involves an in-eliminable reference to such 
items; and hence it is not surprising that any attempt to understand 
human behavior in terms of mechanical explanation must conflict 
with Aristotelianism.82
MacIntyre’s recourse to the expression “in-eliminable reference”, with 
its gesture at impossibility arguments, should perhaps make us some-
what suspicious, given what I’ve said previously about the apriorism 
in Dreyfus’ Heideggerian account of practical holism. MacIntyre’s ref-
erence to “law-like generalizations”, moreover, suggests that, at least 
when he wrote After Virtue, he may have been in thrall to an outdated 
positivist view of science which no contemporary naturalist holds. Still, 
even if Dupré’s version of pluralist naturalism is certainly free from 
many of positivism’s well-documented sins, there is a sort of residual 
scientism (I believe it is actually an unacknowledged holdover from 
positivism) running through his thought and through the thought of 
many contemporary naturalists in the philosophy of the social sci-
ences. Consequently, I  find the instinct to which MacIntyre is giving 
expression in the previous passage to be fundamentally sound. To put 
it starkly: for all of the unquestionable explanatory power unleashed 
by 17th century science and its many offspring, there never really was a 
genuine question as to whether scientific naturalism gave us a believable 
story about human language and social relations. Neither, therefore, 
was there ever any need to stand arguments like Quine’s on their heads. 
There was merely a need for exposing the gross inadequacies in their 
very formulations.
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In a memorable passage from his classic essay “Thick Description: 
Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture”, Clifford Geertz writes,
Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs 
of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, 
and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in 
search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning.83
One of the main problems for those in thrall to scientific naturalism in 
philosophy, it seems to me, is accommodating themselves to the idea that 
such a creature as Geertz describes here could be a starting point for seri-
ous work. And so, for example, in “Beyond Understanding: The Career 
of the Concept of Understanding in the Human Sciences”, Paul Roth 
writes that interpretivists think “cultural artifacts are evidence of mean-
ing, of inner life reified” and that “[n]onnatural states – how things stand 
in the minds of those studied – account for objects in the world”84 I am 
unsure to whom these remarks are addressed. It certainly seems odd to 
imagine them pertaining to the arch-interpretivist Geertz, at least based 
on anything he ever wrote. In any case, there is no reason for holding up 
a caricature of “inner objects” that the interpretive social scientist must 
per impossible “get at”.85 Meaning does not find its “expression” in cul-
tural artifacts any more than thought finds its “expression” in language. 
It is the artifacts themselves that must be understood, be they paintings, 
poems, novels, roadways, utterances, rituals, or ruins. There is no harm 
in retaining certain mundane uses of “meaning” and “understanding” 
where, for example, we say we understand the meaning of the painter 
through understanding the meaning of what he or she produced. It may 
be both the painting and the painter that we want to understand. But this 
gives no call to take these ordinary uses in any inflammatory senses, ones 
that invoke a mystical inner object that must be, but cannot quite be, 
gotten at. Thus, there is no reason to take Geertz’s unabashed interpre-
tivist use of the term “web of meaning” as an invitation to accuse him of 
hypostasizing “meanings” as some kind of ethereal entity. The substan-
tive “meaning” can be read as a useful, albeit frequently misunderstood, 
shortcut for indicating what a speaker of a language does, for example, 
when asked to explain an utterance, which is to substitute for it other 
words in their explanation.86 Even if the manner in which interpretivists 
and hermeneuticists sometimes speak can encourage misunderstandings, 
the idea that when they talk of “meaning” they intend to refer to some 
unobservable entity “outside the causal order” (the “idea” idea as it were) 
is just one more tired philosophical dogma.87 Speaking, and so explaining 
your speech, are observable actions; there is nothing hidden about them. 
Qua actions, they are already normatively shaped. The alternative is to 
regard speaking as the emitting of normatively inert signals that require 
interpretation by placing them into a semantic theory. This brings us full 
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circle back to theoretical holism, which as I have tried to argue, is noth-
ing more than a collection of statements in search of a sense.
Few writers have been more convincing than Dupré in arguing for plu-
ralism in the philosophy of the natural sciences. Displacing physics as 
the paradigm to which the natural sciences must aspire has been entirely 
healthy. And yet, although the idea of pluralist naturalism in the social 
sciences may sound correct, my discussion has followed the tendency 
of many other writers sympathetic to interpretivism and hermeneutics 
by giving a certain pride of place to philosophical issues connected to 
cultural/social anthropology. In this tradition, the anthropologist is seen 
as trying to make sense of other societies in an on-going comparison 
between its background understanding and her own; there is no thought 
in this of imagining either from a normatively inert “sideways on” per-
spective.88 Astonishing (or perplexing) as this may sound, I am trying to 
articulate a perspective from which the ongoing critical project of Philo-
sophical Anthropology, informed by and informing anthropology, can be 
regarded as the “queen of the sciences”.89
It is worth emphasizing that this is importantly distinct from, but not 
inconsistent with, a perspective that acknowledges the usefulness of 
 “middle-range” theories in sociology or political science, for example. In 
such cases, a social scientist might make a conscious choice to screen off 
philosophically loaded questions about normativity, and on this basis, 
employ objectifying methods that resemble or draw on those of the natural 
sciences. There is nothing inherently wrong with such approaches. Studies 
that investigate causal relations between everyday non- theoretical macro 
variables (such as “church-goer” and “philosopher”, for example) might 
be suitable for studying limited aspects of human behavior, whether these 
come from one’s own society, a different society, or both. They can have 
explanatory power, sometimes even providing long-term predictive abil-
ity, and thus produce much useful knowledge. It is, however, important 
to be clear about why they are only suitable for “adducing external facts” 
about their subjects: naturalist methods prescind from fully enculturated 
human beings, and do so always at the risk of obscuring this inconvenient 
truth. They do not add up to an overall theory of the human language 
user, i.e., the human being. As I have argued in my analysis of theoretical 
holism, failing to recognize this risk is a recipe for incoherence. From this 
perspective, the thick description recommended by interpretivists and 
like-minded social scientists is, in an important sense, more fundamental 
than the thin descriptions provided by naturalist methods.90 To take one 
example, the various iterations of rational choice (even though not para-
digmatic of a naturalist theory per se) are most properly understood as 
investigating a set of skills for comporting oneself that, while perhaps all 
cultures have achieved in some measure, others have refined to a much 
higher degree (approaching idolatry in some cases). Barring a descent 
into a view of detached means-ends rationality bordering on Platonism 
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in mathematics, the historical, cultural context for making sense of such 
an achievement calls for thick description; a sufficiently different cultural 
context, or a radical enough historical change of context-dependent cir-
cumstances, would escape the purview of rational choice theory, thus 
making its reliance on thin description much less relevant for understand-
ing what is going on.91 None of this is a plea for anti-naturalism, but for 
a widening of the scope of what we accept as natural, so as to include the 
nature of human life as already shaped by meaning and understanding. 
Otherwise, naturalism is far too restricted.
Galileo’s shattering of Aristotle, and with it a naïve trust of our experi-
ence of ourselves and of nature, the rupture with which modern natu-
ralism began, has no doubt been mostly good for science (certainly for 
physics, chemistry, and their progeny). In many other practical respects, 
probably too many to count, it has been decisively beneficial for most 
of us. For philosophy, and perhaps other very countable but sadly not 
counted ways of understanding ourselves, not so much. It goes without 
saying that for all the wisdom I  find in MacIntyre’s work, and in the 
work of others such as McDowell, G.E.M. Anscombe, and Charles Tay-
lor, Heidegger, and of course Wittgenstein, there is simply no question of 
a wholesale re-adoption of an Aristotelian worldview. We simply know 
too much, about the history of the universe and of our galaxy, and about 
the evolution of life and human culture, to fit this into any sort of static 
framework, whether ancient or medieval. Trying to force our knowl-
edge into the confines of an entirely pre-modern worldview would do 
unimaginable intellectual violence to our thinking. Among other things, 
we know that there was an awfully long time when there simply were 
no “self-interpreting animals” around. Yet, once we get into view what 
interpretivists and hermeneuticists, broadly understood, have been trying 
to say about “meaning”, at least in their more lucid moments, I hope it 
is clear that language, properly understood, is, and always has been, the 
issue separating them from mainstream naturalists, particularly in phi-
losophy and the social sciences. And why shouldn’t language be the great 
divider? I think, for better or worse, there is only so much that can be 
done to normalize this very strange fact, if “fact” is indeed the right word 
here. Perhaps we are stuck with ourselves, sui generis. Explanations come 
to an end (and start) from somewhere.
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of the Social Sciences, ed. Stephen P. Turner and Paul A. Roth (Oxford: Black-
well, 2003), 315.
 85. Ibid.
 86. Cora Diamond, “How Long Is the Standard Metre in Paris?,” in Wittgenstein 
in America, ed. Timothy G. McCarthy and Sean C. Stidd (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2001), 104–39, is a brilliant treatment of this kind of confusion. While 
her paper is primarily concerned with Kripke’s view that units of measure-
ment refer to “chunks” of space or time in ways completely cut off from our 
practices of measurement, her distinction between “transitive” and “intransi-
tive” employments of words also seems appropriate for deflating criticism of 
“meaning” in Roth’s Quinean attacks on interpretivism and hermeneutics. 
See “How Long Is the Standard Metre in Paris?” 104–39.
 87. It is important not to confuse the emphasis that writers such as Taylor or 
Geertz for example place on the need for interpretation in the social sci-
ences, with the role “interpretation” plays in the dialectic of Wittgenstein’s 
52 Lost in the Ancient City
rule-following remarks. Paul Roth seems to equate the two when he labels 
Taylor an “interpretivist” and then argues that Wittgenstein, as read by 
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finding the final interpretation that cannot itself be interpreted. But there is 
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use of this term with Wittgenstein’s ridicule of the same token. On the con-
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tion” of a rule at PI §201: “But we ought to restrict the term ‘interpretation’ 
to the substitution of one expression of the rule for another”. This is precisely 
what the hermeneuticist does when she offers an interpretation of a text, 
albeit in a much more complicated context. See Roth, “The Philosophy of 
Social Science in the Twentieth Century: Analytic Traditions: Reflections on 
the Rationalitätstreit,” 103–18.
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2  The Grammar of Conflict
Kevin M. Cahill
“I am afraid we are not rid of God because we still have faith in grammar.”1
I
In what follows, I discuss some questions raised by recent work of Cora 
Diamond in which she has criticized arguments made by Peter Winch that 
try to show the logical limitations of what can be said about alien systems 
of thought and practice.2 In Part II, I provide some brief historical back-
ground to my discussion. In Part III, I summarize Diamond’s main criti-
cisms against the Winchian sort of view. In Part IV, I examine Diamond’s 
view and its implications for the kinds of questions we can ask about the 
possibility of criticism between systems of thought with different gram-
mars. In particular, I look briefly at an intersection between her views and 
those of Hilary Putnam’s on the question of realism. In Part V, I address 
some issues and possible criticisms arising from my way of setting things 
out in Part IV. In Part VI, I discuss two consequences of what I take to be 
Diamond’s views, one pragmatic and the other historical.
II
In his now classic paper from 1964, “Understanding a Primitive Soci-
ety”, Peter Winch attacked E.E. Evans-Pritchard’s (by then already 
classic) ethnographic work Witchcraft, Oracles, and Magic Among the 
Azande.3 Evans-Pritchard had claimed to find a contradiction at the 
heart of the Zande system of magic, a contradiction that arises from 
the Zande view that witchcraft is an inherited substance.4 This view 
entails that all members of a clan with one witch are themselves 
witches, since the Zande clan is a group related biologically through 
the male line.5 This would mean that the whole system of witchcraft 
either was pointless, since asserting that someone was a witch would 
in effect assert nothing more than clan membership. Or it would mean 
that the thought that some people in the clan are witches while others 
are not contradicts the underlying premise about witchcraft substance 
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transmission. It is worth underlining that Evans-Pritchard is not at all 
dismissive of Zande magical practices. He writes with great sensitivity 
in helping the reader come to appreciate the role these practices played 
in Zande life: “We have to see”, he says, “how the drive behind all acts 
of witchcraft is to be looked for in emotions and sentiments common to 
all men – malice, jealousy, greed, envy, backbiting, slander, and so on”.6 
In the  concluding chapter, moreover, we read
Throughout I have emphasized the coherency of Zande beliefs when 
they are considered together and are interpreted in terms of situa-
tions and social relationships. I have tried to show also the plasticity 
of beliefs as functions of situations. They are not indivisible idea-
tional structures but are loose associations of notions. When a writer 
brings them together in a book and presents them as a conceptual 
system their insufficiencies and contradictions are at once apparent. 
In real life they do not function as a whole but in bits. A man in one 
situation utilizes what in the beliefs are convenient to him and pays 
no attention to other elements which he might use in different situ-
ations. Hence a single event may evoke a number of different and 
contradictory beliefs among different persons. I hope that I have per-
suaded the reader of one thing, namely, the intellectual consistency 
of Zande notions. They only appear inconsistent when ranged like 
lifeless museum objects.7
Nevertheless, for all of the context he supplies, on a couple of occasions 
early in the book, and not long after having pointed out the discovery of 
contradiction in the system of Zande magic, Evans-Pritchard seems to 
betray his true view of his subject matter when he asserts, “Witches, as 
the Azande conceive them, clearly cannot exist”.8 As if to remind us, or 
perhaps himself, of this consequence of the contradictory nature of Zande 
beliefs, we read a bit further on, “We must remember that since witch-
craft has no real existence a man does not know that he has bewitched 
another, even if he is aware that he bears him ill will”.9
Where Evans-Pritchard writes of a “conceptual system”, Winch quite 
naturally takes him to mean something like a modern scientific theoreti-
cal structure. Winch also takes for granted that freedom from contradic-
tion is one of the hallmarks of such a structure and that Evans-Pritchard, 
qualifications about “lifeless museum objects” notwithstanding, is rely-
ing on something like this conception of a scientific theory in particular as 
a gold standard for judging whether or not any given system corresponds 
with reality. Winch criticizes Evans Pritchard’s occasional remarks to the 
effect that while Zande magic was to a certain extent coherent in its own 
terms, it failed to describe an independently existing reality as judged by 
the more rigorous canons of Western science. Specifically, Winch objected 
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that, in effect, Western science and Zande magic were incommensurable 
discourses, different grammars as it were, and that Evans Pritchard was 
attempting the impossible in relying on the one grammar to criticize the 
other grammar’s relation to a supposedly discourse-neutral term, “real-
ity”. He writes,
We can imagine a language with no concept of, say, wetness, but 
hardly one in which there is no way of distinguishing the real from 
the unreal. Nevertheless we could not in fact distinguish the real 
from the unreal without understanding the way this distinction oper-
ates in the language. If then we wish to understand the significance 
of these concepts, we must examine the use they actually do have – in 
the language.
Evans-Pritchard, on the contrary, is trying to work with a concep-
tion of reality which is not determined by its actual use in language. 
He wants something against which that use can itself be appraised. 
But this is not possible.10
Winch concludes that Evans-Pritchard, in trying to import the standards 
for speaking about reality from one language in order to criticize the use 
of the same word in another, has made a serious logical blunder.
It is noteworthy  .  .  . that the Azande, when the possibility of this 
contradiction about the inheritance of witchcraft is pointed out to 
them, do not then come to regard their old beliefs about witchcraft 
as obsolete. “They have no theoretical interest in the subject.” This 
suggests strongly that the context from which the suggestion about 
the contradiction is made, the context of our scientific culture, is not 
on the same level as the context in which the beliefs about witchcraft 
operate. Zande notions of witchcraft do not constitute a theoretical 
system in terms of which Azande try to gain a quasi-scientific under-
standing of the world. This in its turn suggests that it is the European, 
obsessed with pressing Zande thought where it would not naturally 
go – to a contradiction – who is guilty of misunderstanding, not the 
Zande. The European is in fact committing a category mistake.11
III
Before I  turn to discussing the upshot of Diamond’s arguments, there 
are two points that I want to make about her interpretation of Winch. 
The first point is that she does not take his position to be merely an 
expression of anti-scientism. Given the way Winch formulates his objec-
tion to Evans-Pritchard in the previous section, that would be an easy 
conclusion to draw. Winch was anti-scientistic, and famously so, but as 
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Diamond makes clear, his main point is also meant to cut a good deal 
deeper. She writes,
I am suggesting that the issue for Winch was not specifically a mat-
ter of using scientific standards to criticise the Zande but of what he 
takes to be the failure to recognise that there are two different con-
cepts of reality involved, in two different “languages.” What Winch 
regards as illegitimate is taking one such concept to be the correct 
one. And this is what he takes to be at stake if one says, after noting 
the parallel position of the Europeans and the Zande, that the Euro-
peans are right and the Zande wrong.12
In other words, Diamond is pointing out how Winch thought it was inco-
herent to privilege in any absolute sense the idea of “reality” at work in 
any discourse over the idea of “reality” at work in another discourse, 
regardless of whether one of them was scientific. That is, Winch thought 
in order to criticize a particular conceptual scheme, cultural system, or 
domain of discourse, one must already be “moving within the system”.13 
This is because he thought it was a logical requirement of such debates 
that all parties are in agreement as to the meaning of (perhaps a weighted 
portion of) their terms. Presumably, for example, Winch would have 
found it as logically suspicious for someone to make pronouncements on 
the reality of Zande magic from a Christian standpoint, as he found the 
sort of assertions that Evans-Pritchard made. This is because, as the pre-
vious passages make clear, Winch found the idea of a discourse-neutral 
conception of the meaning of the sign “reality” to be confused. This view 
involves the idea that criticizing certain elements of social and intellectual 
systems of thought and practice from the “outside” deprives these ele-
ments of the very identity and content they have only within the “inside” 
of a particular social context. Because such criticism would violate the 
purported boundaries of intelligible speech, someone who engaged in it 
could be met with the response “you can’t say that”, i.e. criticism from 
“outside” literally makes no sense.
The second preliminary point concerns the fact that it is Diamond’s 
interpretation of Winch that is my primary focus in this chapter. This 
accounts for why I move fairly quickly in the last section through the 
details of Winch’s attack on Evans-Pritchard on to Diamond’s criticisms 
of Winch’s position in this section. I am aware that there is a very large 
and still growing literature both on Winch’s 1958 book on the social 
sciences and his 1964 paper criticizing Evans-Pritchard; that literature 
merits a substantially longer treatment than I can provide here. But my 
interest is not in providing anything like a scholarly synopsis and analysis 
of this material. My purpose, rather, is to investigate what I see as some 
of the consequences of Diamond’s reading of Winch. I happen to believe, 
as a matter of fact, that her interpretation and analysis rely on a faithful 
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understanding of his actual arguments. But if that somehow turns out not 
to be the case, that should not have much or any bearing on what I write 
next when I examine the consequences of her views.
Diamond attacks Winch’s position on the grounds that it imposes a 
dubious logical or metaphysical requirement on the conceptual resources 
available to language users, and so unnecessarily restricts the possibility 
of criticizing a system of thought such as an alien world view in which 
one does not participate. The dubious requirement is, of course, the idea 
that the content of terms like “reality” (and relatedly, “true”) must be 
articulated only within the pre-given logical spaces provided by existing 
discourses. At the time he wrote his paper, this may have seemed to Winch 
like a bit of philosophical obviousness, made so by his way of reading 
later Wittgenstein at the time. But quite apart from questions concerning 
Wittgenstein interpretation, Diamond finds this view anything but obvi-
ous. She asks, “[W]hy should there have to be an ‘established universe of 
discourse?’ Why can one not be making, giving articulation to, a kind of 
thought about reality in thinking about the conflict?”14 She elaborates the 
thought behind these questions in the following passages:
[W]e can take the situation here to be one in which what is real is 
contested; and this idea of reality as contested is a different notion 
of reality from that which is involved in either of the two forms of 
thought themselves. If the conflict is understood in this way, the 
space for the dispute between the two forms of thought is not given 
in advance; it is not provided by either of the two modes of thought 
that are in conflict. . . . There is thus an important sort of contrast 
between the way the notion of real and unreal works in the dispute 
and the way that notions of real and unreal work in the two systems 
of thought that are at odds. . . . [I]n such systems of thought, there 
are standards that operate independently of any particular move that 
someone makes; but in the kind of conflict with which we are con-
cerned. . . , giving what one takes to be rational grounds for one’s 
judgement is itself part of the articulation of the logical space here, 
the space of reasons in this conflict.15
Further on we read,
What is questionable about Winch’s arguments is that he repeatedly 
emphasises there being understandings of real and unreal internal to 
the modes of thought that may be in conflict, as if that implied that 
any understanding of real and unreal at work in judging that Zande 
thought about their oracle (say) is deeply wrong must involve ille-
gitimately misapplying one of the prior understandings of real and 
unreal. Whereas one can say instead: in bringing out the irreconcil-
ability of the principles involved in two modes of thought, and in 
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reasoning about such cases, we may be developing an understanding 
of real and unreal.16
Thus, against Winch, Diamond holds that making new conceptual and 
linguistic moves, including new modes of evaluating other discourses, 
can emerge as part of a conflict, so that indeed in many cases one can 
intelligibly criticize another system. This means that one can, for exam-
ple, criticize another culture’s practices as confused or false, or in some 
cases even delusional without invoking a traditional “view from side-
ways on” metaphysics of rationality that is unconnected to any linguistic 
practice at all. This is not an invitation to linguistic imperialism. Our 
criticism may be hasty, sloppy, or based on sheer ignorance or prejudice; 
coming to understand the meaning of what people do and say may take 
enormous effort. What Diamond is questioning, however, is that there is 
a ready-made, a priori condition on meaning that rules out the very idea 
of making new conceptual and linguistic moves, especially new modes of 
evaluating other discourses with regard to questions of reality and truth. 
Indeed, her view seems to be that the intelligibility of such an evaluative 
practice is already internal to our grammar, just as we find it, so that one 
can say “that”, except that “saying that” in such a case may have some 
new, perhaps unpredictable features that no a priori argument about 
meaning can preclude.
I should just briefly note here that exploring Wittgenstein’s relation 
to the idea of what is supposedly logically out of bounds to thought 
and thus to criticism has been utterly central to Diamond’s interpretative 
work on Wittgenstein for the last 30 years. Much of this writing has been 
devoted to developing the details of the so-called “resolute reading” of 
the Tractatus. Greatly simplified, this way of reading that book involves 
an attempt to draw out what Diamond takes to be the implications of the 
thought expressed in this passage from the preface:
[T]he aim of the book is to set a limit to thought, or rather – not to 
thought, but to the expression of thoughts: for in order to be able 
to set a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of the 
limit thinkable (i.e. we should have to be able to think what cannot 
be thought). It will therefore only be in language that the limit can 
be drawn, and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be 
nonsense.17
As Diamond reads it, a major aim of the Tractatus is to deconstruct the 
very idea that one could employ special kinds of language, more specifi-
cally special kinds of nonsense, to convey otherwise ineffable thoughts 
that lie on the other side of the limit of the ordinarily sayable, and so 
thinkable. In the present context the more relevant text is of course Philo-
sophical Investigations, as it is largely from that and other later writings 
The Grammar of Conflict 59
that most philosophers have drawn inspiration for their views about the 
logical-grammatical (im)possibility of criticizing, or even understanding 
at all, from “outside”. Yet Diamond is no less adamant that Wittgen-
stein’s later work not be read as lending support to any arguments pur-
porting to establish the “bounds of sense”. And with good reason, for 
such a reading would land the later Wittgenstein in precisely the confu-
sion against which he warned of in his earlier book.
IV
I agree with Diamond’s main criticisms of the kind of view put forth by 
Winch.18 In what follows, I discuss what I take to be some of the implica-
tions of her analysis, even though I am very unsure whether she would 
regard them as genuine implications. I take Diamond at any rate to be 
committed to something close to the following two claims: 1) systems of 
thought may contain logical resources for making various types of criti-
cisms that go beyond what is clearly visible to their current participants 
and 2) these conceptual resources can be developed, brought out, made 
manifest, by, among perhaps other things, conflicts with other systems of 
thought. I think that Diamond is certainly correct in claiming 1), while 
I think 2) raises some complicated issues. In particular, it is unclear to me 
whether Diamond thinks that the logical space that may be articulated in 
the course of a conflict must be understood as a result of mutual features 
of each conflicting system’s logical resources, or if it is enough for coher-
ent criticism that only one of those grammars has this potential openness 
in its self-understanding of “reality”. As I will try to show, it is difficult 
to argue that only the first possibility is permissible and allowing for the 
second possibility reveals some interesting complications.
The main issue between Winch and Diamond here runs both deep 
and broad in the history of 20th century philosophy. Its depth is a func-
tion of its importance, which I  believe is great. By “broad”, I  mean 
that despite substantial philosophical differences among them, the list 
of those who have held positions with strong affinities to the one Dia-
mond finds in Winch is a venerable one. Indeed, on the list of eminent 
thinkers targeted in his “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”, 
Donald Davidson includes, in addition to Winch, Quine, Kuhn, Fey-
erabend, Sapir/Whorf, and Strawson.19 Surprisingly absent from this 
list, however, is the Rudolf Carnap, whose thought as much as any-
one’s proved a source for many of the central ideas in various iterations 
of 20th century linguistic relativism. In particular, Carnap’s distinction 
between questions that are “internal” and those that are “external” to a 
linguistic framework, with his rejection of the latter as lacking cognitive 
significance, bears more than a little resemblance to Winch’s insistence 
that we can only ask questions about the meaning of words, “reality” 
for example, in the language.20
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The kind of realist views Diamond defends in her dispute with Winch 
are quite close to those represented by Hilary Putnam during the last 
35 years or so of his philosophical life. During that span, Putnam pushed 
back hard against the kind of anti-realism inherent in the Carnapian view 
and what he sometimes referred to as the “tired pseudo-Wittgensteinian 
philosophy of language” he found typical of many verificationist inter-
preters of Wittgenstein, especially Norman Malcolm.21 In light of these 
connections, I want to begin my examination of Diamond’s arguments 
against Winch with a passage from a paper by Warren Goldfarb, where 
he is discussing Putnam’s attack on ideas that were central to the work of 
Carnap in the early 1930s, in particular Carnap’s defense of a principle 
of tolerance and its sanctioning of linguistic pluralism in The Logical 
Syntax of Language.22
As Goldfarb has described it, the issue here concerns Putnam’s asser-
tion that the principle of tolerance already presupposes the (to Putnam, 
at any rate, dubious) verification principle. If a prior commitment to veri-
ficationism (in Winch’s context this would be a use-theory of meaning) 
cannot be justified, then Carnap cannot easily deflect “external” ques-
tions about how “the world truly is” merely by appealing to tolerance.23 
While not endorsing Carnap’s verificationism per se, Goldfarb seems to 
think that Putnam’s dismissal of it is a bit too quick. Goldfarb asks,
How would Carnap react to Putnam’s argument? In the argument, 
Putnam assumes that the notion of “The world as it truly is” is 
antecedently understood, so that Carnap needs to adduce powerful 
enough considerations to undercut it. In my view, though, Carnap 
would simply point out that the notion should not be assumed as 
understood, and is in fact rather unclear, so it would be best to start 
by clarifying it. There seems little way for Putnam to clarify it except 
by telling us what the world, as it truly is, is. That is, he will wind up 
giving us his theory of what the world is. Putnam’s argument then 
dwindles to an assertion (or a proposal) that a linguistic framework 
be deemed correct only if its rules include Putnam’s theory of the 
world. This is hardly an argument at all; it is just the outright rejec-
tion of Carnap’s pluralism.24
Assuming for the moment that Putnam was correct in rejecting Carnap’s 
verificationism, then his rejection of the principle of tolerance and his 
commensurate suspicions of Carnap’s rejection of “external” questions 
concerning the meaning of terms outside of any linguistic framework may 
seem well motivated and natural. But, as I take Goldfarb to be bringing 
out, if we broaden our perspective from the narrow issue of verification-
ism per se to a much more ecumenical and non-theoretical understanding 
of linguistic practice, so that our view of meaning is informed by the close 
conceptual relation (even if not identification) between meaning and use, 
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then the sort of dogmatic tone that Goldfarb is bringing out in Putnam’s 
position vis-à-vis Carnap becomes far less attractive as a general view.
With Goldfarb’s point against Putnam in mind, we can return to Dia-
mond’s criticisms of Winch by posing an issue in the following way: While 
it is unclear how Winch (or Carnap) can insist that no language can have 
the grammatical resources for engaging questions about ‘reality” (or “the 
world as it truly is”) in a manner not already given internally by the 
grammar of the language itself, it seems equally unclear to me whether 
such questions are always appropriate, and so whether there is any non-
dogmatic basis for insisting that every language must have such resources 
for asking them. Previously, we saw Diamond ask, “why should there 
have to be an ‘established universe of discourse’? Why can one not be 
making, giving articulation to, a kind of thought about reality in thinking 
about the conflict?” I am asking a different, perhaps symmetrical, ques-
tion: what if one of those conflicting systems has no such resources for 
envisaging a conflict about reality outside its already established universe 
of discourse? In other words, what if there were cases where the logical 
space or spaces for resolving the conflict only came from one of the two 
conflicting systems (for example, ours)? Is that something we can rule 
out a priori? I think the idea that every discourse must be open to the 
sort of conflict under discussion here is just as murky as Winch’s insist-
ence that no discourse can be. Is it legitimate, that is, simply to rule out 
the possibility of a grammar in which “reality” (and perhaps other terms 
like “truth”) only has meaning within the domain of the grammar itself? 
What if, in other words, there were “natural born Carnapians”, or bet-
ter still, “natural born Winchians”? Judging by their indifferent reaction 
as described by Evans-Pritchard when he pointed out a contradiction in 




There are three points relating to the last section that I want to address 
before moving on. First, I have not made any specific demand that the 
reader imagine a group of language users who cannot extend their sense 
of reality based on the development of their own conceptual resources 
or through their encounters with other forms of life. My point has not 
been that any language, as a matter of logic, cannot so develop, but that 
it is dubious business to insist, as a matter of logic, that each one must 
be able to develop this way. How the anthropological and linguistic facts 
play out is of course another matter. In making this point, moreover, I am 
merely drawing some implications from what Diamond herself writes. 
As we have seen, she asks why there should have to be an ‘established 
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universe of discourse’ for the deployment of a concept like reality. This 
question seems to leave completely in place the coherence of the idea 
that while there might be such a practice, contra Winch and others, there 
doesn’t have to be. I have not felt particularly obligated so far to give a 
background story that describes what this might be like, precisely because 
my point here relies on an argument based on symmetry: if it is dogmatic 
to insist with Winch, that talk of reality always must be confined to an 
established domain of discourse, then it is equally dogmatic to insist that 
it never can be thus confined. If Diamond had wanted to argue that she 
found it impossible to imagine such a language, she could have written 
something very different from what she actually wrote.
B
Second, a critic might nevertheless object that the real point Diamond 
could or should have made is that the idea of grammar that my symmetry 
argument relies on, a grammar in which unlike our grammar there simply 
is no talk of reality and related concepts without an established universe 
of discourse, is absent more concrete detail or special explanation, not 
something we can really imagine. This objection might draw inspira-
tion from a point made long ago by Stanley Cavell that projectability of 
words into new contexts is something internal to language, because the 
criteria by which we apply our concepts just have, qua criteria, this kind 
of openness to them. Another way to put this point would be to note with 
Cavell that criteria aren’t just self-applying in some general mechanical 
sense. There must be a specific context for the employment of a concept, 
and this requires a language user in the context who sees to it, and so 
must take responsibility, that the criteria connected to certain words are 
applied in that given context. Cavell’s wonderful example of the natural 
extension of the word “feed” from “feed the kitty” to “feed the parking 
meter” illustrates the point well.25 In short, someone could argue against 
my story thus far that the projectability of grammatical criteria is essen-
tial to language, and that my symmetry argument requires that we imag-
ine language users for whom precisely such projectability is lacking.26
In responding to this Cavellian criticism from ordinary language, 
I want first to note that if projectability of criteria is internal to a lan-
guage, then insisting that the concepts of any language must have this 
feature makes as much sense as insisting that a triangle have three sides. 
If we are talking about a language at all, then the criteria governing the 
use of its concepts are projectable. More to the point, there is something 
potentially misleading in the critic’s use here of Cavell’s original exam-
ple. The example of feeding the meter nicely shows what it means to say 
that criteria are not closed by showing how they can be projected into a 
novel context. But of course it is also true, for otherwise much of Cavell’s 
diagnosis of external world skepticism in the Claim of Reason falls away, 
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that everyday application of criteria governing everyday concepts also 
requires relevant projection; even in the most mundane of circumstances 
they are not self-applying.27 Even pointing at my cat and telling my son 
to “feed the kitty” requires such projection of criteria and uptake on both 
of our parts. Cavell’s diagnosis of skepticism relies on the idea that the 
skeptic’s claim to know the existence of a generic object lacks any specific 
context to make it coherent. There is no suggestion by him that providing 
such a context would require Descartes to describe unusual contextual 
features of his sitting in front of the fire. He just has to say something 
that would make it relevant for him to remark that he is holding a piece 
of wax. In effect, language users are condemned to projecting criteria in 
context all the time; some examples like “feeding the meter” just make 
this activity more apparent.
This makes it evident that the objection of my imagined critic is not 
really about projectability per se. It is about the actual projection of par-
ticular concepts by actual language users into particular kinds of new 
contexts. (One could equally characterize the dispute as being about cer-
tain facts being taken to stand in as representatives, schemata if you will, 
of the legitimate projection of certain concepts into these new contexts.) 
At any rate, projectability in a language per se and the actual projection 
of particular concepts into new situations are not the same. In the cases 
we are looking at here, not only will the ordinary language philosopher’s 
appeal to the question “what do we say when?” not be of much use, 
what “we” say and “when” is just what is at issue, in particular in light 
of there not being an obvious “we”. If therefore, there is no disagreement 
about the pertinence of the very notion of projectability for grammar, 
but only about its extent, we seem to have a dispute about the grammar 
of “grammar”. As we will see, symmetry considerations will come into 
play here as well.28
As we have seen, there may be certain “new” contexts such as the 
logical spaces between two already existing grammars of which Dia-
mond speaks, where one side finds itself ready to explore the projection 
or extension of its concepts pertaining to the nature of reality, but where 
members from the other group of language users do not accommodate 
such an investigation. Of course, it’s obvious that we ourselves don’t cot-
ton on to just any projection of concepts; no one is claiming that criteria 
can be extended willy-nilly. How then should we describe cases where 
our own concepts are not extended? On some occasions, an attempt at 
a new use may be almost universally perceived as so wrongheaded that 
it just falls silently flat. Other times, perhaps in the case of “feeding the 
meter”, the new use immediately catches on. Still, in other cases, we 
end up in conflicts, where one side sees the point or correctness of the 
new use, while another side does not. (Such cases seem to be everywhere 
at the moment.) I  think there is a strong temptation to describe such 
cases, especially but not only those concerning morals and politics, as 
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characterizable as cases in which the side for whom the new use does not 
seem natural is “withholding” its assent, where “withholding” is taken 
to refer to some sort of semi-conscious repression of something that, were 
it not for some inculcated shame, resentment, or bigotry, the extension 
might be gladly granted. Yet if, as Cavell made so forcefully clear many 
years ago, “voluntary” and “involuntary” present us with a misleading 
and inadequate set of options for thinking about action, so perhaps do 
“assenting” understood as projecting and “withholding” understood as 
“repressing” for thinking about extending grammar.29
A number of years ago Sabina Lovibond coined the term “transcen-
dental parochialism” to denote an ideal state of affairs where a soci-
ety’s critical resources for reform were fully extended, at their limits so 
to speak, yet where the language or discourse so arrived at would still 
be a recognizably human one. She contrasted this with what she called 
“empirical parochialism”, which she characterized in effect as the paro-
chialism of repressive conservatism.30 One might wish that this pair of 
concepts could be of some help in the context of our current discus-
sion about the nature of a possible extension of each of our two imag-
ined group’s grammars into uncharted logical space. The idea could be 
that the side willing to explore the extension of its grammar into new 
logical spaces would be overcoming empirical parochialism and striv-
ing towards a more enlightened transcendental parochialism, while the 
other side would be seen as failing in such a task. Unless, however, one 
wants to take on what I regard as some fairly substantial metaphysical 
baggage about the nature of rationality, I don’t think this terminology 
gets us any further. If we are not just dealing here with a self-righteous 
and logically unmotivated call for permanent linguistic revolution, where 
the aim seems to be change for the sake of change, we might wonder 
how one ever knows whether one is being transcendentally parochial or 
merely empirically parochial. How, relatedly, does one determine that 
the other side is being empirically parochial? More to the present point, 
where comes the certainty in the kind of conflict we are envisaging, that 
either group is guilty of empirical parochialism, should the conflict about 
whether to explore the new logical space go unresolved? Maybe there 
could be any number of concrete conceptual logjams, stable configura-
tions of unresolved conflicts consistent with neither side’s being guilty of 
“empirical parochialism”.
Is it always reasonable to suspect bigotry or ignorance if a group of 
speakers simply does not respond to a particular “invitation” to extend 
or change its practices? Does this always call for some special explana-
tion or justification in terms of something like repression that accounts 
for their withholding an extension of their concepts? There is a difference 
between, on the one hand, making the merely abstract grammatical point 
that any given parochial view could, at least in theory, be extended at a 
particular point, and on the other hand, saying that people must always 
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push the limit at that point on pain of being an irrational reactionar-
ies. Prima facie, someone or some peoples not projecting some of their 
concepts into new logical spaces no more needs a special explanation 
than does our willingness (or is it now an insistence?) on doing so. If this 
is true, then it may not always be clear whether lack of assent must be 
regarded as a failure or refusal to project one’s concepts into new logical 
spaces, so much as being regarded as something that just never seemed 
apt to some people. Naturally, language users may sometimes actively 
resist changes. And in such cases, there may well be some background 
story which explains what happens: some ethical or social sensitivity 
or hope or worry. But we don’t have to look at everything through the 
lenses of a Weltanschauung that seduces us into regarding every such case 
as a result of what some imagined clan of old, conservative elders forbids. 
Allowing the projection of criteria implicates us no less than preventing 
such projection implicates others. Both are equally signs of a value com-
mitment. We may call the new space a result of an appropriate extension 
of the same grammar. They may not even have so much of an idea of this 
space. To insist on attributing bad faith to those who resist exploring new 
logical spaces, not to mention those to whom doing so doesn’t show up 
as a live option, is just political metaphysics.
Grammar is embedded in practice, and without a practice, talking 
about what grammar per se calls for or doesn’t call for is useless. Oth-
ers may not have our same practice(s) of extending particular concepts 
beyond certain uses. If someone were to ask whether, as a matter of logic, 
a group of language users must have this or that practice, how might 
one answer? It is very unclear that we have anything like a pre-given 
notion of what constellation of practices and concepts are necessary for 
a grammar to be “complete”. Wittgenstein writes at On Certainty §611 
and §612,
Where two principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled with 
one another, then each man declares the other a fool and heretic.
I said I would ‘combat’ the other man, – but wouldn’t I give him 
reasons? Certainly; but how far do they go? At the end of reasons 
comes persuasion. (Think what happens when missionaries convert 
natives.)31
These passages can be, and most likely have been, read as expressing a 
kind of relativist cum incommensurability thesis. As I made clear earlier 
in her discussion of Winch, I agree with Diamond that there are deep 
confusions with this type of view. Nor do I  see any convincing reason 
for attributing such a view to Wittgenstein, based on these or any other 
passages. But more to the present point, these passages do not suggest 
that there is any kind of guarantee in the nature of things such that all 
empirical parochial views, or, even all transcendental parochial views, are 
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harmonizable, either into one big overarching transcendental parochial 
view or even into some more modest, transitional harmony. If anything, 
Wittgenstein’s mention of “persuasion” and his subsequent reference 
to what missionaries do does not strike me as though he was particu-
larly sanguine about the idea that, whatever eventual harmony might 
arise between conflicting grammars or colliding forms of life, it must 
be necessarily describable as a transcendental parochial view arrived at 
through the mutual exploration and articulation of conceptual resources. 
The symmetry idea comes in here again with the following considera-
tion: someone can indeed ask “why can’t there be a merging of empirical 
parochial views into a larger empirical parochial view and finally into 
something like Lovibond’s idea of a transcendental parochial view?” The 
answer is that there is nothing like a knock-down philosophical argu-
ment showing why this question is out of bounds. But someone may ask 
a different, symmetrical question: “Why must there be a harmonization 
of empirical parochial views, tending to a harmonized transcendental 
parochial view?” The answer here too is that there is nothing like a con-
clusive philosophical argument ruling this out as somehow illegitimate. 
In effect, we are back to my symmetry-based question about Diamond’s 
question about the nature of grammar and the contours of logical spaces 
between conflicting grammars. We seem to be at an impasse.
C
Third and finally, before I turn to some of the consequences of Diamond’s 
view, it is worth emphasizing that I don’t believe that her idea has to be 
read as entailing that grammars containing the resources for a logical 
space of conflict outside of themselves also contain the actual correctness 
of some particular view or set of views held in spe by those who speak 
a language with such a resourceful grammar. Rather, the grammars with 
such resources may be understood to contain the bare concept that some 
as yet unspecified view is correct. This is the idea of the sheer possibility 
of getting things right in a way not yet fully intelligible from within any 
of the discourses of the parties to a conflict. To arrive at some contentful 
view of what is in fact right, much more in the way of various sorts of 
practical and scientific resources from one (or both) of the conflicting dis-
courses will have to be brought into the picture. So, in an important sense, 
I believe this concept of reality as being something to be worked out is 
basically formal and empty of content (or at least empty of any clear 
content). Individual claimants in a dispute might gain some solace from 
the logical possibility that their currently held view may resemble what 
turns out to be the right one at a later stage. In many cases, especially 
where something like their views have prevailed in a given conflict, it may 
even be reasonable for them to describe those views and their attendant 
concepts as always having been the right ones all along and thus to share 
a kind of organic lineage with prior established truths. But by itself the 
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grammatical feature whose possibility Diamond and Putnam are pointing 
to, while I believe intelligible, won’t support anything else in the way of 
specific concrete or empirical claims. The grammatical possibility may 
be important for maintaining a certain self-critical attitude towards epis-
temic practices, making clear that we can always do better, but the gram-
mar doesn’t really add any empirical content to the view we arrive at in 
any given case. Once it is evident that the realism we are concerned with 
here amounts to a kind of regulative idea, in effect a formal feature of our 
grammar and perhaps the grammar of others, the insistence that “some-
where out there, there must be a way things really are” sounds more 
like the making manifest one’s commitment to a historico-grammatical 
artifact, however important this may be legally, ethically, or scientifically.
I thus take Diamond to have argued convincingly that such a gram-
matical artifact shows how criticism from “outside” can be entirely 
in logical order. But the considerations I  have brought out in the last 
two paragraphs do, I believe, mean that such criticism may sometimes 
have a quite particular, even peculiar shape and will depend on some 
rather precarious facts. In what follows, I  want to discuss two issues 
in particular that may arise when two sorts of grammars, one with the 
more “Putnamian” view of the “world as it truly is”, conflicts with the 
more “Winchian” or “Carnapian” view where that phrase only has a 
use within a framework.32 The first issue is mainly pragmatic, while the 
second involves some deep philosophical questions concerning the nature 
of intercultural conflict.
VI
In this section, I want to look briefly at two important consequences of 
Diamond’s arguments. The first is pragmatic, the second is ethical and 
historical. Diamond is correct to oppose the claim that the nature of real-
ity can in all cases only be debated from within a given system of thought. 
Nevertheless, her argument leaves me uneasy in a certain pragmatic sense. 
I can sum up my sense of what I find unsatisfying by merely pointing out 
that her argument about what our grammar allows us to do in the way 
of criticism licenses a conflation of the observer and participant points of 
view in certain debates, making “us” as it were both judge and party to 
the same dispute. For many people, these are roles that other important 
practices that we hold strongly incline us to keep separate. Consider, in 
this light, the following scheme for visualizing the two situations:
Case 1       Judge/Jury
                   
                       Party A     vs.     Party B
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Case 1 is supposed to represent something like a normal trial or formal 
dispute in our culture, where judge/jury, Party A, and Party B are three 
different individuals or groups belonging to that culture. Case 2 is sup-
posed to represent the sort of cross-cultural or trans-historical judgements 
with which Diamond and Winch are concerned. While my diagrams may 
strike one as vastly oversimplified in relation to our real world experience 
of conflict, I don’t believe that their formal structure fatally misrepresents 
how conflict can look in other contexts, especially ones concerning cer-
tain intercultural conflicts. In fact, given the relevance for cultural and 
social anthropology of the very recent colonial past, where colonial rul-
ers routinely collapsed the observer and participant standpoints, Case 2 
seems especially pertinent to the issues under discussion here.
I agree with Diamond that there is not some logical requirement that 
Party A in Case 2 fails to fulfill (though there could be an institutional 
one). And so, I  think she is correct that we can’t just exclude the pos-
sibility of practices for making precisely these kinds of judgements. So, 
Party A’s judgements in Case 2 can be completely in order, which is to 
say, in Case 2, Party A can make judgements überhaupt about Party B’s 
view. But it is not surprising either, if people feel there is something fishy 
or unsatisfying with Case 2, precisely because there is something deeply 
embedded in our practices, even if not our logico-grammatical practices, 
that suggests the two roles that Case 2 collapses ought rather to be kept 
separate as an ideal of objectivity. I feel sure Diamond is aware of this, 
but I believe nevertheless that it is worth underlining that while Case 2 
is coherent, it also is different from Case 1, and its logical coherence 
does not erase that difference. Consequently, regardless of how Party 
A comports himself or herself in relation to Party B, there is an implicit 
paternalism in Case 2 that is somehow less than satisfying, even though 
not incoherent.
The second issue concerns what I  believe to be a more philosophi-
cally interesting and to some degree neglected point, both in Diamond’s 
discussion and in the literature generally. It seems to follow that if we 
cannot rule out grammars of both types, one grammar that allows for the 
bare notion of “reality” having a use outside of its own already articu-
lated conception, and another type without such a notion, or at least with 
a much more restricted notion, then we are led to the idea that the feature 
of the grammar of Party A that makes criticism from outside intelligible 
is not a given, but rather has a contingent dimension to it. Such a gram-
mar can be regarded as a sort of historical achievement. This fact, in turn, 
would suggest that there is not likely to be any stand-alone argument 
showing that the grammar with the feature that makes criticism from 
Case 2   Party A (Also Judge/Jury)   vs.    Party B
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outside or exploration of new logical spaces intelligible is, or ought to 
be, immune to change. This does not imply of course that once we real-
ize the historical contingency of our grammar’s containing things like the 
“concept of an object as independent of that concept”, we could simply 
shake ourselves loose of this concept through an act of will, even if for 
some reason we found ourselves wishing to do so. To say that a feature of 
our grammar is historical or conventional is not to say that it is arbitrary 
or easily dropped. Things are much more complicated than that. But like 
any other concept or feature of a grammar, this one must be articulated 
and thus supported in practices if it is to remain available to us. And this 
fact about the historical embeddedness of grammar can raise, in turn, the 
normative question as to whether this feature is worthy of that contin-
ued support. That is to say, the very fact of the existence of a feature of 
a grammar can’t by itself be used in any non-circular way to justify our 
continued reliance on that very same feature. In our present context, this 
does not imply, however, that no defense at all can be articulated of the 
value of the idea of reality conceived as independent of any discourse. 
Our practices make this kind of internal argument available to us as well. 
For example, Diamond makes clear that in the case of witchcraft and 
witches, more is at stake than questions of reality and possibility. How 
we think about those questions may have serious ethical consequences, 
which, while not exactly providing our ontology with an “external” jus-
tification, do suggest the difficulties involved with the view that a choice 
of what to take as real is somehow arbitrary. She writes,
When we are confronted by contemporary systems of thought and 
practice involving the identification and punishment of supposed 
witches in Africa, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, we may indeed reject 
these systems as appalling, but we may also take it that they involve 
hideous injustice to vulnerable people who are punished for doing 
occult harm, where the accusations and punishment depend on a 
system of false beliefs about what human agents can do and what can 
constitute good evidence of what they have done. Our thought about 
our own and other people’s systems of thought and practice, and 
our rejections of such systems, are not isolated from judgements of 
injustice; and our judgements of what is just and what is unjust may 
be connected with judgements about whether people are capable of 
having done what they are accused of doing and with judgements 
about the methods of supposedly establishing that they have done 
what they are accused of doing.33
Anyone appalled at the injustice involved in these practices of punishing 
innocent individuals, who nevertheless claimed that these powerful con-
siderations had no bearing on what to think about reality, would likely 
be engaged in a form of self-deception. The question is whether these 
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considerations having to do with reality, truth, and justice settle the mat-
ter. Is there anything profound remaining for philosophy to say?34
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3  Skepticism and the Human 
Condition
Kevin M. Cahill
“The data of ethnology prove that not only our knowledge but also our 
emotions are the result of the form of our social life and of the history of 
the people to whom we belong.”1
I
I take it that one of the most significant characteristics of the concep-
tual and ideological revolutions that ushered in the modern period in 
the West is the way the new theological, scientific, and economic regimes 
portrayed themselves as representing a kind of genuine natural order 
over what they saw as the social and theological institutions of the Mid-
dle Ages (which, I don’t doubt, understood themselves as embodying a 
natural order too).2 This exemplifies a general moral: during periods of 
great change, it will often be useful for furthering one’s agenda to frame 
the debate so that it will seem as though one’s new conceptions of sci-
ence, commerce, religion, or the subject of epistemology, are not just new 
and better, but were already latent in the older and dominant regimes, 
and that this fact would have been clearly seen by earlier generations if 
only they had managed to cast off the artificial social barriers, traditions, 
and superstitions of precisely those older systems. That is to say, the new 
order will usually find it advantageous to present itself as having made 
a set of discoveries about certain fundamental factors, the nature, say, 
of human beings, and not as having reorganized our interpretations of 
those factors. With regard to Western modernity’s more or less uncritical 
acceptance of its own accepted individualistic notions of political, moral, 
and epistemological agency, both in its relation both to medieval Europe 
and to other cultures, Charles Taylor refers to such an interpretation as a 
“subtraction story”.3 At the broadest level, this essay addresses questions 
connected to conceptual and/or cultural difference and change, specifi-
cally the intersection of certain questions that concern modernity, human 
nature, and the concept of the self.4 More specifically, I want to look at 
a nest of connected questions in philosophical anthropology or perhaps 
better yet, the anthropology of the self in the Western epistemological 
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tradition after Descartes as that tradition is represented in the work of 
Stanley Cavell.
In his insightful treatment of skepticism about the external world, 
Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Skepticism, 
Michael Williams was principally concerned to establish the credentials 
of a contextualist approach to epistemology.5 According to the position 
which Williams defends there, external world skepticism arises out of 
the traditional epistemologist’s demand for a context invariant account 
of the conditions of knowledge in general.6 Williams’ term for the guid-
ing belief that such an account is available is “epistemological realism”. 
He describes this view as the assumption there is a kind of thing called 
“knowledge of the external world”, which the epistemologist tends to 
assimilate to natural kinds talk among realists in metaphysics and the 
philosophy of science.
Williams believes that once we have accepted the demand for an 
entirely general, context invariant account of knowledge, our canvassing 
of the various sources of knowledge will almost invariably land us with 
something close to a sense-data theory, what Williams terms the “pri-
ority of experiential knowledge”. Williams holds further that the thesis 
of the priority of experiential knowledge is essential to epistemological 
realism qua foundationalism.7 Yet the epistemologist’s acquiescing in the 
demand for absolute generality not only leads to the priority of experi-
ential knowledge, it has immediate and familiar skeptical consequences 
since, while perhaps context invariant (assuming for the moment we 
allow such talk to go unchallenged), sense data are notoriously unsuit-
able for establishing any secure epistemological foothold in the world 
outside of the mind.
Williams describes his approach as providing a “theoretical diagnosis” 
of external world skepticism, which aims to show that epistemological 
realism is a false doctrine, or at least a poorly supported one, based on 
the dubious assumption that knowledge exhibits the kind of essential 
structural unity supposedly characteristic of natural kind concepts.8 Wil-
liams argues in turn for the truth of his own contextualist epistemol-
ogy, which rejects the foundationalist idea that the supposedly context 
invariant deliverances of the senses are the only source of knowledge. In 
rejecting epistemological realism as a dubious doctrine, Williams believes 
he can also show that there are good reasons for regarding his own con-
textualist account as convincing, and so for regarding skepticism as false.
Although most of his energy is devoted to the diagnosis and critique of 
epistemological realism, Williams also has much to say about so-called 
“therapeutic diagnoses” of skepticism. As Williams understands it, a 
therapeutic diagnosis of skepticism seeks to locate and display something 
that is fundamentally amiss with the meaning of one or more of the skep-
tic’s premises, so that the skeptic’s conclusions are not so much shown 
to be false, as they are revealed to be confused or incoherent.9 Although 
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in some places Williams appears sympathetic to the main representa-
tives of this approach, whom he uncontroversially takes to be Austin, 
Wittgenstein, and Cavell, he finds their assessments often based on an 
under appreciation or misunderstanding of the strength of the skeptic’s 
arguments.10 Yet, setting aside Williams’ treatment of Austin and Witt-
genstein, there is something very misleading in Williams’ presentation 
of Cavell’s thought about the nature of external world skepticism. In 
particular, Williams’ claim that Cavell regards himself as having provided 
a therapeutic diagnosis that yields a definitive refutation of skepticism 
flies directly in the face of Cavell’s own stated views that not only is 
skepticism irrefutable, but that trying to refute it is itself an expression 
of skepticism.11 How Williams might have missed this feature of Cavell’s 
thought, or as is perhaps more likely, why he chose to disregard it, is 
difficult to say. This point may become clearer once Cavell’s account has 
been laid out.
Cavell has claimed that attempts to give a philosophical refutation of 
skepticism are misguided because they tend to obscure or suppress what 
he terms the “truth of skepticism”.12 By this, Cavell does not mean to sug-
gest that it is the coherence of the philosophical thesis of skepticism itself 
that dooms such attempts to failure, but rather something such attempts 
at refutation cover up, namely the fact that “Our relations to the world 
as a whole, or to others in general, is not one of knowing, where knowing 
construes itself as being certain”.13 Cavell does not endorse the philo-
sophical thesis of skepticism. Indeed, he thinks there is something wrong 
with the skeptic’s conclusions. But he thinks that because the skeptic is 
on to something, the philosopher who tries to refute skepticism is, in an 
important sense, as misguided as the skeptic himself. He thus suggests 
that we might think of both parties as subject to what Kant calls a “dia-
lectical illusion” in the Antinomies of Pure Reason:
I hope it will not seem perverse that I lump views in such a way, tak-
ing the very raising of the question of knowledge in a certain form, 
or spirit, to constitute skepticism, regardless of whether a philosophy 
takes itself to have answered the question affirmatively or negatively. 
It is a perspective from which skepticism and (what Kant calls) dog-
matism are made in one another’s image, leaving nothing for choice.14
For Cavell, the force of these considerations is that, while we cannot 
fulfil the skeptic’s requirements for knowledge, neither do we fail to fulfil 
them. As he notes, however, this only raises a further question: “Why 
does the skeptic – how can he – take what he has discovered to be some 
extraordinary, and hitherto unnoticed, fact? Or perhaps we could ask: 
Why does he take his discovery to be a thesis?”15
This brief description of Cavell’s attitude towards skepticism may 
sound reminiscent of a well-known remark by Heidegger in Being and 
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Time concerning something Kant says in the preface to the second edition 
of the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant had complained there that it was 
a “scandal of philosophy” that no one had yet succeeded in proving the 
existence of the external world.16 Heidegger’s response to Kant’s com-
plaint was to suggest that the real scandal is “not that this proof has yet 
to be given, but that such proofs are expected and attempted again and 
again”.17 Yet while some of Heidegger´s thoughts on skepticism dove-
tail with Cavell’s analysis, in particular around the relevance of human 
finitude, there is an important sense in which Cavell and Heidegger dif-
fer crucially on the underlying significance of the “truth of scepticism”. 
I shall return to this point presently.
Philosophy is of course not the only venue where Cavell has examined 
the issue of skepticism. He has also written eloquently on the importance 
of this question for areas such as literature and film. But the reason it is 
essential to consult Cavell’s prodigious writings in areas often regarded 
as peripheral to philosophy if one wants to understand his thought about 
skepticism is not just that he so often explicitly raises the topic in his 
interpretations of art. That would risk mistaking his discussions of the 
arts as mere window dressing for his more “strictly philosophical” work, 
such as that devoted to Wittgenstein. There are no “strictly philosophi-
cal” works in Cavell’s corpus; or better, all of his works are strictly philo-
sophical because while not wishing to conflate philosophy and art, Cavell 
rejects the intellectual priority of one over the other. He writes, for exam-
ple, that “I  have more than once said or implied that the problem of 
the other was no less a literary than a philosophical problem”.18 And so 
accordingly, we find the following in the introduction to his collection of 
essays on Shakespeare:
My intuition is that the advent of skepticism as manifested in 
Descartes’ Meditations is already in full existence in Shakespeare, 
from the time of the great tragedies in the first years of the seven-
teenth century, in the generation preceding that of Descartes.19
Cavell treats film with equal philosophical seriousness, as we can see 
when he claims that Clark Gable’s difficulties in understanding Claudette 
Colbert in the 1934 comedy It Happened One Night “is a framing of the 
problem of other minds”.20
Indeed, one of the most prominent themes running through all of 
Cavell’s work is the idea that an engagement with skepticism forms an 
essential part of the human condition. In particular in Cavell’s view, 
skepticism is an expression of our inability to be at peace with the inher-
ent contingency involved in our application to the world and to each 
other of the criteria that inform the everyday intelligibility of language. 
We find this theme articulated, for example, in “Declining Decline”, an 
essay in which Cavell discusses the possibility of reading Wittgenstein as 
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a philosopher of culture. Cavell writes there, “the griefs to which lan-
guage repeatedly comes in the Investigations should be seen as normal 
to it, as natural to human natural language as skepticism is”.21 Not only 
does Cavell believe that the possibility of skepticism forms a natural part 
of our life with language, he repeatedly claims that he sees the impulse 
to eradicate skeptical doubt (prevalent within, but not limited to, phi-
losophy) as also somehow basic to our humanity. In the same essay he 
describes this impulse as “the desire for thought, running out of control. 
That has become an inescapable fate for us, apparently accompanying the 
fate of having human language.”22 This point is put even more forcefully 
a few pages later: “I mean to say that it is human, it is the human drive 
to transcend itself, make itself inhuman, which should not end until, as 
in Nietzsche, the human is over”.23 Such remarks as these lend further 
weight to Cavell’s thought that his diagnosis of the origins of skepticism 
is close in spirit to Kant. In particular they seem in harmony with Kant’s 
assertion in the preface of the Critique of Pure Reason that
Human reason has this peculiar fate that in one species of its knowl-
edge it is burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the very 
nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as tran-
scending all its powers, it is also not able to answer.24
Nevertheless, while for thinkers like Kant, Barry Stroud, and Thomas 
Nagel, the problems of metaphysics are intuitive intellectual problems, 
for Cavell, the sources of skepticism lie not only or even primarily in our 
intellect but first and foremost in our affective nature.
At any rate, we can begin to see where Cavell’s interpretation of skep-
ticism diverges substantially from Heidegger. For although Heidegger 
does not offer a theoretical response to skepticism, it would nevertheless 
make little sense for him to term a “scandal” what we have seen Cavell 
characterize as our “inescapable fate” (unless Heidegger thought there 
was something inherently scandalous about being human, something 
Cavell might well have thought, but I doubt Heidegger would ever put 
things this way). Cavell is right in thinking that there is something pro-
foundly dubious about the attempt to give a philosophical refutation of 
skepticism. I also have much sympathy for the importance he attaches to 
what he terms “the truth of skepticism”. Nevertheless, I will show how 
his failure to consider significant alternatives undermine his claim that 
some kind of engagement with skepticism is itself part of what it is to be 
human.
Can we think of the “truth of skepticism” as merely one way of pre-
senting what I take to be the facts to which it refers, that is, certain facts 
of human finitude? To put it another way: must an engagement with 
these facts be mediated by epistemological concerns to the degree Cavell 
assumes is compulsory? Or are there other ways of being in touch with 
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the concrete reality of this truth, ways which are not mediated by the 
concerns with knowledge that we find in the exclusively modern works 
of philosophy, literature, and film that Cavell discusses? I believe there 
are and I will argue that Cavell’s conception of the human arises from the 
inadequate consideration he gives to the possibility that humans within 
different historical cultures may have sufficiently different conceptions 
of the self than the one he takes for granted. Attention to the possibility 
of such differences makes it unrealistic to assume that the problems that 
Cavell locates in the sphere of the human must inevitably arise (or inevi-
tably be repressed, which is in effect the same). To put this another way 
by borrowing a phrase from William James, Cavell does not account for 
the very real possibility that there can be people for whom skepticism is 
not a “live option”.
This essay will involve an investigation of precisely this last aspect of 
Cavell’s understanding of skepticism. In particular, as opposed to Wil-
liams’ theoretical diagnosis and Cavell’s version of a therapeutic diag-
nosis, I will argue for a historical or cultural-anthropological diagnosis 
of skepticism. My approach is rooted in the suspicion that largely moti-
vating much of what Cavell says about skepticism, not so much about 
its irrefutability, but about its chronic recurrence, is a picture of what 
it means to be a human being, specifically what a human self is. And 
I further suspect that it is a picture that fundamentally fails to appreciate 
the depth or logical significance of historical practices for our intelligibly 
talking about the self in the ways Cavell wants to do.
Two reasons why I believe Cavell’s work is worthy of serious attention 
is my belief that he has provided us with the “best case” for thinking 
that skepticism is a natural part of human life and because this claim 
is intimately connected to his taking for granted a more or less modern 
conception of the self.25 Overturning these ideas, then, is likely to have 
important and interesting consequences. I will show that at the root of 
Cavell’s portrait of the human lies an ahistorical dogmatic ontology of 
the self that suffers from its assumption that certain features characteris-
tic of the modern individual are universal. Therefore, whereas Cavell has 
primarily intended to provide a kind of ethology of the human animal, 
he has instead succeeded in providing an ethnography: a compelling eth-
nography, but an ethnography nonetheless.
In Part II, I clarify how I intend to deal with three features of Cavell’s 
thought on skepticism that might be thought to present obstacles for my 
way of laying out and criticizing his work. These are first, the asymmetry 
of Cavell’s understanding between external world (or material object) 
skepticism and other-minds skepticism, second, the occasional explora-
tion of the relationship between skepticism and sex or gender in Cavell’s 
writing, and third, the relationship between history, especially the his-
tory of modernity, and skepticism as Cavell understands it.26 In Part III, 
I give a brief synopsis of Cavell’s analysis of external world skepticism, 
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with emphasis on why Cavell thinks the skeptic’s procedures lead to a 
kind of incoherence. In Part IV, I discuss why Cavell nevertheless insists 
that the argument laid out in Part III does not constitute a refutation 
of skepticism, and, more importantly, why he believes that for human 
language users skepticism is in a certain sense natural and unavoidable. 
The key idea in this section is that a particular interpretation of the self 
is utterly central to Cavell’s claim that a relation to skepticism is inevi-
table for creatures with language and thought. In Part V, I provide an 
overview of work by Charles Taylor where he presents a portrait or the 
modern Western self that is substantially more historical and stands in 
fairly stark contrast to what I regard as Cavell’s mainly ahistorical pic-
ture. In Part VI, I  turn to some anthropological literature that further 
challenges the picture of selfhood that lies at the heart of Cavell’s under-
standing of skepticism. In Part VII, I draw out some of the philosophical 
consequences of my analysis. I argue that Cavell’s claim that skepticism 
is an inevitable expression of the human condition is at best underdeter-
mined; seen less charitably, it is hard even to make sense of the claim. 
In Part VIII, I address questions connected to my use of historical and 
ethnographic material in my analysis of skepticism. In Part IX, I show 
that there is no reason to believe that the self as Cavell understands it is 
somehow necessary to linguistic agency. Part X addresses some remain-
ing issues concerning modernity and the modern self. I argue that even 
when taking into account what signs there are of hermeneutic, historical 
understanding in Cavell’s account, these are not enough to avoid the con-
clusion that a kind of essentializing (even to the point of fetishizing) of 
the modern conception of the self pervades his thought and that this seri-
ously undermines his claim about the universality of the human relation 
to skepticism. Finally, In Part XI, I briefly address a few of the practical, 
ethical, and political dimensions of the contingency of skepticism in light 
of the contingency of the correlative modern notion of selfhood.
II
In this Part, I deal with issues that some might feel pose important chal-
lenges for my own presentation and analysis. These issues concern my 
way of handling three features of Cavell’s thought about skepticism: 
the asymmetry between his treatment of external world (or “material 
object”) skepticism and other-minds skepticism, the relation between 
skepticism and gender, and lastly the question of the role that history 
plays in his account of skepticism. My reason for dealing with these 
issues in a preliminary way here, rather than in a systematic way later, is 
that the second option would, I think, unnecessarily complicate my story. 
It would draw me off in all sorts of directions without in the end adding 
anything substantial to my discussion. Someone might think that if these 
issues are worth mentioning at all, then they are surely worth handling 
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in the body of this essay. I disagree and my reasons for disagreeing will 
hopefully emerge and be convincing by the end of this essay. Yet I feel 
I should say something about these issues, if only to ward off possible 
unwarranted attacks to the effect that I have ignored or distorted crucial 
aspects of Cavell’s thought altogether. Whether or not this is actually the 
case can only be evaluated for each issue individually, and then only after 
my narrative is completed.
A
In Part III, I will sketch the salient features of Cavell’s understanding of 
skepticism including the part of his view that I go on to examine in the 
remaining sections of this essay, namely, the anthropology of the self that 
I believe runs through his authorship. Yet my sketch of Cavell’s diagnosis 
of the skeptic’s procedures in philosophy, and my conjoining it to my 
own description of his portrait of the human in Part IV that relies on 
this sketch, might seem to be incongruous in one troubling respect. For 
while the sketch of Cavell’s account of philosophical skepticism draws 
mainly from Part II of The Claim of Reason, which deals primarily with 
external world (material object) skepticism, my description draws not 
only from some of Cavell’s works where that variant of skepticism is 
at stake, for example from those works devoted to Romanticism or to 
American Transcendentalism.27 It also draws from his numerous discus-
sions in which other-minds skepticism is in focus, for example from some 
of his works that address themselves to film and to Shakespeare.28 The 
possible problem with my presentation stems from the fact that while 
there is a crucial asymmetry in Cavell’s diagnoses of external world and 
other-minds skepticism respectively, this asymmetry of his analyses plays 
no role in my critique of his anthropology of the self.
The asymmetry itself is rooted in Cavell’s view that external world skep-
ticism and other- minds skepticism have somewhat different logics and eti-
ologies, and thus that their diagnoses call for somewhat different concepts 
and responses. With external world skepticism, Cavell believes that my fail-
ure to have knowledge of a generic object in a best possible case threatens 
to ramify to my knowledge as a whole, thus generating a global skepticism 
about material objects.29 But he also believes that to try to live this kind of 
skepticism would be next to impossible as it would involve renouncing my 
ability to lead a normal human life. Fortunately, as with Hume’s famous 
description of the change that came over him upon leaving his study for the 
billiard parlor, this version of skepticism dissipates when we return to the 
world of our practical engagement with things. Cavell says,
To say that I cannot “live” material object skepticism is to say that 
there is an alternative to its conclusion that I am bound, as a normal 
human being, to take. Accordingly, to say I (can) live skepticism with 
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respect to others is to say that there is no such alternative, or no such 
conclusion.30
This is what Cavell means, that with material object skepticism, I have 
to (and usually can) “forget my skepticism”, that is, I can forget the les-
son of my failed best case of knowledge of a generic object and become 
reabsorbed with objects in the everyday world.31
But Cavell also thinks that the role of the key terms in which he frames 
external world skepticism, in particular the idea of a best case of knowl-
edge of a generic object, become more obscure when it comes to other-
minds skepticism. In particular, with other-minds skepticism it is far less 
clear that I need or can have a best case for knowing a generic object. (I 
took you to be content with me when in fact you were angry and only 
feigning contentment.) The nature of the “objects” we want to know, so 
to speak, are the individual “mind-states” (love, fidelity, hatred, envy) of 
individual humans. Because there are no relevantly generic minds, failure 
in the one case need not ramify.32 We read in a late essay,
In the case of other minds I find that instances of the other do not 
generalize; or rather, where objects are singled out on the model of 
the Cartesian format of supplying a basis for a claim to know and 
grounds for doubting the basis, the format does not express my inter-
est. At the place with material objects where I object to your claim 
to know by saying, for example, that “you don’t see the back half 
of the object,” I say in the case of other minds that you don’t know 
what’s going on in the other, who might, say, be feigning what you 
say she feels, or feeling something quite different. The difference is 
that the case of the material object is argumentative; I am apt to feel 
bullied by it and if I accept it confess a shock or realization. Whereas 
the case of the other is too trivial to mention. Who doesn’t know 
that what I go on in knowing others is their outward behavior – or 
is it their conduct, or the subtler movements of the body, especially 
the face, and, as documentary filmmakers insist upon, the hands? In 
any event, what is inside the other is not transparent to me. This is 
no news, and accordingly it suggests that the problem of the other 
is not discovered the way the problem of the knowledge of objects 
is discovered.33
Furthermore, this feature of our relations to this or that person on this 
or that occasion means that for Cavell, a kind of piecemeal other-minds 
skepticism is not only possible for us, avoiding it calls for effort and 
attention. He writes,
With respect to material objects we have to “forget” the possibility 
of skepticism, e.g. that the best case will fail us. With respect to other 
82 Skepticism and the Human Condition
minds we might say that we have to “remember” the possibility of 
skepticism, e.g. that we have not permitted ourselves a best case, that 
we do not know but that we may, at any place, be singled out; hence 
that, so far as we know, we now are not.34
I take that his saying that with other-minds skepticism I have to remem-
ber the possibility of skepticism means that acknowledgement of oth-
ers requires a specific form of attention, that I have to be more active 
in applying criteria, that I have perhaps to remember to resist my own 
temptations to overlook or deny others. Cavell sums up the asymmetry 
between the two variants of skepticism this way:
[T]here is no everyday alternative to skepticism concerning other 
minds. There is no competing common sense of the matter; there is 
nothing about other minds that satisfies me for all (practical) pur-
poses; I already know everything skepticism concludes, that my igno-
rance of the existence of others is not the fate of my natural condition 
as a human knower, but my way of inhabiting that condition: that 
I cannot close my eyes to my doubts of others and to their doubts 
and denials of me, that my relations with others are restricted, that 
I cannot trust them blindly.35
Therefore, unlike external world skepticism, which Cavell thinks has 
a provisionally satisfactory everyday alternative, viz. my absorption in 
my everyday life with objects, and which thereby cannot be lived except 
perhaps on pain of something close to insanity, other-minds skepti-
cism has no obvious everyday alternative. Absorbing myself in what 
I suspect to be fakers may be possible, but it would require some seri-
ous mental gymnastics. I can, however, easily and coherently not care 
whether I know or understand you: “I said there is no general, everyday 
alternative to skepticism concerning other minds. Now I will say: I live 
my skepticism”.36
While the livability of other-minds skepticism is precisely why Cavell 
finds drama and film such rich resources for philosophical reflec-
tion, this fact also suggests that his treatment of other-minds skepti-
cism is likely to be less perspicuous than his dealings with material 
object skepticism. And indeed, not only do I find his treatment of the 
former substantially more drawn out and complex (not to mention 
sometimes downright incomprehensible) than his analysis of the lat-
ter, I am frankly unsure whether his prolific dealings with other-minds 
skepticism add up to a coherent account at all. (It is also unclear to 
me whether they are supposed to do so. I am further unsure whether 
his acolytes perceive this as a problem or a virtue.) At any rate, in the 
present case it would be good if I could skirt a comprehensive handling 
of this issue.
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Fortunately, Cavell himself provides the clue to the resolution of this 
issue. He writes in the preface to the Claim of Reason,
One of my first expressions of my contrary intuitions about these 
cases was to say that at the conclusion of the material object case 
I was left sealed inside the circle, whereas at the end of the other minds 
case I was left sealed outside the circle of the other’s experiences.37
Cavell describes here his “contrary intuitions” about the positionality of the 
self in relation to its object. Yet while his expression of a sense of reversed 
relationality is no doubt interesting, given my interests here, it makes sense 
to ignore it. This is because my focus on the anthropology of the self in 
Cavell’s work is concerned with the unquestioned status of the modern 
self’s image of itself as thus “sealable” in the first place. Whether sealed in 
as with material object skepticism or sealed out as with other-minds skepti-
cism, we are surely dealing here with the same “punctual” self.38
B
This section concerns the way in which I  handle a possible different 
asymmetry in Cavell’s understanding of skepticism, an asymmetry that, 
though he clearly came to believe it to be significant, never received a 
worked out articulation in his thought, and thus in my view can’t really 
be said to have anything like Cavell’s imprimatur. This is the asymmetry 
in the way skepticism may be inflected by sex and/or gender.
The category pairs of male/female and feminine/masculine seem to play 
minimal, or at least very subterranean, roles in Cavell’s thinking about skep-
ticism from the time of Must We Mean What We Say, through the Claim of 
Reason, and on into the mid-1980s. In his analysis of remarriage comedies, 
Pursuits of Happiness, Cavell does begin to broach gender-related issues 
such as the way the creation of what he calls the “new woman” made these 
comedies possible, but there is as of yet no suggestion that skepticism itself 
may be more intimately connected to sex and/or gender.39
The possibly deeper connections that Cavell was to explore only a few 
years later in his analysis of Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale might thus 
be read as marking a significant shift in the position that he had by then 
already been advocating for nearly two decades, namely, that a relation 
to skepticism was something inherently human that each of us bore sim-
ply in virtue of being language users. In the introduction to his collec-
tion of essays on Shakespeare, however, Cavell writes that while he had 
harbored a suspicion for some time that the impulse to skepticism was 
somehow deeply connected to sex and gender,
I resisted saying it. . . . Because the premonition or suggestion threat-
ens the insight I had found and refound so guiding for two decades in 
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pondering human finitude, that human language is inherently open 
to the repudiation of itself. The premonition or suggestion or tuition 
of the play of Leontes’ opposition to his wife is that skepticism is a 
male business; and accordingly that the passion for knowledge as 
such, so far as it is motivated in skepticism (hence in a certain strain 
of modern philosophy as such, since Descartes, Hume, and Kant), is 
inflected by gender difference, that the economy of knowing is differ-
ent for men and for women (Is this news?).40
The specific explanation proposed for this suggested asymmetry in the 
play is that
Because The Winter’s Tale represents skepticism as the question 
whether I  can know that my children are mine, the question of a 
father and distinctly not that of a mother, the implication now seems 
to me irresistible that the issue of skepticism in this text . . . is inflected 
by the question of gender.41
Cavell is of course not suggesting that the fall into skepticism is a singu-
larly masculine temptation. In fact, it is precisely the lack of any clear-cut 
correspondence to sex that leads him to introduce gender concepts into 
his account. He thus notes, “I know some women for whom I do not 
doubt that the skeptical issue does arise. One might here speak not of 
men and women but of masculine and feminine aspects of human charac-
ter generally”42 As to what might prompt a corresponding feminine flight 
from finitude, he speculates a bit later,
Then a feminine passion toward the unconditioned, construed as a 
drive toward the given, may be representable not as doubt but instead 
as love. And what masculine philosophy knows as skepticism femi-
nine philosophy knows as fanaticism. Fanaticism is explicitly one of 
Kant’s names for a distorted expectation of reason, one form taken 
by the desire to refuse human limitations, the limitation of finitude; 
hence it is exactly measurable with skepticism.43
Yet, despite what may be a fruitful line of exploration, there are several 
reasons for why I opt not to examine the question of how issues of gender 
may, as Cavell puts it, “inflect” the issue of skepticism.
My first reason for not making Cavell’s speculations about skepticism’s 
relation to sex and gender central to my essay concerns what I hope to 
accomplish by the historicist and cultural anthropological thrust of my 
argument. I will argue that a fundamentally essentialist, because ahistori-
cal, conception of the self permeates Cavell’s work on skepticism. If it 
should turn out that by Cavell’s own lights much of his authorship per-
tains primarily to men instead of to all of humanity, that still leaves him 
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by my lights making questionable claims about an awful lot of human-
ity. Second, even if it is plausible that, as Cavell speculates, the feminine 
existential issue is not a catastrophic doubt pertaining to knowledge but 
a catastrophic fanaticism pertaining to love, it could well be that my 
approach applies just as well to the self of such fanaticism as it does to 
the self of skepticism. Both ideas seem to take for granted a radicalized 
sense of the punctual sealed off/sealed in self that I  find equally non-
compulsory. Finally, however, my third and main reason for not dealing 
with the issues of how sex and gender play out in Cavell’s work is simply 
that this provisional asymmetry in his analysis of skepticism receives so 
much less attention than do his much broader claims about the relation 
of skepticism to humanity as a whole. Indeed, only a few pages after sug-
gesting that feminine fanaticism about love is exactly measurable with 
masculine skepticism about knowledge, we find Cavell back to making 
the more typical sort of universalist claim I find suspect:
What skepticism threatens is precisely irretrievable outsidedness, an 
uncrossable line, a position from which it is obvious (without argu-
ment) that the world is unknowable. What does “threaten” mean? 
Not that skepticism has in its possession a given place in which to 
confine and isolate us, but that it is a power that all who possess lan-
guage possess and may desire: to dissociate oneself, excommunicate 
oneself from the community in whose agreement, mutual attune-
ment, words exist.44
In fact, given my approach, both the degree and nature of Cavell’s 
ambivalence around this issue expressed in this passage from “Macbeth 
Appalled” in the same collection bear out my decision not to make it 
central to my essay.
There is in me . . . a standing possibility that I use the more general, 
or less historical . . . species anxiety to cover a wish to avoid thinking 
through the anxiety of gender. If there is a good reason to run this 
risk it is that the reverse covering is also a risk, since knowing what 
is to be thought about the human is part of knowing what is to be 
thought about gender.45
C
In the case of the asymmetry Cavell finds between other-minds skepticism 
and external world skepticism, and in the case of the question he raises 
of the relation between sex/gender and skepticism, my previous discus-
sions will have to suffice: for the reasons given, I won’t revisit either of 
those issues later in the essay. In the case of the third issue I deal with 
in the present section, that of the history of modernity and its relation 
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to skepticism, the situation is more complicated. After my presentation 
in the next section of Cavell’s diagnosis of skepticism, my critique of his 
views of the self that are internal to that diagnosis will be fundamentally 
historical and anthropological in its orientation. I will argue that Cavell 
in effect relies on an ahistorical essentialist picture of the modern self. 
What makes things complicated for my mode of presentation, however, 
is that it could give the reader the false impression that history is entirely 
absent from Cavell’s writings. Understandably, this could give rise to 
some head shaking on the part of impatient readers, especially those sym-
pathetic to Cavell, because historical context is in fact not absent from 
Cavell’s numerous discussions. On the contrary, references to the histori-
cal context of the advent of both skepticism and the modern notion of the 
self are abundant in his writings. A few examples make this clear.
While noting his previous neglect of Macbeth in the preface to his col-
lection of essays on Shakespeare, Cavell states that,
Macbeth was the remaining great tragedy of Shakespeare’s I had not 
been moved, or was otherwise not able, to test against the thought 
that this mode of tragedy is a response to the crisis of knowledge 
inspired by the crisis of the unfolding of the New Science in the late 
16th and early 17th centuries, especially as articulated so decisively 
for philosophy in the next generation following those tragedies by 
Descartes’ articulation of modern skepticism.46
Later in “Macbeth Appalled” in the same collection, Cavell says that
I proposed thinking through the play [Antony and Cleopatra] as a 
representation of the catastrophe of the modern advent of skepticism 
(hence also of the advent of the new science, a new form of know-
ing), taken as an individual and a historical process.47
In “Being Odd, Getting Even (Descartes, Emerson, Poe)”, among specu-
lations that Cartesian skepticism may be the alternative to affirming the 
conditions of one’s finitude we find a parenthetical remark indicating the 
significance of historical context for the emergence of Descartes’ cogito:
I imagine that the appearance of the cogito at its historical moment 
is a sign that some conditions were becoming ones for which get-
ting even, or anyway overcoming, was coming to seem in order: for 
example, the belief in God and the rule of kings.48
Again, in “Night and Day: Heidegger and Thoreau” from 2000 Cavell 
refers to the historical situation in which modern skepticism broke 
through as “the cultural cataclysm represented by the advent and instal-
lation of the new science in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries”.49
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Finally, in 2004, Cavell expresses his wish “to leave open the idea that 
a Cartesian ‘privacy’ bears on what is felt as Shakespeare’s marking of a 
new stage in human – Western? – Subjectivity”.50
Rather than arguing, then, that Cavell simply ignores history in his 
account of modern skepticism, my complaint will be that the lack of phil-
osophical weight that he attributes to historical context is troubling. It 
is, moreover, this fact that I think justifies the way I will present Cavell’s 
account of the self. I will ascribe to Cavell a largely ahistorical view of 
the nature of the self that lies at the basis of his account of modern skep-
ticism. After this ahistorical and essentialist view is on the table, I will 
explicitly take into account the kinds of considerations that Cavell raises 
about historical context in order to see if these contradict or amelio-
rate this criticism. Not only will I show that they do not, citing Cavell’s 
own remarks about historical context actually allows me to bring out 
even more clearly how his consistently strong claims about skepticism 
and human nature reveal that he must either adhere to something like a 
metaphysical developmental story about the modern conception of the 
self, or, as I suspect is more likely, land him in some sort of subtraction 
story.51 Neither option will turn out to be tenable. Both exhibit a disre-
gard for what I believe to be a more compelling hermeneutic approach to 
historical-cultural considerations.
III
In the previous section, we saw Williams wrongly attribute to Cavell the 
ambition of providing a therapeutic diagnosis of skepticism that would 
amount to a definitive refutation. Yet more important than citing autho-
rial disclaimers by Cavell that undermine William’s claim is getting into 
a position to see precisely why Cavell thinks any project of definitive 
refutation of skepticism misses its mark so widely. This is what my brief 
sketch of Cavell’s analysis of material object (external world) skepticism 
aims to do.52
Cavell argues against Austin that criteria, the marks by which we cor-
rectly apply our concepts, do not provide the materials for a convincing 
rejection of the skeptic.53 To see why, consider Austin’s anti-skeptical 
arguments that make use of knowledge of specialized criteria. Suppose 
for example I call out, “Look at that gorgeous ’65 Mustang right there!” 
A friend might challenge me with the question, “How do you know that’s 
a ’65?” If we assume for a moment that the challenge is directed to the 
specific claims implicit in my call, then it could well be taken as asking 
how I know that there is a 1965 Mustang as opposed to a 1966 Mustang, 
given that the two editions are very close in appearance and are easily 
mistaken for one another. Austin’s use of specific criteria was supposed to 
show how I could meet this type of challenge by using my special knowl-
edge of Mustangs to give a response such as “Because of the grille”. (To 
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someone familiar with these editions, the grille on the two different years’ 
models can be distinguished, even from a considerable distance, and was 
one of two main differences in outer appearance (the other being the 
quarter ornaments)). By Austin’s lights, if my friend persisted by asking 
how I really know the year of the car, this could reveal him to be either 
ignorant or confused about just what it would be to know the difference 
between a 1965 and 1966 Mustang based on their outer appearance.54
If my companion were simply interested in challenging things like 
my ability to distinguish between two early editions of a popular 1960s 
American car, then my response might satisfy him. But as Cavell makes 
clear, the Cartesian skeptic’s doubt is intended to have a much wider and 
more destructive scope; it is meant to force me to admit that, my feeling 
of certainty notwithstanding, the “car” parked on the street might for all 
I know be a fiberglass replica (my “stuffed goldfinch”, as it were), and no 
amount of complaining about common sense and “what is true for pre-
sent intents and purposes” can make this possibility just disappear. This 
point shows how, as Cavell argues, Austin’s kind of anti-skeptical argu-
ment is useless if, instead of relying on examples that make use of spe-
cial knowledge of concepts and of one’s abilities to discriminate specific 
objects, the skeptic actually makes his point with reference to grammati-
cal criteria that govern our use of words, referring to what Cavell calls 
a “generic object”, i.e. a car, a tomato, a bird, a piece of wax, a tree.55
Once we take into account that not only does the skeptical challenge 
operate with a generic object (a car) and not a specific object (a ’65 Mus-
tang), but a generic object perceived under ideal conditions (right there 
in the street under bright sunshine), his line of questioning can be fatal 
to our claims to perceptual knowledge. If I am wrong about the Mustang 
being a ’65, either because I didn’t know the difference between its grille 
and that of a ’66, or perhaps because I was careless in my reporting, 
I may see no great threat to knowledge in admitting, that, after all, it was 
a ’66 Mustang and not a ’65.56 My error is localized and need not have 
any broader epistemic reverberations. But if, however, I am standing five 
feet away with ample light and normal eyesight, the potential effects of 
mistaking a fake car for a real one are not so easily contained. This is 
why in Cavell view, Austin’s examples are unsuited to refute skepticism: 
the skeptic operates with criteria for generic objects that describe the best 
possible occasions of our correct our use of general concept words under 
ideal circumstances.57 The depressing conclusion to these reflections on 
the attempt to refute skepticism by the notion of criteria is that
Criteria are “criteria for something’s being so”, not in the sense that 
they tell us of a thing’s existence, but of something like its identity, 
not of its being so, but of its being so. Criteria do not determine the 
certainty of statements, but the application of the concepts employed 
in statements.58
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Criteria pertain to those occasions when it is appropriate or justified to 
claim something about the world, but not necessarily to when one is cor-
rect in doing so.
Cavell thus thinks that refutations of skepticism that rely on cri-
teria fail. But he does not worry that this failure makes the truth of 
the skeptical thesis more likely. In fact, he thinks that considerations 
from criteria do play a key role in showing what is fundamentally 
amiss with the skeptic’s procedure; it is just not the role sometimes 
assigned to them. To see what Cavell finds suspect in the skeptic’s 
apparently impeccable line of reasoning, consider the following sche-
matized exchange:59
1. Claim: Here is a car. (Made under ideal circumstances)
2. Request for Basis: How do you know?
3. Basis: I know because I see it. (“By means of the senses”)
4. Grounds for Doubt: How do you know you’re not dreaming or 
hallucinating?
Cavell notes that as far as he is aware, the usual efforts to stanch the 
skeptical movement of this recital concentrate on either the Request for 
a Basis (2) or the Ground for Doubt (3).60 His own unorthodox line of 
inquiry, on the other hand, will focus on the Claim itself.
As the schema illustrates, the skeptic’s procedure requires that a 
claim be made about a generic object such as a car, a piece of wax, or 
a hand when presented under ideal perceptual circumstances. Further, 
because the case is a best case, if doubt can be raised about my claim 
to knowledge here, it can be generalized so as to call into question 
all of my knowledge of material objects. This then seems to threaten 
to yield a skeptical conclusion. Yet at this point Cavell thinks he can 
bring to bear a crucial point that he has argued for earlier, namely, 
that the criteria governing words are not self-applying. The words 
I utter may have a general semantic meaning, but in a particular con-
text unless I mean something by them, they may mean anything at all, 
which is really to say nothing at all: without my input, “criteria are 
dead”.61 This allows Cavell to broach the surprising idea that “what 
can comprehensibly be said is what is found to be worth saying”.62 
Because criteria are not self-applying, we have to apply them with 
some purpose or other when we speak. So if the initial Claim (1) is 
to provide the skeptic the platform he needs to launch his attack, the 
Claim itself must be uttered for some specific reason, given an actual 
use, that makes it worth saying in that context. In the case of the 
skeptical recital of traditional epistemology, this possibility prompts 
Cavell to ask, “Is the example the philosopher produces imaginable as 
an example of a particular claim to knowledge? What are his examples 
examples of?”63
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Now the epistemologist may naturally assume that it is sufficient for 
him to have made a genuine knowledge claim even if the only unusual 
thing about his utterance is that in ordinary circumstances its truth would 
be so “flamingly obvious”.64 Yet just proclaiming out of the blue “Here 
is a hand”, with no context for saying so (and as Cavell provocatively 
underscores “because it’s true” does not on its own provide such a con-
text), could mean anything, and consequently nothing.65 There are cer-
tainly contexts in which words such as these can be sensibly uttered; it’s 
just that the epistemological non-context isn’t one of them. Saying some-
thing, even something flamingly obvious, has its conditions, but the epis-
temologist, “wants to speak without the commitments speech exacts”.66 
As there is no claim context, no context in which we understand why the 
skeptic says what he says and so for our understanding what he says in 
saying it, no concrete claim is made.67
With these considerations in the background, Cavell maintains that 
in so far as there is an incoherence at the very beginning of the skeptic’s 
procedure, the very knowledge claim that is supposed to generate the 
generalized doubt in the first place cannot not be coherently entered. 
Cavell sums up his reading of the skeptic’s predicament as a dilemma:
The “dilemma” the traditional investigation of knowledge is involved 
in may now be formulated this way: It must be the investigation of 
a concrete claim if its procedure is to be coherent: it cannot be the 
investigation of a concrete claim if its conclusion is to be general. 
Without that coherence it would not have the obviousness it has 
seemed to have: without that generality its conclusion would not be 
skeptical.68
The skeptic relies on a baseless claim that provokes a baseless question 
and thus a baseless attempt to answer it.
But if Cavell has in fact revealed something incoherent in the skeptic’s 
procedure, why should we not read him as having at least tried, and 
perhaps even succeeded, in giving a conclusive refutation of skepticism? 
The answer is that pointing out, as Cavell seeks to do, that the skeptic’s 
particular opening move is incoherent, because his basis claim lacks a 
context for meaning anything at all, is not equivalent to showing that 
the skeptical thesis that we can never know the truth of that basis claim 
has been shown to be false. To show the falsity of the skeptical thesis, 
to refute it, one would have to show that, contrary to that thesis, one 
knows, or can know, the truth of utterances like “Here is a hand” that 
the epistemologist is inclined to make. To show that, one would have to 
hold that one had managed to understand what the epistemologist really 
meant with his (empty) basis claim, while at the same time maintaining 
that the skeptical conclusion, that knowing this (empty) claim to be true 
was impossible, was itself false. But this requires that the truth of the 
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basis claim could in fact be known, even if the claim itself can’t actually 
be understood in the first place. As Cavell puts it,
The reason we cannot say what the thing is in itself is not that there 
is something we do not in fact know, but that we have deprived 
ourselves of the conditions for saying anything in particular. There 
is nothing we cannot say. That doesn’t mean that we can say every-
thing, there is no “everything” to be said. There is nothing we can-
not know. That does not mean we can know everything: there is no 
everything, no totality of facts or things to be known. To say we do 
not (cannot) know things-in-themselves is as much a Transcendental 
Illusion as to say we do.69
All that Cavell’s argument amounts to thus far is the idea that we don’t 
understand what the skeptic says, along with the implied suspicion that 
neither does the skeptic. Arriving at a place where a purported claim 
turns up as empty is not a refutation of anything. Nor is it a demonstra-
tion that, as a matter of general philosophical principle, one can’t say 
what the skeptic is trying to say. This is enough to make clear that there is 
something seriously wrong with the idea that Cavell believes he has given 
a conclusive therapeutic refutation of skepticism.
IV
We see, then, that Cavell thinks one reason why material object (exter-
nal world) skepticism “cannot” be refuted is quite simply that it doesn’t 
really provide anything to refute. One could, I suppose, construe this as a 
kind of logical or philosophical sense in which he imagines anti-skeptical 
arguments as missing their targets. Yet according to Cavell, this is hardly 
the only or even the deepest sense in which such arguments are unsatis-
factory. To see this, consider that one could well wonder why it is that 
skepticism arises in the first place. Or better, once having been exposed 
as incoherent by a diagnosis of the type Cavell offers, one could well ask 
why skepticism doesn’t merely evaporate or disappear, as certain illu-
sions or bad ideas sometimes do, never to return. Cavell holds, on the 
other hand, that skepticism is a pervasive problem in everyday life and 
an accordingly a recurring theme in philosophy, film, and drama. What, 
in his view, accounts for this phenomenon?
We first need to note that since skepticism as Cavell understands it 
is inherently tied to the constant vulnerability of our criteria to failure 
and rejection, it would never arise for a creature without language. 
Without meaning to imply that he would ever suggest that a creature-
with-language could be intelligibly factored into parts in anything but a 
nominal sense, Cavell would I believe allow for one or the other aspect 
of this unified whole to be emphasized in a given case, especially if 
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doing so permitted one to make a salient point. In the present case we 
can say that for Cavell, skepticism is not only part and parcel of our 
being creatures-with-language (and minds), but perhaps more perti-
nently creatures-with-language and minds.70 This makes clearer why he 
regards theoretical attacks intended to refute skepticism as even more 
profoundly mis-calibrated than we have seen thus far; they fail to take 
into account how deeply skepticism pertains to our affective nature 
as language users, however much it can appear in philosophy to be a 
primarily if not wholly speculative problem. At the most basic level in 
his thinking, therefore, Cavell holds that attempts to refute skepticism 
misfire because the impulse to skepticism is, qua impulse, not at root 
an intellectual position and so not a “suitable object of refutation”. 
Skepticism’s manifestation as a philosophical problem is more aptly 
seen for him as a kind of (as we’ll see in a moment, motivated) distor-
tion or sublimation of the genuine vulnerabilities of an animal with 
language into an inflated intellectual problem. In The Claim of Reason, 
Cavell is referring precisely to such covering up of the affective roots 
of philosophical skepticism when he recalls “what I have throughout 
kept arriving at as the cause of skepticism – the attempt to convert the 
human condition, the condition of humanity, into an intellectual dif-
ficulty, a riddle.”71
The idea that human speakers face a permanent susceptibility to skep-
ticism traces out a remarkably consistent Leitfaden running through 
Cavell’s authorship over more than 40 years. Consider first this famous 
passage from his ground-breaking essay on Wittgenstein from 1962:
For Wittgenstein, philosophy comes to grief not in denying what we 
all know to be true, but in its effort to escape those human forms 
of life which alone provide the coherence of our expression. He 
wishes acknowledgement of human limitation which does not leave 
us chafed by our own skin, by a sense of powerlessness to penetrate 
beyond the human conditions of knowledge.72
In his magnum opus from 1979 we read,
If the fact that we share, or have established, criteria is the condi-
tion under which we can think and communicate in language, then 
skepticism is a natural possibility of that condition; it reveals most 
perfectly the standing threat to thought and communication, that 
they are only human, nothing more than natural to us.73
Some years later, in an essay from the mid-1980s, Cavell describes the 
possibilities of skepticism as “natural to the human being; parts of the 
nature or fate of a creature complex enough for, or fated to, language.74 
Skepticism and the Human Condition 93
In works from the mid and late 1990s, Cavell asserts for example that the 
ordinary language philosopher’s
sense of returning words from their metaphysical to their every-
day use is driven by a sense of a human dissatisfaction with words 
(not as it were solely a philosophical dissatisfaction) in which an 
effort to transcend or to purify speech ends by depriving the human 
speaker of a voice in what becomes his (or, differently, her) fantasy 
of knowledge, a characterization I have given of what happens in 
skepticism.75
He makes substantially the same claim in an essay published a couple of 
years later:
Reading tragedy back into philosophical skepticism I  would vari-
ously, in various connections, characterize the skeptic as craving the 
emptiness of language, as ridding himself of the responsibilities of 
meaning, and as being drawn to annihilate externality or otherness, 
projects I occasionally summarize as seeking to escape the conditions 
of humanity, which I call the chronic human desire to achieve the 
inhuman, the monstrous, from above or from below.76
Finally, in a late essay from the 2000s, Cavell is still articulating this per-
spective, for instance in maintaining that
the question of what I might call skepticism’s necessity and its pos-
sibility, to its paradoxical presence within our very possession of lan-
guage, glimpsed when Descartes asserts that we are misled by the 
ordinary word “see” into supposing that we really as it were see 
things of the world.77
Indeed, Cavell consistently holds in addition that this tendency to deny 
the human by attempting to evade the burdens of human speech and 
thought is an essential possibility that goes into the very makeup of the 
concept of the human being itself. Passages such as these, written over 
many years, illustrate this point:
(T)he denial of the human, the wish to escape the conditions of 
humanity, call them conditions of finitude, is itself only human.78
Nothing is more human than the wish to deny one’s humanity, or 
to assert it at the expense of others.79
  .  .  . the denial of the human is the human; thinking to escape 
human nature from above, and from below . . . to interpret a meta-
physical finitude as an intellectual lack.80
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. . . skepticism’s negation of the human, its denial of satisfaction 
in the human (here in human conditions of knowing), is an essential 
feature of the human, as it were its birthright.81
.  .  . a final philosophical victory over (the temptation) to skepti-
cism, which would mean a victory over the human . . .82
. . . I persist in thinking that to lose knowledge of the human pos-
sibility of skepticism means to lose knowledge of the human . . .83
Further, the relation to skepticism that Cavell regards as endemic to the 
life of language users does not in his eyes remain a bare, even if constant, 
unactualized possibility. As I have already pointed out in the introduc-
tion, on occasion Cavell makes the even stronger claim that we are fated 
to full-blown outbreaks of skeptical madness. Here are two passages 
cited previously:
What turns it upon us is philosophy, the desire for thought, running 
out of control. That has become an inescapable fate for us, appar-
ently accompanying the fate of having human language.84
I mean to say that it is human, it is the human drive to tran-
scend itself, make itself inhuman, which should not end until, as in 
Nietzsche, the human is over.85
These sorts of remarks are not isolated or idiosyncratic; other passages 
make it clear that Cavell views skepticism as not merely a perhaps unfor-
tunate, but ultimately manageable impulse. His use of terms like “drive” 
and related terms warrants a reading in which he thinks it is simply part 
of our nature that we will in fact find ourselves overcome by unbridled 
fits of irrational intellectual aggression:
I take skepticism not as the moral of a cautious science laboring to 
bring light into a superstitious, fanatical world, but as the recoil of 
demonic reason, irrationally thinking to dominate the earth. I take it 
to begin as a wish not to reject the world but rather to establish it.86
The human capacity – and the drive – both to affirm and to deny 
our criteria constitutes the argument of the ordinary. And to trace 
the disappointment with criteria is to trace the aspiration to the sub-
lime – the image of the skeptic’s progress.87
As we have already seen, on Cavell’s analysis the skeptic’s argument 
requires a non-claim context. In so far as the traditional anti-skeptic tries 
to defeat the skeptic, he acquiesces in this initial yet “decisive conjuring 
trick”. Both the skeptic and the anti-skeptic accept the intelligibility of a 
picture of language where the criteria that guide our words and concepts 
are self-applying, operating in a vacuum, isolated from the contextual 
factors that make it understandable why someone some place at some 
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time might be concerned to say what she says at all. Moreover, Cavell 
thinks that such denial of the conditions for how language, mind, and 
world might come together is not surprising. On the contrary, such blind 
ambition is bound to break out. It is Cavell’s fascination with our inabil-
ity to live with the all of the contingency, complicity and complexity that 
comes with our application of our criteria to the world and to each other, 
that motivates his work on philosophy, literature, and film.88
But all of this only begs the question as to what kind of view of the 
human being underlies Cavell’s view of skepticism’s inevitability. Why, in 
fact, is he so confident that skeptical worries will return to haunt us? This 
is a central question for this essay. In order to begin our approach to it, 
we can take another rightfully celebrated quotation from Cavell’s early 
essay on the later Wittgenstein.
We learn and we teach certain words in certain contexts, and then we 
are expected, and expect others, to be able to project them into fur-
ther contexts. Nothing insures that this projection will take place (in 
particular, not the grasping of universals nor the grasping of books of 
rules), just as nothing insures that we will make, and understand, the 
same projections. That on the whole we do is a matter of our sharing 
routes of interest and feeling, modes of response, senses of humor 
and of significance and of fulfillment, of what is outrageous, of what 
is similar to what else, what a rebuke, what forgiveness, of when an 
utterance is an assertion, when an appeal, when an explanation – 
all the whirl of organism Wittgenstein calls ‘forms of life.’ Human 
speech and activity, sanity and community, rest upon nothing more, 
but nothing less, than this. It is a vision as simple as it is difficult, and 
as difficult as it is (and because it is) terrifying.89
Because criteria don’t just apply themselves on their own, but require our 
involvement, nothing guarantees that we will make the effort to apply 
them, let alone that we will apply them correctly and successfully. As 
we shall see shortly, moreover, Cavell believes there is much that mili-
tates against our willingness to own up to precisely these possibilities. In 
fact, after The Claim of Reason, it was the investigation of this theme in 
philosophy and various art forms that came to dominate Cavell’s energy 
even more than it had before that watershed publication.
Now we saw earlier that Cavell wants to say that there is a “truth of 
skepticism” to which the skeptic has latched on, even if not always in 
a very perspicuous manner. As Cavell puts it, this truth was that “Our 
relations to the world as a whole, or to others in general, is not one of 
knowing, where knowing construes itself as being certain”.90 The basis 
for what I think of as Cavell’s “anthropology” resides precisely in what 
he finds to be our human inability, both in our relations to the world 
and to each other, to live with the conditions that underlie this truth.91 
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In Cavell’s various numerous elaborations of skepticism, it is clear that 
he believes that we find living with this truth to be an almost unbearable 
task. Hence, his repeated claims that it is human to deny the human 
condition. But why do we find facing this condition so hard? Why is 
the contingency internal to criteria so terrifying that Cavell finds we are 
driven almost of necessity to deny their very existence?
Consider in this vein two long quotations taken from the same stretch 
of The Claim of Reason that vividly portray the core of a Cavellian 
response to these questions.
My major claim about the philosopher’s originating question – e.g., 
“(How) do (can) we know anything about the world?” or “What is 
knowledge; what does my knowledge of the world consist in?” – is 
that it . . . is a response to, or expression of, a real experience which 
takes hold of human beings. It is not “natural” in the sense I have 
already found in the claim to “reasonableness”: it is not a response 
to questions raised in ordinary practical contexts, framed in language 
which any master of a language will accept as ordinary. But it is, as 
I might put it, a response which expresses a natural experience of a 
creature complicated or burdened enough to possess language at all. 
What experience? Well, of course, an experience or sense that one 
may know nothing about the real world. But what kind of experience 
is that? How or when does it emerge?92
The experience of knowing nothing about the real world at all is of course 
the experience of the total failure of our criteria to make actual contact 
with it. A bit further on we find the following:
I can here only attest to my having had such experiences and, though 
struggling against them intellectually, have had to wait for them to 
dissipate in their own time. It seems to me that I relive such experi-
ences when I  ask my students, as habitually at the beginning of a 
course in which epistemology is discussed, whether they have ever 
had such thoughts as, for example, that they might, when for all 
the world awake, be dreaming; or that if our senses, for example 
our eyes, had differently evolved, we would sense, i.e., see, things 
other than as we see them now, so that the way we see them now 
is almost accidental, anyway at least as dependent on our constitu-
tion as on the constitution of the world itself; or that the things of 
the world would seem just as they now do to us if there were noth-
ing in it but some power large enough either to keep us in a sort of 
hypnotic spell, or to arrange the world for our actions as a kind of 
endless stage-set, whose workings we can never get behind, for after 
all consider how little of anything, or any situation, we really see. 
I know well enough, intellectually as it were, that these suppositions 
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may be nonsense, seem absurd, when raised as scruples about par-
ticular claims to knowledge. But if these experiences have worked in 
the initial motivation of particular claims, then the attempt to prove 
intellectually that they have no sense is apt to weaken one’s faith in 
intellectuality. . . . [W]hen the experience created by such thoughts 
is there, it is something that presents itself to me as one, as I have 
wished to express it, of being sealed off from the world, enclosed 
within my own endless succession of experiences. It is an experience 
for which there must be a psychological explanation; but no such 
explanation would or should prove its epistemological insignificance. 
And I know of no philosophical criticism which proves that either.93
There is a lot one could say about these passages.94 Here I want to focus 
on how the experience of the possible failure of our criteria described in 
the first passage gets elaborated by Cavell in the second as an experience 
whose content, though admittedly bordering on the absurd, is neverthe-
less impervious to rational criticism: the experience reveals something 
“true”, even if not exactly the truth of a thesis. First, recall that irrefu-
tability, even in the face of nonsensicality, is one of the hallmarks of 
skepticism according to Cavell. But second, and more significant, note 
that even if the language that Cavell uses to describe this experience may 
strike some as “poetic” or “non-philosophical” (and anything like a 
sharp distinction between the force of poetry and philosophy is likely to 
be a distinction Cavell would question anyway), when he writes that this 
experience presents itself to him as a sense of “being sealed off from the 
world” in his own “endless succession of experiences”, Cavell takes the 
experience to reveal something genuine, let’s say true, about his condi-
tion: that in some sense he really is separate, cut off from the world.
The very presentiment, however much lacking in rational grounds, 
that the criteria on which our lives and sanity as speakers depend may 
completely fail us, exacerbates the underlying “metaphysical fact” that 
we are utterly alone with this real or potential failure. Variations on this 
threat of isolation are pervasive in Cavell’s work. Nearly all of his writ-
ing, both prior and subsequent to The Claim of Reason, and whether 
in philosophy, film, or literature, is dedicated to showing that the “best 
case” of himself as revealed in the previous passages is representative of 
the universal human struggle to live with the horror of our separateness. 
Indeed, the persistent motif of chronic horror at our separateness and 
the resulting flight from this fact is as consistently sounded in Cavell’s 
writings as is the correlative theme of the connection between our being 
criteriological creatures and skepticism itself: “[T]ragedy is the working 
out of a response to skepticism – as I now like to put the matter, that 
tragedy is an interpretation of what skepticism itself is an interpretation 
of. . . .”95 What they are both an interpretation of is our separateness. If 
anything, it is the repressed fact that each of us is our “own haecceity” 
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that is the real truth of skepticism, a truth we flee and that underlies the 
essential connection between language and skepticism.96 We see, then, 
that Cavell’s account of skepticism has several strands, which though 
in any given work can seem more or less related, in fact make up one 
philosophical fabric. The following, from 1988’s In Quest of the Ordi-
nary: Lines of Skepticism and Romanticism, weaves them together in one 
stretch.
Here my thought was that skepticism is a place, perhaps the central 
secular place, in which the human wish to deny the condition of 
human existence is expressed: and so long as the denial is essential 
to what we think of as the human, skepticism cannot, or must not, 
be denied. This makes skepticism an argument internal to the indi-
vidual, or separate, human creature, as it were an argument of the 
self with itself (over finitude). That this is expressed as a kind of argu-
ment of language with itself (over its essence) is how it came to look 
to me as I worked out the thought that Wittgenstein’s Investigations 
is not written – as it had in my experience uniformly been taken – 
as a refutation of skepticism (as if the problem of skepticism were 
expressed by a thesis) but as a response to what I have come to call 
the truth of skepticism (as if the problem of skepticism is expressed 
by its threat, or temptation, by our sense of groundlessness).97
Cavell’s interpretation of skepticism is brilliant, original, and often com-
pelling in a way that none of its contemporary rivals approaches. Having 
said that, I also believe, however, that his philosophy is badly marred by 
an ahistorical and uncritical assumption that certain features character-
istic of modern Western individualism are universally valid. In the Claim 
of Reason he asserts that,
The truth here is that we are separate, but not necessarily separated 
(by something); that we are, each of us, bodies, i.e. embodied; each 
is this one and not that, each here and not there, each now and not 
then. If something separates us, comes between us, that can only be 
a particular aspect or stance of the mind itself, a particular way in 
which we relate, or are related (by birth, by law, by force, in love) 
to one another – our positions, our attitudes, with reference to one 
another. Call this our history. It is our present.98
It may be true that on Cavell’s interpretation of skepticism, especially 
other-minds skepticism, we are not completely at the mercy of our sepa-
rateness. We can be honest and ever vigilant about the requirements our 
criteria and the world make on us. It may even be the case, as this passage 
may seem to suggest, that Cavell thinks our proclivities towards flight 
and denial are more inflamed by some historical settings than by others. 
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Nevertheless, whatever significance he might on occasion be prepared to 
ascribe to cultural context, the upshot of the ontology of separateness 
underpinning Cavell’s anthropology is that we are at bottom creatures 
who simply can’t stand being the kind of creatures we are. The founda-
tion for Cavell’s thought, and the foundation from which he believes all 
of us are always fated to begin as animals burdened with language is that 
“[w]e are endlessly separate, for no reason.”99 Yet what if there is no 
convincing reason for thinking that assertions like this one correspond to 
a “brute metaphysical fact” about our predicament? What if on the other 
hand there are good reasons for interpreting such assertions as revelatory 
of a state of mind characteristic of a particular grammar, of a certain 
historical horizon?
V
By referring in the previous section to Cavell’s “anthropology”, I did not 
intend anything unusual by this use of the term, even if Cavell is not an 
anthropologist, or at least not one of the usual sort. I merely meant to flag 
my view that a fairly definite picture of the human being runs through his 
authorship. Of course, “anthropology” is more typically used to denote 
a social scientific discipline with its own institutional moorings in uni-
versities. Fronting this more usual sense of the word makes it natural to 
ask about the sources of Cavell’s data. A short answer is that I suppose 
Cavell takes his observations about the human mainly from philosophy, 
everyday life, and not the least art forms such as film, drama (especially 
Shakespearean tragedy), poetry, etc. If I  am roughly correct, however, 
that there is an ontology of the human running through Cavell’s thought, 
then this short answer might seem to set this ontology up for easy ridi-
cule, since surely (he, and I, must both know that) ethnographies are one 
thing, films or plays quite another. Yet while Cavell surely realizes that, 
for example, reading Descartes’ Meditations or watching Cary Grant 
and Katherine Hepburn’s banter on the big screen are importantly differ-
ent activities from observing Berber cooking rituals, he would, I believe, 
reject any strong conclusion that only the second observational setting 
can provide genuine facts about the goings on of a human culture. Elabo-
rating this point sufficiently would require an explanation and perhaps 
defense of an essential feature of Cavell’s views that, for example, art can 
teach us something about the “real world”. Bringing Cavell’s work into 
closer contact with the fields of history and anthropology as I do next 
also requires that I make a point explicit: the narratives that histories and 
ethnographies provide do not rely on or consist of “direct observational 
data”. Thus, while historical and ethnographic accounts are certainly dif-
ferent from works of art, they are not incommensurable as sources of evi-
dence. Because I think these points should be obvious at this time point 
in intellectual history, I take them for granted in what follows.
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Having just defended Cavell’s bona fides for speaking about the 
human without having conducted field work, my discussions in this 
part and the next nevertheless take a more empirical (though certainly 
not empiricist) turn. Having shown previously how Cavell believes that 
skepticism is an ineradicable feature of human life with language, it may 
seem natural for me to pursue a project of comparative epistemology 
and to ask whether in fact disciplines such as social or cultural anthro-
pology or history provided any good reasons for thinking that skepti-
cism is actually a universally observed phenomenon. I can imagine that 
such a project has its own intrinsic interest and that it could well be 
complementary to my work here. Since, however, I have also claimed 
that underlying Cavell’s sense of the essential connection between lan-
guage and skepticism is our often repressed sense of ourselves as sepa-
rate, what I described as the real “truth of skepticism” we flee, I will 
pursue a different avenue here.
Recall Cavell’s claim that the experience of feeling sealed off from the 
world in his own endless succession of experience is a major motiva-
tion for the skeptic’s originating question. This connects to his taking 
the experience to reveal something about his genuine predicament, a pre-
dicament the honest awareness of which we are driven to flee. Yet if a 
tendency to flee this kind of experience is one of the ways in which Cavell 
understands our shared humanity, then presumably something like the 
experience that sets us fleeing is also shared. Now Cavell says he realizes 
that the suppositions of the experience may seem nonsensical or absurd; 
perhaps we could say the same of the thoughts and reactions of Lear, 
Othello, and other figures who serve to illustrate skepticism’s insanity 
throughout Cavell’s authorship. Still, there is no suggestion on his part 
that the descriptions he offers of his own experiences or those descrip-
tions of these other representatives of humanity are unintelligible gibber-
ish. If, on the other hand, these descriptions had been offered outside of 
any imaginative or projective context, then we would be hard pressed to 
do anything with them at all. Yet many of us in fact are able to connect 
our understanding to Cavell’s words, or to Lear’s words, or to Othello’s 
words, etc. What I  am driving at is that descriptions such as Cavell’s 
don’t just perform their figurative work out of the blue.100 Rather, they 
give expression to experiences of hyperbolic separateness capable of seiz-
ing the intellect for beings who already can interpret themselves as iso-
lated and cut-off. For me this raises two related questions: 1) What if the 
having of such experiences not only makes skepticism seem inevitable, 
but if their very description already in some way goes with, or arises 
out of, a prior background ontology of the person? 2) What would it 
be like to imagine the descriptions of these experiences doing the work 
Cavell requires them to do without some prior context for imagining that 
ontology?
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I begin my critique of Cavell’s anthropology of the self with a remark 
from anthropologist Clifford Geertz’s “From the Natives’ Point of 
View”:
The concept of person is, in fact, an excellent vehicle by which to 
examine this whole question of how to go about poking into another 
people’s turn of mind. In the first place, some sort of concept of this 
kind, one feels reasonably safe in saying, exists in recognizable form 
within all social groups. Various notions of what persons are may be, 
from our point of view, more than a little odd. People may be con-
ceived to dart about nervously at night, shaped like fireflies. Essential 
elements of their psyche, like hatred, may be thought to be lodged in 
granular black bodies within their livers, discoverable upon autopsy. 
They may share their fates with doppelgänger beasts, so that when 
the beast sickens or dies they sicken or die too. But at least some 
conception of what a human individual is, as opposed to a rock, an 
animal, a rainstorm, or a god, is, so far as I can see, universal. Yet, at 
the same time, as these offhand examples suggest, the actual concep-
tions involved vary, often quite sharply, from one group to the next. 
The Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or 
less integrated motivational and cognitive universe; a dynamic center 
of awareness, emotion, judgment, and action organized into a dis-
tinctive whole and set contrastively both against other such wholes 
and against a social and natural background is, however incorrigi-
ble it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea within the context of 
the world’s cultures. Rather than attempt to place the experience of 
others within the framework of such a conception . .  . we must, if 
we are to achieve understanding, set that conception aside and view 
their experiences within the framework of their own idea of what 
selfhood is.101
I will consider this passage more fully in Part VIII. For now I want to 
note that although, as usual, Geertz is mostly right on the money, he 
moves too hastily here from briefly referencing various cultures’ con-
ceptions of the person to an elucidation of the “the Western conception 
of the person”. In this present context, the other cultural interpreta-
tions to which he refers are, I  think, more properly contrasted with 
the “modern Western conception of the person” than they are with the 
mere “Western conception”. This is because the “modern Western con-
ception of the person” can also be relevantly contrasted with the “pre-
modern Western conception of the person”, or as I will from now on 
put it, the “pre-modern Western conception of the self”.102 Writing in 
1974, Geertz can perhaps be forgiven for not having made much of 
this, as much of the intellectual heavy lifting in this area had yet to be 
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done. That all changed with Charles Taylor’s monumental Sources of 
the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity published in 1989. While 
Taylor’s book by no means appeared on the scene de novo, its synthesis 
of historical and philosophical analysis constituted an enormous and 
original intellectual achievement.103 Its themes also came to define Tay-
lor’s intellectual agenda for the next 20 years, exploring the significance 
of the central interweaving strands of European modernity, culminat-
ing in the magisterial A Secular Age from 2007.104 Much of this work, 
especially as it traces the interplay of historical and intellectual changes 
that produced modern understandings of selfhood are directly relevant 
for evaluating the ontological underpinnings of Cavell’s interpretation 
of skepticism. In what follows, I give a brief sketch of Taylor’s descrip-
tion of the contrast between what he calls the dominant understanding 
of the self in the modern West and a very different understanding char-
acteristic of pre-modern Europe.
According to Taylor, the understanding of the nature of what a self is 
that is taken for granted by most modern Westerners (and probably also 
by many people living in cultures or sub-cultures that have been deeply 
shaped by the by the dominant culture of modern Europe and North 
America) is the idea of a center of consciousness and motivation that is 
bounded or “buffered”. By “buffered”, Taylor means a sharp distinction 
between on the one hand what is taken to be “inside” the mind, charac-
terized as subjective feeling, thought, evaluations, secondary sense quali-
ties, etc. and on the other hand what is regarded as the world “outside” 
the mind, interpreted as non-mental, spatial, and value neutral.105 A key 
argument in Taylor’s account is that the modern understanding of such 
a sharp boundary has a history, and that this history is tied to the emer-
gence of certain historical practices of what he calls “disengagement”. 
He writes, “For the modern, buffered self, the possibility exists of tak-
ing a distance from, disengaging from everything outside the mind”.106 
By “disengagement” Taylor means among other things, certain spiritual 
and moral forms of self-understanding achieved through discipline, espe-
cially pertaining to salvation, that became prevalent around the time of 
the Protestant Reformation. Somewhat later, these ideas morphed into 
conceptions of political autonomy, rights, and obligations internal to 
early iterations of liberalism. Taylor also frequently speaks of practices 
of “disengaged rationality”. This term signifies an agent’s ability to adopt 
a stance of theoretical reflection, in which she “disengages” from her 
immediate practical, instinctual, or emotional engagement with the envi-
ronment as she experiences and interacts with it. Disengaged rationality 
thus denotes an objectivizing stance toward the world often paradigmati-
cally associated with the explanatory power of natural sciences such as 
physics and chemistry, but also with instrumental forms of reasoning 
connected to economic behavior and to developing technology. Although 
I list them separately here, in fact all of these aspects of disengagement 
Skepticism and the Human Condition 103
are only so many threads in the ongoing creation of one historical tapes-
try that comprise Taylor’s account of modernity.
Now we clearly don’t spend all or even most of our time in the vari-
ous kinds of stances made possible through the disciplines of disen-
gagement. Yet for a myriad of reasons, some of them connected to the 
status accorded to the activities that disengagement makes possible, the 
“buffered” understanding of ourselves has, as Geertz writes, become so 
“incorrigible” for us that it is an “an outlook which has to some extent 
colonized the common sense of our civilization”.107 Taylor’s reference to 
common sense here underscores a crucial point: as with any conception 
at or near the “bottom” of our worldview, the buffered self is not a theo-
retical entity.108 Moderns (especially perhaps educated ones) just tend to 
assume that the sense of a sharp boundary or buffer between the self and 
world that disengagement both creates and reinforces merely reflects a 
gulf that is there anyway, and that consequently thought, reason, mean-
ing, emotion, everything mental, must obviously be inside our heads or 
souls. Nevertheless, against this ahistorical common-sense view Taylor 
argues that
The localization is not a universal one.  .  .  . Rather it is a function 
of a historically limited mode of self-interpretation, one which has 
become dominant in the modern West and which may indeed spread 
to other parts of the globe, but which had a beginning in time and 
space and may have an end.109
In striking contrast to the modern buffered self of modernity, Taylor 
paints a vivid portrait of a prevalent understanding in the Middle Ages, 
up to and including much of the Renaissance. His term for this under-
standing is the “porous self”.
By definition for the porous self, the source of its most powerful and 
important emotions are outside the “mind”: or better put, the very 
notion that there is a clear boundary allowing us to define an inner 
base area, grounded in which we can disengage from the rest, makes 
no sense.110
As in the case of the self as buffered, Taylor’s point is not that the sense 
of the self as porous was a well-supported theory based on evidence. Its 
place in the pre-modern “conceptual scheme” was more basic and “has 
to be seen as a fact of experience, not a matter of ‘theory’, or ‘belief’ ”.111 
We should instead imagine this as
how we sense things to be; and thus how we seem to experience 
them. Then the inside is no longer just inside: it is also outside. That 
is, emotions which are in the very depths of human life exist in a 
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space which takes us beyond ourselves, which is porous to some out-
side power, a person-like power.112
To illustrate this idea, Taylor refers to the historical example of how 
melancholy was once imagined. Today, we would of course normally 
describe melancholy (or perhaps better depression) as a state pertaining 
solely to an individual consciousness. Someone might object to my way 
of putting this so bluntly because we do naturally also speak of a group 
of people (or even mammals) as being melancholy. We even describe 
the atmosphere of, say, a dive bar as melancholy. Despite this, if we’re 
being honest, most of us will admit that for us now such uses have 
become secondary or metaphorical. They are dependent on, even if not 
reducible to, the more primary case consisting of an individual state 
of consciousness. Philosophers such as Heidegger may want to dispute 
this, but even they know they are fighting an uphill battle against mod-
ern “common sense”. Taylor’s point, however, is that there was a time 
in Europe when certain objects or substances “outside” the mind did 
not just represent certain emotional states or have as a matter of fact 
tendency to provoke them in people. The connection was immeasur-
ably closer:
Consider melancholy: black bile is not the cause of melancholy, it 
embodies, it is melancholy. The emotional life is porous here again; 
it doesn’t simply exist in an inner, mental space.113
Perhaps more important still, this fuzziness or porosity between inside 
and outside did not of course merely affect the way in which the assumed 
boundary between me and objects in the world was experienced, but 
also between me and my fellow humans. Taylor even goes so far as to 
state that under such circumstances, the very notion of a “self” is a bit 
misleading.114 In other words, the self was experienced as a social being 
through and through:
The point I am trying to make here is that in earlier societies, this 
inability to imagine the self outside of a particular context extended 
to membership of that society in its essential order.115
I introduced Taylor’s notion of a buffered self by reference to modern 
disciplined practices of disengagement and by noting the way things 
tend to be characterized on each side of the inside-the-mind/outside-
the-mind dichotomy once these practices become the primary carriers 
of our understanding. The outside half of that divide I  described as 
“non-mental, spatial, and value neutral”. This description is one of a 
“disenchanted” world, to use Weber’s famous term. Not surprisingly, 
this stands in radical contrast, if not outright opposition, to how Taylor 
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describes pre-moderns as experiencing the world as enchanted, contain-
ing not only meaning and moods, but real forces of good and evil. Even-
tually as modernity progressed, our relation to the “external world” 
changed fundamentally:
The buffered self is the agent who no longer fears demons, spirits, 
magic forces. More radically, these no longer impinge: they don’t 
exist for him: whatever threat or other meaning they proffer doesn’t 
“get to” him.116
Taylor is also not the first to point out that what he calls the “Great Dis-
embedding”, the change from an enchanted to a disenchanted outlook, 
has had far-reaching implications for how we live our relations not only 
to the world but to ourselves and to one another as well.117
The disciplined stance helps to build a second facet of what I’ve 
been calling the buffered self. I discussed above how disenchantment 
involves a drawing of boundaries, an end to porousness in relation 
to the world of spirits. Now the disengaged stance also leads to the 
drawing of boundaries, and a withdrawal from certain modes of inti-
macy, as well as taking a distance from certain bodily functions.118
In fact, Taylor believes that the change has been so profound, that most 
moderns must “find the idea of spirits, moral forces, causal powers with 
a purposive bent, close to incomprehensible”.119
At this point we seem to be left with a discontinuous story, according 
to which in the space of a few hundred years major populations of Europe 
underwent profound conceptual and cultural changes, in particular in the 
way they came to understand the very notion of the human self. Yet while 
there will presumably never be a final story of the changes wrought by 
modernity, this does not imply that just any old narrative will do. While 
no doubt many people today realize that we are very different from those 
strange medievals, what we actually know firsthand may not amount 
to much more than a familiarity with a few hysterical caricatures in a 
Monty Python sketch. Taylor glosses this somewhat lamentable state of 
affairs: “In this sense, modern self-consciousness has a historical dimen-
sion, even for those – who are, alas, many today – who know next to 
nothing about history”.120 In addition, while he thinks we can all agree 
that one of “the central features of Western modernity  .  .  . is the pro-
gress of disenchantment, the eclipse of the world of magic forces and 
spirits”,121 he also believes we are too easily led into accepting a “drasti-
cally overly simplified Entstehungsgeschichte of exclusive humanism”,122 
one that distorts our understanding of our relations to the past as well 
as to the present. On Taylor’s view, one of the most widespread of such 
accounts of the genesis of the modern self is what he calls “subtraction” 
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stories.123 Resisting such metanarratives is a key goal of Taylor’s overall 
project, which he explains this way:
Concisely put, I mean by this stories of modernity in general, and 
secularity in particular, which explain them by human beings hav-
ing lost, or sloughed off, or liberated themselves from certain ear-
lier, confining horizons, or illusions, or limitations of knowledge. 
What emerges from this process – modernity or secularity – is to 
be understood in terms of underlying features of human nature 
which were there all along, but had been impeded by what is 
now set aside. Against this kind of story, I will steadily be argu-
ing that Western modernity, including its secularity, is the fruit of 
new inventions, newly constructed self-understandings and related 
practices, and can’t be explained in terms of perennial features of 
human life.124
As a result of their having absorbed such subtraction stories by a kind of 
cultural osmosis, many if not most moderns uncritically accept a dogma 
of the self as something like a natural kind. They thus “tend to think that 
we have selves the way we have hearts and livers, as an interpretation-
free given”.125
We ought to view the essentialism and determinism that a subtrac-
tion story requires us to accept ought with great suspicion. Such a story 
also requires that we view human history as lacking any genuinely crea-
tive force, that it, in effect, be regarded as a mere unravelling of a story 
already told. What, on the surface, appears to be the self-interpretations, 
evaluations, and actions of human agents, made within limited historical 
horizons and in immensely complicated contexts, comes instead to be 
seen as the mere unfolding of factors working out their inevitable effects 
behind our backs, just so as to bring us to our present state of affairs 
and understanding. Naturally, there is little or no detailed evidence for 
this grand structural story. It works more like an article of faith. The 
epistemological and metaphysical problems that attach to anything like 
a subtraction story of the self are so immense that I  think one is well 
within one’s rights to be skeptical about the very intelligibility of this 
metanarrative.
Rather than present his own grand explanatory history of the self, 
Taylor prefers instead a more historical and hermeneutic approach. He 
avoids the pretense of a “value-free” explanation, instead treating the 
changes between the porous and buffered self as having involved sub-
tle, contextual, and tentative shifts in moral perspective. In the introduc-
tion to Sources of the Self he writes that “Selfhood and the good, or in 
another way selfhood and morality, turn out to be inextricably inter-
twined themes”.126 Later in the same work, we read that “Radically dif-
ferent senses of what the good is go along with quite different conceptions 
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of what a human agent is, different notions of the self”.127 Nearly twenty 
years later we find him voicing the same view in A Secular World:
In short, the buffered identity, capable of disciplined control and 
benevolence, generated its own sense of dignity and power, its 
own inner satisfactions, and these could tilt in favour of exclusive 
humanism.128
By eschewing a metaphysical “view from nowhere” account, Taylor can 
instead offer us an historically extended “perspicuous representation” 
consisting of historical Zwischenglieder, with human beings experiencing 
gains and losses each step of the way.129
I should stress that Taylor does not think that the dominant modern 
Western conception of the self as buffered is intrinsically confused, even 
if he may hold that, for example, the Cartesian and Lockean accounts of 
the self are philosophically suspect. We can, and apparently do, interpret 
ourselves as being “buffered” selves in a disenchanted world. Cartesian-
ism and its innumerable descendants may simply be metaphysically per-
verse inflections of this otherwise logically innocuous, if not altogether 
happy, interpretation of our condition. However, even this everyday 
common sense understanding of a self is by no means an understanding 
that would have been obvious to Europeans several centuries ago. It is, 
furthermore, still far from common sense in many parts of the world 
today.130
VI
As we just saw, Taylor contrasts the modern “buffered” self with a more 
“porous” understanding, which he suggests went hand in hand with a 
more enchanted European world before the Reformation, and especially 
before the intellectual upheavals in science, politics, and commerce of the 
17th century. In this part, I want to turn to some ethnographic material 
that covers much of the same conceptual ground. In addition to allowing 
me to bring to bear perspectives from disciplines different from intel-
lectual history and philosophy, this will broaden my focus before I turn 
back to interrogating Cavell’s views of the self of modern skepticism in 
the next part of this essay.
Note first, however, that while the various understandings of the self 
on view in the material discussed next would certainly seem to fall out-
side of what Taylor includes under the concept of a “buffered” self, 
it is not obvious that they satisfy Taylor’s concept of a “porous” self. 
This suggests that there is more conceptual space outside of “buffered” 
than is covered by “porous”. As we have seen, “porous self” denotes 
something like a psycho-spiritual entity that is more or less locatable in 
the body but is nevertheless in contact with the “outside” world both 
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causally and semantically. This is what I take Taylor to mean when he 
writes that black bile did not symbolize melancholia, and did not just, 
as a contingent matter of fact, cause melancholia, it was itself melan-
cholia. So that, odd as it sounds to us, for the mind to be in contact 
with this substance was to be in direct contact with the state of mind of 
melancholia itself, not merely with a brute cause of an internal mental 
state. Presumably, similar considerations would apply to other states of 
mind and other discreet states of affairs. If Taylor is right, this seems to 
have been internal to what living in the “enchanted world” of medieval 
Europe came to, at least for many. Yet, it is unclear to me that, which-
ever similarities with other societies this particular fact about medieval 
Europe may indicate, this particular conception of porosity is manifest 
in the understandings summarized next. And of course, particulars mat-
ter. Accordingly, the reader should not infer that I  believe that these 
understandings necessarily fall under the term “porous” self in Taylor’s 
sense. Instead, it is preferable for now to take them as simply falling 
under the contradictory of “buffered”, i.e. “non-buffered”. I will say a 
bit more about this later.
The initial focus of my discussion is Rane Willerslev’s Soul Hunters: 
Hunting, Animism, and Personhood among the Siberian Yukaghirs from 
2007.131 The Yukaghirs are a people of the Upper Kolyma River in north-
eastern Siberia, and Willerslev’s book is an exploration of aspects of 
the hunting practices of Yukaghir culture, in particular of the Yukaghir 
understanding of the nature and role of the self in these practices. Will-
erslev’s book is a richly illustrative work on a perplexing topic in its own 
right. Moreover, its discussion of the Yukaghir understanding of person-
hood suggests fruitful comparisons with other ethnographic material that 
I will mention, if only cursorily.
There are several key ideas that make up Willerslev’s portrait of the 
Yukaghirs. The first is animism, which he introduces into his discussion 
with some caution. As Willerslev makes clear, ideas such as animism 
have fallen out of favor among contemporary anthropologists as ana-
lytical concepts because they are frequently associated with the colonial 
period when the field was taking shape. During this time, there was 
a tendency to assume either that indigenous declarations of animist 
practices and beliefs were either a sign of “primitive mentality” or of 
“the natives’ ” propensity to deceive Westerners about what they were 
really up to.132 I will return later to this tendency, not restricted to Vic-
torian anthropologists, whereby beliefs and practices such as animism 
are dismissed out of hand on the grounds that it is simply not possi-
ble for anyone to hold such views. For now, it is enough to note that 
Willerslev quite sensibly maintains against this kind of dogmatism that 
one cannot even get so far so as a critique of a people’s practices and 
concepts unless one takes the time to understand what those practices 
and concepts entail. Naturally, this begins, at the very least, with taking 
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seriously their self-interpretations when it comes to their own lives.133 
As Willerslev puts it,
For us in the West, it is customary to assume that attributes of 
personhood, with all this entails in terms of language, intentional-
ity, reasoning, and moral awareness, belong exclusively to human 
beings. Animals are understood to be wholly natural beings, and 
their behavior is typically explained as automatic and instinctive. 
Among the Yukaghirs, however, a different assumption prevails. In 
their world, persons can take a variety of forms, of which a human 
being is only one.  .  .  . Moreover, humans and animals can move 
in and out of different species’ perspectives by temporarily taking 
on each other’s bodies. Indeed, among the Yukaghirs, as we shall 
see later, this capacity to take on the appearance and viewpoint of 
another being is one of the key aspects of being a person.134
However, grasping the content of these ideas still may not be adequate. 
Any meaningful comparison between systems of thought further requires 
that one correctly see, even if one does not accept, the role that these 
ideational structures play in the lives one wishes to understand. And, as 
Willerslev underscores in this regard, animism among the Yukaghirs is 
not an explicitly articulated doctrinal system.135 Instead, “[t]he person-
hood of animals and things is, as we shall see, something that emerges in 
particular contexts of close practical involvement, such as during hunt-
ing”.136 Consequently, for the Yukaghirs,
animals and other nonhumans are conceived as persons, not because 
personhood has been bestowed upon them by some kind of cogni-
tive processing, but because they reveal themselves as such within 
relational contexts of real-life activities, such as during hunting.137
Complementing animism is another key notion for Willerslev’s account 
of the Yukaghirs, namely mimesis. He describes the Yukaghir cosmos as 
“in effect a hall of mirrors, as various dimensions of reality are conceived 
as replicas or reflections of others” and adds that
In sum, the world of the Yukaghirs is by and large a “mimeticized” 
world: everything is paired with an almost endless number of mimetic 
doubles of itself, which extend in all directions and continually mir-
ror and echo one another.138
Mimesis becomes especially prominent when it comes to hunting:
Animals and their associated spiritual beings are .  .  . said to take on 
human shapes and live lives analogous to those of humans when in their 
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own lands and households. Likewise, when the hunter seeks to bring an 
elk out into the open by mimicking its bodily movements, he is inevita-
bly put into a paradoxical situation of mutual mimicry. As a result, the 
bodies of the two blend to a point that makes them of the same kind.139
The Yukaghir hunter not only understands himself as taking on the per-
spective of the person who is his prey, but also as a reincarnation of a 
deceased relative:
The Yukaghir hunter assumes the viewpoint, senses, and sensibili-
ties of his prey while still remaining aware of himself as a human 
hunter with the intention of killing it. Likewise, the Yukaghir person 
is intertwined with the deceased relative of whom he is considered 
a reincarnation sharing the same name, personality and knowledge. 
Yet he also retains a personhood of his own and is capable of indi-
vidual agency and intention.140
More generally, according to the Yukaghirs’ notion of reincarnation,
each living person is seen as a kind of new embodiment of a par-
ticular dead relative. In fact, everyone in Nelemnoye would always 
insist that the living person is the dead relative of whom he or she is a 
reincarnation. “The two are one and the same person,” they assured 
me. Yet some people would add, “but a person’s body is also him 
or herself,” thereby illustrating that it is an aspect of the person, his 
ayibii or soul, rather than the person in toto that is reincarnated. An 
individual’s body is, in principle, himself or herself, but, as we shall 
see below, it can at times be “colonized” by the ayibii, which might 
divide itself into its various parts and take control.141
In fact, the relation between the “empirical person” or embodied indi-
vidual and the reincarnated ayibii is such that “the perspective of the dead 
person he claims to be can sometimes penetrate his own perspective”142 
This means that at a basic level the empirical individual “is neither himself 
nor his dead relative in any absolute sense, but is something in between or 
both at once. The implication of this, however, involves not only percep-
tual experience, but the very structures of embodiment as well”.143
These brief considerations on animism, mimesis, and reincarnation 
naturally raise questions about how the Yukaghirs understand the just 
mentioned concept of the soul, or ayibii. The word “ayibii” is translated 
as “shadow” in Yukaghir, something that might suggest a dualism of 
body and spirit.144 Willerslev points out, however that
Among the Yukaghirs, however, souls do not have this disembodied 
existence but are vested with a good deal of physicality. We need 
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only point out that the hunter occasionally sees his ayibii in dreams 
as a freely operating being, and in waking life he sees his own soul or 
that of his fellows in the shape of an animal.145
Willerslev also cites work suggesting that, despite conflicting testimony, 
many Yukaghir believe each individual has three ayibii, the “head soul” 
representing the intellect, the “heart soul” controlling motion, and a 
third soul pervading the body and controlling physiological functions.146
The heart, head, and shadow are among its favorite locations, which 
is why people tend to talk about three souls, the head-ayibii, the 
heart-ayibii, and the shadow. However, the ayibii can, in principle, 
reside in all body parts and organs. Diffused throughout the body in 
this way, the ayibii becomes individualized into different agents or 
“persons” (Rus, lyudi), as he [Nikolai Likhachev] called them, each 
of which takes its specific character from the body part or organ it 
inhabits. . . . Thus, each of these animated body parts or organs is 
understood to be a kind of person within the person. However, as 
he emphasized, the ayibii is originally only one, and it can therefore 
gather itself into wholeness and act as a single person.147
As with animism, Willerslev notes how there is a lack of an explicit theo-
retical account of how these various aspects hang together: “In general, 
Yukaghirs showed little interest in my questions about the number of 
souls and where in the person’s body they might possibly dwell.148 As 
with animism, Willerslev underscores how the Yukaghir understanding 
of ayibii comes out best in the practical contexts where it is relevant; 
there is little effort given to reconciling what is said in these practical 
contexts in abstraction from them.149
Willerslev emphasizes, however, that none of this should be taken to 
imply that the Yukaghirs subscribe to some version of monism in which 
everything is understood as simply a part or aspect of an all-encompassing 
“over-self”. On the contrary, he makes it clear for the Yukaghir,
everyday practical life demands a kind of “depth reflexivity” as a 
form of defense mechanism against the dissolution of the self, which 
faces a real risk that identification with the world of other bodies, 
things, and people will become so complete that all the differences 
will appear to vanish and an irreversible metamorphosis will occur.150
The risk of such self-dissolution is nowhere more manifest than in the 
context of hunting:
We must bear in mind that in the world of the Yukaghirs, where 
the various boundaries between self and other, such as the ones 
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between living and dead or human and animal, are permeable and 
easily crossed, the ability not to confuse analogy with identity is of 
paramount importance. This is probably most clearly revealed with 
regard to the Yukaghir hunter and his prey. . . . (H)unters consider 
it necessary to assume the identity of their prey in order to kill it. 
However, if the hunter loses sight of his own human self in this pro-
cess and surrenders to the single perspective of the animal, he will 
undergo an irreversible metamorphosis and transform into the ani-
mal imitated. In this case, then, confusion between analogy and iden-
tity does not lead to madness as such, but instead to something just 
as dreadful, namely “othering” beyond recovery.151
I now want to touch briefly on some interesting resonances that 
Willerslev notes between his account of the Yukaghirs’ understanding of 
personhood and other descriptions in the literature. First, Willerslev sug-
gests a connection between the Yukaghir understanding and the Amer-
indian in the work of Eduardo Viveiros de Castro. Recall that we read 
previously that according to Willerslev, “Animals and their associated 
spiritual beings are  .  .  . said to take on human shapes and live lives 
analogous to those of humans when in their own lands and households”. 
Later he adds that, “This is what Viveiros de Castro  .  .  . calls ‘per-
spectivism’ ”, namely, the conception “according to which the world is 
inhabited by different kinds of persons, human and non-human, which 
perceive reality from distinct points of view”.152 Like Willerslev, Vivei-
ros de Castro does not shy away from using the term “animism” in his 
ethnographic work:
What I am defining here is what anthropologists of yore used to call 
animism, an attitude that is far more than an idle metaphysical tenet, 
for the attribution of souls to animals and other so-called natural 
beings entails a specific way of dealing with them.153
As Viveiros de Castro glosses it, Amerindian animism has some profound 
consequences:
Personification or subjectification implies that the “intentional 
stance” adopted with respect to the world has been in some way 
universalized. Instead of reducing intentionality to obtain a perfectly 
objective picture of the world, animism makes the inverse epistemo-
logical bet.154
Elsewhere he claims that this view entails a “cultural universalism” and 
correlative “multinaturalism”. Humans share a commonly structured 
person-shaped understanding with other species, and each species lives 
in an equally real natural world shaped by its specific perceptual needs.155
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More striking still is the similarity in Willerslev’s and Viveiros de Cas-
tro’s respective descriptions of the dangers which such animism present 
for the Yukaghirs and Amerindians. Willerslev writes,
If . . . mimesis becomes totalizing, and the imitator loses himself in 
what he imitates, we are no longer talking about mimesis but meta-
morphosis: nothing is left to imitate when the difference between the 
copy and the original is totally gone. Mimesis, therefore, is situated 
and defined through difference as much as through similarity.156
Consider in this vein this passage from Viveiros de Castro in which he 
compares the threat of solipsism implicit with Western objectivism with 
an opposite and perhaps even more terrifying possibility inherent in 
Amerindian views:
Solipsism and metamorphosis are related in the same way. Solipsism 
is the phantom that threatens our cosmology, raising the fear that we 
will not recognize ourselves in our “own kind” because, given the 
potentially absolute singularity of minds, our “own kind” are actu-
ally not like us. The possibility of metamorphosis expresses the fear – 
the opposite fear – of no longer being able to differentiate between 
human and animal, and above all the fear of seeing the human who 
lurks within the body of the animal that one eats. Our traditional 
problem in the West is how to connect and universalize: individual 
substances are given, while relations have to be made. The Amer-
indian problem is how to separate and particularize: relations are 
given, while substances must be defined.157
Willerslev also indicates affinities between his depiction of personhood 
among the Yukaghir and Marilyn Strathern’s work in Melanesia, where 
she developed the idea of a “dividual”.158 Strathern writes,
Melanesian persons are as dividually as they are individually con-
ceived. They contain a generalized sociality within. Indeed, persons 
are frequently constructed as the plural and composite site of the 
relationships that produced them. The singular person can be imag-
ined as a social microcosm.159
When writing later that one “of the best known Melansian axioms must 
be that appearances deceive”, she adds that “the unitary identity sets 
the stage for the revelation that it covers or contains within itself other 
identities”.160
Strathern goes on to show how this Melanesian imagining of the per-
son as a social microcosm breaks profoundly with a dominant Western 
understanding of each person’s relations to her body, her actions, her 
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property, and others. According to Strathern, on the latter conception, 
these relations are construed on the model of ownership. She thus writes,
Western proprietism inheres in the way relations between persons 
and things are conceived through the metaphor of the commodity. 
Persons are assumed to be the proprietors of their persons (includ-
ing their own will, their energies, and work in the general sense of 
directed activity).161
Naturally, such a view entails that other persons, let alone external 
objects, are conceptually extraneous to one’s identity. While this may be 
common sense for many of us, Strathern counters that
the Western notion that people own what they do to the exclusion 
of others seems hardly borne out by the evidence on how claims 
and ceremonial duties in such non-Western societies are often struc-
tured. . . . To assume that one can take as an analytical base a con-
dition in which people control themselves and their labor, without 
reference to social others, is to introduce a neoclassical economism 
when one least expects it.162
In sharp contrast with this “proprietary” paradigm, Strathern maintains 
that the
Melanesian cases delineate the impact which interaction has on the 
inner person. The body’s features are a register, a site of that interac-
tion. Consequently, what is drawn out of the person are the social 
relationships of which it is composed: it is a microcosm of relations.163
Consequently, there “is no presumption of an innate unity: such an 
identity is only created to special, transient effect”.164 The situation in 
which a transient unitary identity is created, or drawn out, is one in 
which a specific action is called for by someone else or something else 
to which a person bears the appropriate kind of relation. Action here is 
therefore not regarded as an effect of a unitary willing spiritual entity. 
Rather, it is a temporal manifestation of just one of many relations har-
bored within each dividual person. Strathern thus distinguishes between 
a person, a nest of relations as it were, and an agent, a single actor acti-
vated on a given occasion by an external entity, be that another person 
or object.165 She writes,
The person is constituted from the vantage points of the relations 
that constitute him or her; she or he objectifies and is thus revealed in 
those relations. The agent is construed as the one who acts because of 
those relationships and is revealed in his or her actions.166
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An agent’s action is thus instigated by another person or object; it is the 
presence of these that calls for some particular response because of the 
way in which they too are understood as sets of social relations. There 
are no clear nodal points of subjects acting on objects (whether those 
objects are understood as other persons or ordinary objects such as food 
stuffs). Instead,
The whole burden of analyzing the objectifications of a gift economy 
has been that, if we use the shorthand at all, it is persons (relations) 
who replace persons (relations). These may appear as bodies, but 
then the body is an objectified form: the self so to speak from anoth-
er’s point of view.167
Strathern sums up this radically different way in which persons, agents, 
their objects, and their relations are understood in the Melanesian con-
text as she finds it.
The center is where the twentieth-century Western imagination puts 
the self, the personality, the ego. For the ‘person’ in this latter day 
Western view is an agent, a subject, the author of thought and action 
and thus ‘at the center or relationships. .  .  . It has shaped our cul-
tural obsession with the extent to which human subjects are actors 
who create relationships or act rather as the precipitation of rela-
tionships; this obsession fuels the individual/society dichotomy with 
which I began.168
Despite these notable similarities, however, there also seem to be some 
interesting differences between the Hagen and Yukaghir. So far as 
I  can tell from Willerslev’s account, personhood among the Yukaghir 
can involve a transitory multiple identity of the hunter, his prey, and 
a deceased relative. This involves not only cross-species relations, but 
also both synchronic and diachronic human relations. The main focus in 
Strathern’s description of the Hagen, on the other hand, seems to me to 
be on synchronic social relations alone.169 It’s thus unclear to me whether 
it would be apt to say of them, as Willerslev does of the Yukaghirs (and 
perhaps would say of the Amerindian in Viveiros de Castro’s work) that 
they live in a “hall of mirrors”.
Finally, I should repeat that the understandings of personhood in the 
ethnographic material described previously certainly seems to be rather 
different from Taylor’s account of the medieval porous self. In these eth-
nographic descriptions of non-buffered selves, rather than a porous, yet 
mostly discreet, individual mind or soul existing in both direct causal 
and semantic contact with entities in the world, we find something more 
like the attainment of wholesale multiple identities in one and the same 
embodied being. So far as I can see, then, even if a person is not exactly 
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understood as bound at the skin, as in the modern Western picture, the 
specific notion of porosity seems either to be absent in the summarized 
descriptions, or at least not to be in the forefront of them.170
VII
There is no getting around the fact that the descriptions of the people 
recounted in the previous section are puzzling (even though they are 
often the very stuff of which much history and ethnography is made). 
One perhaps all too human response to this perplexity is to try to explain 
it away. Willerslev notes for instance an aversion in some quarters to 
ascribing even self-proclaimed animist views to peoples on the grounds 
that it smacks of “primitivism”. Some writers have actually preferred to 
treat certain paradoxical statements made by informants as deceptions 
offered up in order to conceal the real nature of their activities from 
overly inquisitive Western investigators.171 I completely agree with Mar-
shall Sahlin’s assessment that this option fails miserably as an attempt to 
show respect to indigenous cultures. Rather, it does “symbolic violence” 
to them and sacrifices huge portions of ethnography to a “moral shake-
down” imposed by a misguided political agenda.172 It simply strains cre-
dulity to believe that the Yukaghir hunters with whom Willerslev lived, 
and the informants of countless other ethnographers who have similarly 
investigated other cultures, were putting on an elaborate show to satisfy 
his need to project a Eurocentric fantasy onto an exotic “other”. This is 
just political humbug. At any rate, my main conclusion is that there is no 
good reason for attributing to these people an essential relation to skepti-
cism as Cavell conceives of it. In fact I find it difficult, to put it mildly, 
to accommodate Cavell’s vision of skepticism, tied as it is to the experi-
ence of the locked-in/locked-out self, within the contexts of these other 
cultures. On the contrary, in the cultural-historical worldviews we have 
been looking at, there seems to be little or no place for the very experi-
ence of a fundamental predicament of separateness. Indeed, the ideas 
of “acknowledging the other” or “accepting the world” seem forced in 
these contexts, since the others and the world are already very much 
woven into the fabric of the self.
Of course it’s important to keep in mind that on Cavell’s view, that each 
of us is his “own haecceity” is not a conclusion we arrive at through phil-
osophical argumentation, in the manner in which, for example, Descartes 
seeks to establish this kind of proposition after his First Meditation. Even 
if he seems to think that Descartes was on to something significant, for 
Cavell the philosophical doctrine of our isolation only seems to result if 
we follow the misguided assumption that our fundamental relation to 
the world might have been one of knowing with certainty. If, as I think 
Cavell rightly argues, there is something fundamentally illusory with this 
assumption anyway, then this fact or proposition, if those are the right 
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words, is not something we could ever really know. Instead, the “experi-
ence” leading to the “philosopher’s originating question”, an experience 
Cavell thinks we usually respond to by fleeing into various obsessions, 
including various epistemological projects, is supposed to be a revealing 
mood that uncovers our true predicament of separateness, even if that 
revelation is not construed by Cavell as a cognitive operation and that 
separateness is at least temporarily remediable in a way that philosophi-
cal solipsism never could be. Our condition of separateness has to be 
lived with and faced up to, not just cognized, if we are to attain the only 
genuine relations to others and the world of which we are capable, the 
relations of acknowledgement and acceptance.
Still, even during those brief respites when the dust of our panic set-
tles and we are perhaps able, however fleetingly, to accept the world and 
to acknowledge others before we once again succumb to our mania for 
domination through knowledge, Cavell’s view is that our fundamental 
existential condition must remain that of separateness. In the context of 
these other systems of thought, however, the for us apparently redeeming 
concepts of acknowledgement and acceptance seem frankly redundant 
and out of place. In fact, not only does it become difficult to talk about 
any possible edifying lesson to be had through having the experiences 
of separateness described so vividly by Cavell, I  think it is completely 
opaque how, for instance, we can realistically entertain the question as 
to what it would be like for the Yukaghir to undergo such an experience. 
Yet according to Cavell, it was the essence of our very humanity to be 
vulnerable precisely to the feeling of the world’s withdrawal, if only long 
enough to repress it. I don’t buy it.
It could be argued that I  am defending an extremely implausible 
form of psychological relativism, to be denying the “psychic unity of 
mankind”, by implying that all emotional experience is determined by 
language, and, where there seem to be different grammars of such expe-
rience, concluding that there we have logically incompatible emotional 
possibilities. Nothing is further from the case. I take it as given that joy, 
fear, grief, anger, and expectation are part of our common natural inher-
itance and are found universally in all cultures. But experiences such 
as that of “being sealed off from the world, enclosed within my own 
endless succession of experiences”173 or of oneself being under threat of 
metamorphosing into a moose seem to me only possible for a creature 
burdened with a language. And it seems further to me to be not only the 
case that certain things are simply not given expression in the context of 
certain forms of life, but entirely unclear how to conceive of their sensibly 
being given such expression.
At this point, I might be accused of trying to get away with a logical 
sleight of hand. That is, one might try to show that my argument against 
Cavell’s claim for the universality of the human condition of separate-
ness relies on nothing more than a shopworn and now generally rejected 
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argument from incommensurability of the kind commonly associated 
with figures such as Thomas Kuhn, Peter Winch, and others.174 In the 
examples from history and ethnography I have discussed, so this coun-
terargument could go, certain words such as “self”, “person”, “agent”, 
“soul”, “mind”, “individual”, “I”, “body”, and “world” appear in very 
different linguistic contexts and seem to be employed in very different 
ways than those ways to which most of us in the modern West are famil-
iar. If, moreover, these lexical items, these signs, have whatever particular 
meaning they have in those very different contexts, how, it can be asked, 
can I pretend to locate in these other contexts of use what Cavell means 
by the same expressions in the contexts of use in which he employs these 
terms? This would require that I understand what Cavell means by them 
in his context, and then, when turning my attention to the appearance of 
these expressions in ethnographic contexts, I am somehow able to recog-
nize that Cavell’s meaning can’t be meant or said in these other systems of 
thought: that his meaning won’t “fit” those contexts as a matter of logic. 
The sleight of hand amounts to imagining that after one has extracted a 
sign out of one context of use, that the sign somehow magically retains 
its meaning, and then discovering that, lo and behold, it can’t retain 
this original meaning in a substantially different context of use. Such 
a maneuver could tempt us to conclude something like “the Yukaghir 
understanding of self is incommensurable with the Western understand-
ing”. But that would involve overlooking that as soon as a lexical item 
is removed from the original context of use and left in limbo as a bare 
sign, there was no more “meaning” remaining for to fit or not to fit into 
the new and supposedly incommensurable context. The same signs in the 
new context may mean whatever they mean, and this may indeed be dif-
ferent from what those signs mean in the first context. But this is not the 
same as the first meaning not fitting into the slot occupied by the second 
meaning. All I am doing, so this potential criticism goes, is identifying 
some superficial syntactical or lexical similarities, the occurrences of the 
same signs in different contexts, and drawing tendentious philosophical 
conclusions about what can and cannot be thought in those contexts. 
To claim therefore that Cavell can’t articulate his skepticism within the 
logical parameters provided by the logic of affect that each of these other 
cultures exhibit, is not just a bold metaphysical claim, it is downright 
incoherent. Claiming that “Cavell can’t say that” logically only works if 
I can provide some story about what “that” is supposed to be. And, as we 
have just seen, it is in the very nature of this trick as I’ve described it that 
no such story is being told. My attempt to show that Cavellian skepticism 
cannot be formulated by drawing the limits around what can be said in 
these other thought systems, so this line of criticism might go, is simply 
unintelligible.175
But in fact, I  am not relying on anything like an incommensurabil-
ity thesis and I am not claiming that Cavellian skepticism cannot, as a 
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matter of logic, be formulated within these other “conceptual schemes” 
or systems of thought. I am only claiming that I, for one, cannot make 
sense of what it would mean for the Yukaghirs to sense (or repress) the 
“brute metaphysical fact” of their separateness given what Willerslev 
reports. But I am also claiming that I doubt anyone else can make sense 
of this either.176 There is nothing logically amiss here. More importantly, 
it is essential to reject an assumption on which the accusation of my 
relying on an incommensurability thesis may rest in the first place. This 
assumption is that I am treating these accounts as though they consisted 
of uninterpreted strings of signs and then drawing my conclusion. This 
is false. On the contrary, I take the ethnographies and histories in which 
these accounts appear to contain careful translations, not merely unusual 
strings of signs. I take it that historians and ethnographers (and hopefully 
their attentive readers) actually have some measure of comprehension 
of these strange pronouncements, even if they do not sit easily with our 
ordinary understanding. Addressing this issue, Strathern writes,
It is important to show that inapplicability is not just a result of poor 
translation. Our own metaphors reflect a deeply rooted metaphysics 
with manifestations that surface in all kinds of analyses.177
At the same time we may not be justified in assuming that such trans-
lations are based on scant evidence, on mere individual occurrences of 
expressions taken out of context, so that a more extensive comparison 
would surely remove for us any oddity. Strathern writes in this vein, 
“Comparative analysis does not in the end turn on the applicability of 
single concepts but on the comparison of whole systems”.178
Consider in this light the following passage from J. Prytz Johansen’s 
work in New Zealand:
According to our knowledge the reason why the Ngatiwhatuwa came 
to Kaipara was a murder committed by the Ngatikahumateika. This 
tribe murdered my ancestor Taureka. The tribe lived in Hokianga. 
This country was theirs, the tribe’s. My home was Muriwhenua, it 
was my permanent residence because my ancestor lived there. Later 
I  left Muriwhenua because of this murder. Then I  tried to revenge 
myself, and Hokianga’s people were defeated and I took possession 
of the old country. Because of this battle the whole of Hokianga was 
finally taken by me right to Maunganui, and I lived in the country 
because all the people had been killed.179
Johansen adds almost laconically, “All the events described  .  .  . took 
place long before the narrator was born”.180 If after having learned their 
informant’s language and conducted extensive field work, investigators 
found that, given the perplexity they cause, such statements could be 
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rendered with more tame translations, they would have no good rea-
son for not providing those instead of the translations one so frequently 
encounters in their works. That is, unless we are to accuse a hefty portion 
of ethnographers of rank sensationalism, we will have to regard passages 
like the previous one as real attempts to give meaningful interpretations 
that express some understanding. (I hesitate to write “express at least 
partial understanding” because that implies that we have some work-
ing notion of what complete understanding looks like, which, unless we 
aren’t concerned about being dogmatic, we should admit we do not). 
If we were to look askance at ethnographies and histories for contain-
ing paradoxical descriptions, then the only occurrences of sentences like, 
“unlike people in X, the people in Y, think Z”, would be the ones we 
could easily domesticate. Having little or no knowledge of German beer 
or religious geography would not present much of an obstacle to assimi-
lating a sentence such as “unlike Düsseldorfers who like Alt Bier best, the 
people in Køln think Kölsch is best” to “unlike the people in St. Louis 
who think Budweiser is the best beer, the people in Milwaukee think 
Miller is the best beer”. If these were the only cases, there wouldn’t be 
much call for ethnographies at all (and maybe not much call for imported 
beer).
I am not, therefore, arguing that we cannot as a matter of logic har-
monize what certain peoples are reported as saying about their lives and 
how Cavell has construed our predicament. I am arguing rather that, as 
a matter of fact, I (we) don’t know how to reconcile the Cavellian picture 
with these (and I suspect countless other) cases of what other peoples say 
or have said about themselves. One could of course find oneself driven 
(or tempted?) to conclude that rather than regarding certain other socie-
ties as having a vastly different concept of the self, we should say that it 
is simply not clear how they can be regarded as having such a concept 
of self at all. I think there are reasons for resisting such a move, but in 
any case, it offers no help to the Cavellian picture, resting as that does on 
Cavell’s essentialist claim about the ubiquity of skepticism and its origi-
nating experience.181
VIII
Even if my arguments in the previous section should allay certain logical 
suspicions about my historicist-oriented critique of Cavellian skepticism, 
there are further concerns that I need to address. These pertain to my use 
of historical and anthropological texts in my critique of Cavell.
First, it might be argued that I have framed the issue wrong and have 
distorted the nature of Cavell’s main claim about what works such as 
Othello are meant to reveal about the human condition. At the begin-
ning of Part V, I provided a defense of my attributing to Cavell a kind 
of anthropology. This was directed in the first instance at those with an 
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empirical bent of mind who might resist or even resent this word being 
used to describe a thinker whose conclusions were primarily drawn from 
the arts. I  can imagine, however, howls of protest coming from other 
quarters to the effect that my critique of Cavell, drawing as it does on 
history and anthropology, completely misses its mark precisely because it 
construes him as making something like a universal empirical claim. The 
complaint might run like this: What you are in effect accusing Cavell of 
doing is making a hasty generalization. You are, that is, saying that he 
draws a false empirical generalization about the human condition from 
an inadequate data set. But that is not at all the kind of reasoning in 
which Cavell is engaged. He is taking himself and characters such as 
Lear and Othello as representatives of humanity, in the way in which an 
ethologist might say “the Canada lynx has long ear tufts, flared facial 
ruff, and short, bobbed tail with a completely black tip. It has unusually 
large paws that act like snowshoes in very deep snow, thick fur and long 
legs and feeds primarily on the snowshoe hare”. It would hardly be to 
the point, this line of counter-argument would continue, for you to assert 
that this statement was false because I had found a Canada lynx who 
didn’t eat meat. That would misunderstand the nature of the statement, 
which describes what is typical or representative of the Canada lynx. My 
attempt to refute the statement by pointing to our supposed vegetarian 
would merely reveal that I did not understand the grammar of such state-
ments in the first place.182 If this were so, then I would be in full agree-
ment with this argument. In fact, Geertz makes this very same point:
The notion that unless a cultural phenomenon is empirically univer-
sal it cannot reflect anything about the nature of man is about as logi-
cal as the notion that because sickle-cell anemia if, fortunately, not 
universal, it cannot tell us anything about human genetic processes.183
Well and good. I am not, however, accusing Cavell of making a hasty 
generalization, but rather of confusing a figure as representative for 
humanity who is rather better thought of as representative of one culture. 
If lots of our vegetarian lynxes start showing up in peoples’ vegetable 
patches in Alberta, we would have ample reason to rethink the worth of 
the ethologist’s original claim about lynx diet, however we wish to regard 
its grammatical status. Claims of what is typical of this or that kind of 
living creature are, to be sure, not the same as universal generalizations. 
But neither are they immune against observable facts.
More seriously, I might be accused of selectively choosing my sources 
and so stacking the deck against Cavell’s views. More specifically, some-
one might accuse me of presuming that Taylor can be employed against 
Cavell as “the voice of intellectual history” on the one hand, while 
Willerslev and others are called into service as the “voices of anthropol-
ogy” on the other. Whereas in truth, no one could responsibly pretend 
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that a single or small subset of thinkers can simply be taken as speak-
ing finally and authoritatively for their respective fields on a subject as 
vast as the nature of the self. This criticism could even be extended if 
someone wished to accuse me of taking myself to be the authoritative 
voice of these voices, thereby making a blunt instrument even blunter. 
And it is true that historical and anthropological data should not be 
cherry picked and hurled at one’s opponents, as much as that image 
appeals to me, and despite the fact that I believe philosophers some-
times deserve such treatment. But I am not assuming in any way that 
Taylor and Willserslev et al. are the only important voices here or that 
I am their only reliable reporter. They are all merely individual (albeit 
very pertinent) voices and my take on their takes is just that. It remains 
the case, however, that these works are part of the record, and granting 
for the moment that they have been competently researched and written 
and that my renderings are fair and balanced, they present a significant 
challenge to Cavell’s viewpoint. After all, since Cavell is the one making 
gestures at typicality, the burden of argument is on him. I merely have 
to play defense.
But not only do I not presume to be the sole legitimate voice for the 
anthropological and historical material sketched previously, I should also 
make clear that despite my reliance on his work, Willerslev and I may be 
in substantial disagreement about an important aspect of his findings. 
Recall that in Part V I  quoted a passage from a well-known paper in 
which Clifford Geertz asserted the peculiarity of the Western conception 
of the self. Willerslev appears to take deep exception to the sort of view 
he sees Geertz as representing. He writes,
My point is not that we should distinguish between two differ-
ent notions of the person, a Western one and a Yukaghir one. The 
anthropological literature is crammed with typologies of this kind 
that crudely contrast the firm self-other boundary of the Western per-
son with the fluid self-other boundary of the non-Western one. In my 
view, however, such bipolar types of personhood, even if conceived 
as ideal types, are widely overdrawn . . .184
This passage contains a footnote with a reference to an article by Melford 
Spiro that explicitly attacks what is taken as the Geertzian view, an attack 
which I thus take Willerslev to endorse.185 Taking a brief look at Spiro’s 
paper provides me with an additional opportunity for bringing out what 
I see as at stake in philosophical discussions of the self. (It will also make 
it more probable that Geertz is more philosophically sophisticated than 
most of his critics would have it.)
Spiro reveals that he was first stimulated to write in opposition to 
Geertz’s view not by Geertz’s original paper itself, but by two social psy-
chologists, Markus and Kitayama (1991), who follow him.186 Remarking 
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on their agreement with Geertz’s contention that the Western conception 
of the person is a “rather peculiar idea within the context of the world’s 
cultures”, Spiro asserts,
This statement, and their approval of it, struck me as strange, for, 
seeing that the person (which Markus and Kitayama, like Geertz, 
conflate with the self) has hardly been a focus of anthropological 
inquiry, it is not inaccurate to say that the person or self has been 
studied in only a small fraction of human societies.187
He soon adds,
To claim, however, that the Western conception of the self is different 
from that of the Indian or the Japanese or the Balinese conception 
is one thing, but to claim that in the context of the world cultures, 
the Western conception is “peculiar” is another, for the latter claim 
implies that typologically there are two conceptions of the self-a 
Western type, on the one hand, and a second type that is instantiated 
in all other societies.188
There seem to be several complaints here, which it will be useful to dis-
entangle. First, there is Spiro’s point that Geertz and his followers have 
failed to distinguish between the concept of the person and the concept 
of the self. Second, there is the claim that the concept of the person has 
simply received too little attention in the literature for the Geertzian view 
to have been validated. Third, there is an objection that the researchers 
whom Spiro criticizes have taken on an either/or typology of Western/
non-Western as the only legitimate axis of comparison for understand-
ing various cultural conceptions of the self (and/or person). And fourth, 
although Spiro doesn’t mention it explicitly in the passages just cited but 
does devote a fair amount of attention to it in his paper, he argues that as 
an empirical matter, Geertz’s talk of a “Western conception of the person 
as a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive 
universe” just isn’t that peculiar after all. Next, I will try to address all 
but the second objection.189
To begin with, I will take up Spiro’s and Willerslev’s third complaint, 
that the very talk of a Western/non-Western typology, or what for my 
purposes here I am taking to be the same, a buffered/non-buffered typol-
ogy, is somehow illegitimate. Spiro asserts that,
in my view a typology of the self and/or its cultural conception which 
consists of only two types, a Western and a non-Western, even if 
conceived as ideal types, is much too restrictive. Surely, some non-
Western selves, at least, are as different from one another as each, in 
turn, is different from any Western self.190
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“Ideal type” is of course Max Weber’s term of art. We will revisit it later 
when I discuss Spiro’s use of “cultural conception”, which I take to be 
more or less equivalent. For now, I merely want to point out that I believe 
that Willerslev and Spiro are at the very least uncharitable and quite likely 
just wrong in their complaint on this point. Let’s assume for a moment 
that there were good reasons for believing that “the Western, buffered” 
self really was in some sense unique, or at least atypical, so that a social 
scientist could with a relatively clean conscience assert that “Westerners 
are pretty much like this (buffered), while (most of) ‘the rest’ are not”. 
And let’s assume, moreover, that it is true as Willerslev asserts that much 
attention in the literature had been devoted to making the case that this 
is so. While it might lead us to ask why such a finding (if it is one) bared 
repeated pointing out, this alone would not necessarily make it irrelevant 
to emphasize it in any particular case. In fact, if this purported difference 
has received so much attention, this may be because it is considered by 
many researchers to be hugely important that one understand its history, 
contingency, and significance. But my main point here in responding to 
this objection is that the buffered/non-buffered dichotomy is of course 
only one axis of comparison and no one (and not Geertz) has so far as 
I can tell claimed that it is the sole legitimate characteristic to investigate. 
There are likely countless comparisons that can and have been employed 
by researchers, which lend support to diverse sorts of groupings. Some 
comparisons may rely on the same kind of either/or conceptual bifurcated 
structure as the buffered/non-buffered distinction does. Others may wish 
to avoid such sharp dichotomies and see fit to use a much more graded 
conceptual scale for the purposes of the comparison one wants to make. 
The upshot is that so long as no pernicious dogmas lie at their basis, there 
is no call for the writings of Geertz et al. to raise any unsavory suspicions 
about methodological framework.
In order to address the first and fourth objections, it will help if I give 
a short outline of Spiro’s own conceptual scheme for thinking about the 
questions at hand. Spiro’s arguments rest in large part on his reliance on 
three ideas and his claims that the work of the social scientists he criti-
cizes fails to respect the important distinctions between them. The three 
ideas are that of “cultural conception of the person”, “self-presentation”, 
and “self-representation”. According to Spiro, the cultural conception of 
the person is an ideal type of understanding of what a self is based on 
such generally shared public, cultural factors such as morals, religion, 
familiar artistic works, knowledge of social structure, ideology, etc. He 
notes first that,
some investigators ascertain the characteristics of the “self” and/
or its cultural conception as an inference from classical texts, some 
from cultural symbols, some from behavioral observations, some by 
means of eliciting procedures, and so on.191
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Subsequently he remarks that
typically, anthropologists (and comparative social psychologists) do 
not investigate the self or the individual’s conception of his self (the 
self-representation), but the cultural conception of the person. They 
mostly arrive at this conception by investigating some set of cultural 
symbols of a social group, from which they infer its cultural concep-
tion of the person, although in a few instances they do so by means 
of various experimental tasks.192
While Spiro does not accuse those social scientists whom he thinks traffic 
merely in cultural conceptions of the person as conducting their research 
entirely from the comfort of their libraries, and while he does not imply 
that the cultural conception of the person (or any other ideal type) is 
without some social scientific value, he thinks that to settle for such a 
generality for one’s understanding of the self is to settle far too cheaply.
It is difficult to clarify the next idea, self-presentation, without already 
drawing on ideas from the cultural conception, because through lan-
guage self-presentation already interfaces with the cultural conception. 
In a rough sense, we can say that according to Spiro, self-presentation is 
something like an individual’s conscious, conceptual take on herself as 
well as the self-articulation that she more or less consciously presents to 
others. If the social scientist bothers at all to conduct one on one inter-
views, then Spiro would likely say that it is the self-presentation she is 
likely to encounter, a kind of presentation that is usually deceptively shot 
through with the expected cultural generalities characteristic of the cul-
tural conception. The true self, in such cases, is obscured.
Spiro doesn’t provide much independent description in his paper about 
the level he terms “self-representation” (naturally), but it is clear that it is 
at this fundamentally individual bio-psychological, affective, and largely 
unconscious level where the real investigative work ought to focus. Suf-
fice to say, he thinks this all-important level escapes the likes of Geertz 
and his co-interpretivists, stuck as they are at the levels of the purely 
symbolic. He complains that
most of these studies assume that cultural conceptions of the person 
are isomorphic with the actors’ conceptions of the self, and some also 
assume that they are isomorphic with the actors’ mental representa-
tions of their self, and with their self itself.193
His explanation for such negligence is that many anthropologists remain 
unfortunately
committed to the regnant theory of wholesale cultural determinism, 
they take it as self-evident . . . that cultural conceptions of the self are 
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isomorphic not only with the actors’ conception of the self, but with 
their mental representation of their own self as well.194
Presumably what Spiro means by “wholesale cultural determinism” is 
something like a quasi-mechanical top-down determination not only 
of the ways in which actors present themselves to the public (including 
themselves) but also a cultural colonizing of their deepest private somatic 
sense of themselves. On this basis Spiro concludes that
[h]aving learned the hard way that one cannot validly infer actors’ 
conception of the self, let alone their mental representations of 
their own self, from the normative cultural conception, it is not 
surprising that I was rather skeptical of Geertz’s claim that from 
a study of symbolic cultural forms alone, one can validly infer 
the manner in which people “actually represent themselves to 
themselves.”195
Based on the distinctions between the cultural conception of the self (more 
or less identical with the concept of a person for Spiro), self-presentation, 
and self-representation, Spiro is able to lay out some specific objections 
against “wholesale cultural determinism”. With regard to Markus and 
Kitayama, Spiro maintains that their
statement that in non-Western societies “others are included within 
the boundaries of the self” would mean that an individual’s other-
representations are located within his self-representation, and such a 
condition (according to modern psychiatry) is a sign of rather severe 
psychopathology.196
Spiro elaborates a bit further on:
[I]f for Markus and Kitayama the term “self” denotes (as I think is 
most likely the case) some psychological entity (an ego, a soul, an “I”) 
within the person, and “others” denotes such an entity within other 
persons, then non-Western peoples, for whom “others” are allegedly 
included within the boundaries of the self, would be characterized 
by little, if any, self-other differentiation, and like William James and 
A. I. Hallowell, I find such a notion very difficult to comprehend. 
Thus, both James and Hallowell, respectively the preeminent psycho-
logical and anthropological (cross-cultural) theorists of the self (in 
my view at any rate), construe self-other differentiation—the sense 
that one’s self, or one’s own person, is bounded, or separate from 
all other persons—as a distinguishing feature of the very notion of 
human nature.197
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On this point, Spiro thus concludes as follows:
Although Geertz contends that in his studies of Bali, Java, and 
Morocco he has employed “symbolic forms” to describe the actors’ 
own “sense of self”  .  .  .  , in my judgment he has employed them 
to describe the ways in which actors are often designated and iden-
tified by others, and in which they often present themselves to 
others. In other words, although he has described the actors’ self-
presentation, he has not described their “sense of self,” or their 
self-representation.198
In addition to the previous arguments based mainly on purportedly 
neglected conceptual distinctions, Spiro also makes recourse to research 
conducted in Bali by Unni Wikan that he believes empirically refutes 
Geertz’s views, in particular by showing up his more dramatic claims 
such as that in Balinese social life “It is dramatis personae, not actors, 
that endure; indeed, it is dramatis personae, not actors, that in the proper 
sense really exist”.199 A  few of the offending passages from Geertz’s 
earlier writings on Balinese culture provide some vivid examples of the 
ideas that Spiro sees Wikan’s research as refuting. In one passage, Geertz 
claims that
The various “village chiefs” and “folk priests” on the Sudra level, 
and, on the Triwangas, the hosts of “kings,” “princes,” “lords,” and 
“high priests” do not merely occupy a role. They become, in the eyes 
of themselves and those around them, absorbed into it. They are 
truly public men, men for whom other aspects of personhood – indi-
vidual character, birth order, kinship relations, procreative status, 
and prestige rank take, symbolically at least, a secondary position. 
We, focusing upon psychological traits as the heart of personal iden-
tity, would say they have sacrificed their true selves to their role; 
they, focusing on social position, say that their role is of the essence 
of their true selves.200
A few pages on, we find much the same idea:
The nearly faceless, thoroughly conventionalized, never-changing 
icons by which nameless gods known only by their public titles are, 
year after year, represented in the thousands of temple festivals across 
the island comprise the purest expression of the Balinese concept of 
personhood. Genuflecting to them (or, more precisely, to the gods for 
the moment resident in them) the Balinese are not just acknowledg-
ing divine power. They are also confronting the image of what they 
consider themselves at bottom to be; an image which the biological, 
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psychological, and sociological concomitants of being alive, the mere 
materialities of historical time, tend only to obscure from site.201
Geertz sums up his interpretation with the terse assertion: “The illumi-
nating paradox of Balinese formulations of personhood is that they are – 
in our terms anyway – depersonalizing”.202
According to Spiro, Wikan’s work shows that the Balinese, pace Geertz, 
are not merely or even primarily concerned with a cultural conception 
of the person or in the public personae the cultural conception extracts 
from them in their self-presentation, but instead are centrally occupied 
with their individual emotional states in a way that indicates they experi-
ence their inner lives as every bit as much of a bounded, unique, more 
or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe as does the typical 
Westerner. Spiro claims that Wikan’s more psychologically focused inves-
tigations reveal that
the Balinese have a constant concern with health, which is hardly 
surprising given that half of all deaths are attributed either to black 
magic perpetrated by “intimate others,” or to poison administered 
by them. Moreover, for the Balinese, she writes, the self is experi-
enced as “steadily exposed to myriad health-endangering forces. . . . 
Fellow beings, deities, demons, sundry (super) natural spirits, and 
the souls of the dead can strike a person sick or dead”. Again, “the 
Balinese live in a world where murder or attempted murder resulting 
in sickness from sorcery is the order of the day”.203
He adds later,
Thus, Balinese actors fear their own anger, according to Wikan, 
because of their belief that should they offend others, the latter will 
use sorcery and poison to make them ill, and they will suffer super-
natural punishment, as well.204
According to Spiro, these considerations show that the Balinese are as 
individualistic in their self-presentation as the supposedly peculiar West-
erner. In fact, in a twist towards the end of his paper, Spiro contends that 
not only is the allegedly peculiar Western self not peculiar within the con-
text of world cultures, it is nothing but a mere “straw man” even within 
the context of the West itself: “No major Western student of the self, 
none at any rate that I am aware of, holds the view that the self, Western 
or otherwise, is not interdependent.205 Spiro’s conclusion is thus that
there is evidence for the proposition that many putative characteris-
tics of the Western self, which allegedly make it “peculiar,” are to a 
greater or lesser degree also found in the non-Western self; conversely, 
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many putative characteristics of the non-Western self, which alleg-
edly are its distinguishing features, are to a greater or lesser degree 
also found in the Western self.206
In response to Spiro’s claim that a failure to respect conceptual distinc-
tions accounts for a large part of the error he attributes to Geertz and others, 
I would argue that while it is doubtless a mistake to think that one can sim-
ply read off what Spiro calls “self-presentation” and “self- representation” 
from cultural conceptions, it is also dubious in the extreme to believe that 
these three categorizations can be somehow understood in conceptual iso-
lation from one another. For example, the very idea that self-representation 
can be made intelligible in logical isolation from the shared concepts of 
language, and so the cultural conception, in which each individual par-
takes, is a fantasy. Presumably even a psychologically focused investiga-
tion into an individual’s sense of herself, her self- representation, one that 
aims to bypass what she might be inclined to share, her self-presentation, 
is going to have to make use of concepts drawn from a shared language. 
And it’s hard to see how this will not involve relying on concepts con-
nected to the cultural conception of the person. Without being isomor-
phic, concepts taken from the language of the culture, the concepts I rely 
on in my conscious modes of self-interpretation (my self-presentation), 
and my own sense of myself (my self- representation) are bound to inter-
penetrate each other. What is the alternative? Is it the idea that we can 
somehow make sense of a language of thought, a private language as it 
were, that each individual speaks to herself and that exists in logical iso-
lation from the public language she shares with others? Is the suggestion 
that anthropologists practice mind reading?
As for Spiro’s assertion that the experience of a kind of non-buffered 
interpenetration of self and other ascribed to various non-Western peoples 
by some social scientists is better described as an implausible inadvert-
ent ascription of mass psychopathology, this is contested by Willerslev’s 
and Viveiros de Castro’s descriptions of a central aspect of Yukaghir and 
Amerindian animism respectively, namely, the persistently felt need to 
distinguish oneself from the animal world so that one does not simply 
vanish into a fusion of selves. Neither Willerslev nor Viveiros de Cas-
tro feel tempted to offer a psychiatric interpretation of their informants. 
Spiro reports that he finds such things difficult to understand; I can cer-
tainly agree with that. Yet I would have thought that such a sense of 
difficulty would be a place for anthropological reflection to begin rather 
than a place for it to stop.207
Next, Spiro’s employment of Wikan’s work in Bali fails badly as a cri-
tique of Geertz. The cited examples, far from exhibiting an inner sense 
of individual independence, actually illustrate how the cultural concep-
tion of a person in Bali, including the idea that “intimate others” are 
capable of inflicting evil on one’s self, actually interpenetrates people’s 
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inner self-representation of who they are. Indeed, it does so in a way that 
flatly contradicts the idea that self-representation and cultural concep-
tion are sharply differentiated in this case. If Wikan’s descriptions are 
reliable, the “others” seem to reach right to the core of the self. Rather 
than providing a non-Western example of a bounded, buffered self, the 
examples show precisely the opposite. The Javanese fear of the effects 
of both black magic from without and the effects of negative emotions 
on others from within read to me like textbook descriptions of porosity. 
The specific ideational content of such fears reveals a subject’s sense of 
himself as non-buffered, not bounded, and dependent.208
Finally, there is Spiro’s assertion that no major Western student of the 
self ever held the view that the self is not interdependent. Except for 
William James and A.I. Hallowell, I am not certain whom Spiro counts 
as a major student of the self. Presumably Spiro would exclude Luther, 
Calvin, Descartes, Pascal, and Kant, who despite their substantial con-
tributions to our present self-understanding chose to disregard the obvi-
ous empirical facts of human development, viz. that each of us is born 
biologically and psychologically helpless and must receive enough care 
in our earliest years to make responsible adulthood possible. What their 
contributions to the peculiar modern view stem from, however, is pre-
cisely, for better or worse, their not stopping at these facts, but instead 
offering their articulations of an individualistic conception of the self that 
is shaped by the requirements of a philosophical view of human agency 
and cognition. However much this view sits in tension with a more inter-
actionist perspective, it has clearly had enormous historical significance 
for how people have regarded themselves in the modern West.
In the end, whether Geertz is correct to declare the Western conception 
of the self to be a “peculiar thing” is largely an empirical matter. So far 
as I know, the buffered self as it is designated in modern Western epis-
temology has only found mass instantiation once.209 The key elements 
of that conception, as one sees perhaps most clearly in Descartes, are 
that of a morally independent integrated motivational and cognitive uni-
verse. Crucially, they entail a view of the self as normatively and logically 
distinct from the “external world”. Secondary qualities, moral “proper-
ties”, and rationality itself are collapsed into the self, which thus gazes 
out on a completely disenchanted world of objects. While what Hume 
said of skepticism may also be true of this sense of isolation from the 
world, that no sooner does one leave one’s room and engage in practical 
activity than it becomes psychologically remote, the sense of the world 
as epistemologically remote and disenchanted is still educated common 
sense in much of the contemporary West. (In certain circles, even to ques-
tion the subject/object divide is to run the risk being accused of trafficking 
in hocus pocus.)
Far from aligning with the depiction of the Western conception 
offered by Geertz and others, the Balinese examples Spiro cites against 
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it serve instead to reveal people who understand themselves as living 
in direct epistemological, semantic, moral, and causal contact with a 
“normatively structured” world. If Taylor is roughly right, then not 
long after the Protestant Reformation and the rise of capitalism not 
only the lifeworld of intellectuals, but much of everyday life in Europe 
was undergoing systematic disenchantment in a manner that would 
have rendered it nearly impossible to understand in the terms Wikan 
finds apt in modern Bali. The kind of pietism described by Weber was 
not just for the scientifically or philosophically educated, but character-
izes a worldview inhabited by the more broadly educated public. For 
the educated classes in Europe and North America, the scientific revolu-
tion followed by the Enlightenment put the final touches on the process 
of banishing both God and human mental life from nature. This is what 
I take Geertz to be referring to in the quotation at issue; I suspect it is 
pretty peculiar.
IX
The main reason for my extended discussions of historical and ethno-
graphic material was to make it more plausible that Cavell’s view of our 
essential human condition as one of separateness is in effect an ethno-
centric dogma, albeit perhaps a tacit one. In addition, however, my dis-
cussion also touches indirectly on a closely related issue that goes to the 
heart of Cavell’s vision of language. I will briefly take this up now.
As we saw earlier, Cavell treats the possibility of skepticism as essen-
tially tied to his insight that criteria are not self-applying, that they need 
to be projected into a context of use. This point is at the center of his 
argument that the skeptic’s procedure, which is launched by claims such 
as “here is a hand” or “here is a piece of wax”, involves the assumption 
that these utterances have specific significance despite their being uttered 
in a “non-claim” context. In other words, the criteria guiding the use of 
these expressions are taken by the skeptic to be magically self-applying, 
an idea Cavell rightly finds unintelligible. In order to be projected into 
a context, language thus requires the correlative concept of a language 
user, a particular kind of agent. This requirement for projection in a con-
text, moreover, is internal to the contingency of language, in particular to 
its teaching and learning, but also to the inevitable failures and mistakes 
in our projections. It is the intrinsic difficulty we humans experience liv-
ing with this essential contingency that generates skepticism. The very 
idea of the consequences of such failures, let alone their actual occasions, 
exacerbate our latent sense of being locked out that these failures make 
manifest. Given that the criteria we project are our distinctly human way 
of reaching the world and reaching each other, it seems understandable 
that the naked isolation that such failure reveals, especially in a best-case 
scenario, could prove terrifying.
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But this issue of linguistic agency may appear to raise a serious prob-
lem for my claims that there are no compelling reasons for thinking that 
Cavell’s understanding of the self is universally valid. If his specific ontol-
ogy is actually necessary for the very concept of linguistic agency, we would 
be faced with some unattractive options in light of the anthropological 
material I have discussed. In other words, we would be faced with a ques-
tion as to how, given what many ethnographers report, their informants’ 
statements could be the expressions of language users at all. “Logically”, 
I suppose, we could infer that, lacking the required agency, these people 
are not language users at all. But not only is this option absurd, it is belied 
by the fact that self-descriptions indicating a non-buffered self pervade the 
historical and anthropological record. One could perhaps hold that eth-
nographic and historical data on the self might be highly misleading for 
thinking about the nature of informants’ actual relationship to language 
use. That is, if the notion of “self” that Cavell takes for granted is taken to 
be identical with the underlying essential nature of language users, then it 
looks like from the Cavellian perspective the cultures I have described pre-
viously must be massively deluded about their language and lives. In effect, 
they are not the kind of creatures with language they think they are. I will 
return to this idea later. For now, I want to explore another possibility.
Putting what I just called the “absurd” option schematically might be 
useful.
1. If there is language, then there must be a Cavellian agent.
2. Certain cultural contexts lack such an agent.
3. Therefore, there is no language in those contexts.
But why should we accept the identification in premise 1) of a language 
user with Cavell’s understanding of the self? If the requirement is only 
that there be an agent in some sense, and it is far from obvious that we 
have any pre-given notion of just what that sense is, then 3) does not nec-
essarily follow. No doubt the very idea of a language having no concep-
tion of linguistic agency at all, a language that lacked usages we would 
most naturally translate as “I said it”, “She said it”, etc. is difficult to 
make sense of. But this is a long way from entailing the specific character-
istics we find Cavell attributing to the self in his rendering of skepticism. 
Cavell apparently regards ordinary empirical bodily and psychological 
individuatedness, that I am I and you are you, as facts that inevitably 
should lead us to interpret ourselves as metaphysically separate, and so 
as intrinsically threatened by the catastrophic possibility of skepticism. 
However, this view is precisely what I  think the historical and ethno-
graphic record contests. Addressing this very issue Taylor writes,
When moderns read of, say, shamanistic cultures where they are 
alleged to believe that the human person has three souls and that one 
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of them can travel outside and even remain there for a time, they find 
it hard to know what to make of this information. Does it mean that 
these people don’t share our sense of the unity of the person or the 
link/identity of a person with his or her body, that they don’t count 
persons in the same way as we do? We can probably be confident 
that on one level human beings of all times and places have shared a 
very similar sense of ‘me’ and ‘mine’. In those days when a Palaeo-
lithic hunting group was closing in on a mammoth, when the plan 
went awry and the beast was lunging towards hunter A, something 
similar to the thought ‘Now I’m for it’ crossed A’s mind. And when at 
the last moment, the terrifying animal lurched to the left and crushed 
B’s head instead, a sense of relief mingled with grief for poor B was 
what A experienced. In other words, the members of the group must 
have had very much the same sense that we would in their place: here 
is one person, and there is another, and which one survives/flourished 
depends on which person/body is run over by that mammoth.210
Nevertheless, Taylor also rightly objects to the common sense equiva-
lence between psycho-biological integrity and metaphysical agency.
But . . . as solid as this localization may seem, and anchored in the 
very nature of the human agent, it is in large part a feature of our 
world, the world of modern, Western people. The localization is not 
a universal one, which human beings recognize as a matter of course, 
as they do for instance that their heads are above their torsos. Rather, 
it is a function of a historically limited mode of self-interpretation, 
one which has become dominant in the modern West and which may 
indeed spread thence to other parts of the globe, but which had a 
beginning in time and space and may have an end.211
That there must be some sort of linguistic agent is one thing; whether we 
have to construe the language user in the manner in which Cavell does, 
taking for granted the metaphysical picture of an isolated self that we 
have seen is far from universal, is quite another.
Naturally, Cavell never denies the “social embeddedness” of language. 
But for all that his picture of language and language users is a highly indi-
vidualistic one. In fact, there is something Sartrean about Cavell’s under-
standing of our individual responsibility for the application of criteria. It 
is reminiscent of Sartre’s description of the responsibility one constantly 
exercises for “choosing not to jump” from a steep precipice as one trav-
erses a narrow mountain path. One wants to say, “Okay okay, I get the 
point, I’m choosing with every step not to jump”. But just because you 
may succeed in convincing me of this sort of intentionalistic story after 
the fact doesn’t mean that this reveals the true nature of agency.212 To 
say “I use the word blindly”, leaving in place as it does the fact that my 
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training into a practice can in many cases just do its work transparently, 
in no way detracts from the fact that it is still a case of my speaking. That 
meaning doesn’t just “take care of itself”, doesn’t imply that I am (or 
even could be) consciously or unconsciously obsessively involved with 
my every act of meaning. Indeed, the Cavellian self may appear to be a 
requirement for language use exactly because of the skeptical contexts 
that emerge in his depictions, where the horror of isolation resulting from 
the possible failure of criteria is at the forefront. Yet what if the self-
interpretation precedes, and even precipitates, the horror, rather than the 
horror revealing the true nature of the self?
Cavell writes in the The Claim of Reason
What we take to be necessary in a given period may alter. It is not 
logically impossible that painters should now paint in ways which 
outwardly resemble paintings of the Renaissance, nor logically nec-
essary that they now paint in the ways they do. What is necessary is 
that, in order for us to have the form of experience we count as an 
experience of a painting, we accept something as a painting. And we 
do not know a priori what we will accept as such a thing. But only 
someone outside such an enterprise could think of it as a manipula-
tion or exploration of mere convention.213
The combination here of a historical sensibility with the rejection of 
social constructivism in the last sentence is admirable. Unfortunately, 
Cavell extends a line of reasoning here to matters of aesthetic ontology 
that he withholds when it comes to the ontology of skepticism.214 Yet the 
more we admit historical understanding into our philosophical view of 
what we mean by the self, the more we must also admit it into our view 
of the everyday world to which the self constantly relates. If there is no 
good reason to think of either of these as “natural kinds”, then the rela-
tion between them cannot simply be taken as given. This idea opens up 
the possibility that while “I am I” and “you are you” and each of us is an 
individual language user, how we respond to the failure of criteria or the 
betrayal of others will not be necessarily characterizable in the fraught 
self-world (and self-other) terms in which Cavell understands them. 
Rather, the empirical language user’s response to this or that failure will 
only be intelligible in terms of how he or she already understands that 
relation. And we have seen that there are strong reasons for regarding 
such understanding as heterogeneous.
X
A
It is now time for me to make good on a promise I made in Part II C, 
namely, that I would eventually address some of Cavell’s remarks that 
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concern the historical context of modern skepticism, remarks which 
prima facie may not seem to fit comfortably with my claim that his story 
is fundamentally ahistorical. First, it is worth pointing out that there are 
places throughout his corpus where Cavell not only shows sensitivity to 
historical context, but actually exhibits historicist sensibilities. For exam-
ple, in the early essay “A Matter of Meaning It”, Cavell expresses clear 
opposition to the idea that modernism simply revealed essential facts 
about the nature of art that were waiting fully intact to be discovered.
To say that the modern “lays bare” may suggest that there was some-
thing concealed in traditional art which hadn’t, for some reason, been 
noticed, or that what the modern throws over—tonality, perspective, 
narration, the absent fourth wall, etc.—was something inessential to 
music, painting, poetry, and theater in earlier periods. These would 
be false suggestions. For it is not that now we finally know the true 
condition of art; it is only that someone who does not question that 
condition has nothing, or not the essential thing, to go on in address-
ing the art of our period.215
In similar fashion, I have already cited passages where Cavell could easily 
be interpreted as holding that he actually believes skepticism’s conceptual 
connection with modernity to be closer than my subsequent discussion 
would suggest.216 Remarks with an historical bent that touch on skepti-
cism are scattered throughout Cavell’s work. In The Claim of Reason 
we read that “It should be considered also that an initiating form for the 
achievement of privacy would be the convulsion of sensibility we call 
the rise of Protestantism”.217 In the introduction to Disowning Knowl-
edge from 1987, Cavell writes of “the historical trauma that sets the 
scene for skepticism (or for which skepticism sets the place), the scene in 
which modern philosophy finds itself”.218 In “The Uncanniness of the 
Ordinary” from 1986, he refers to the acknowledgement of otherness in 
certain works of film and literature as a “datable event in the unfolding 
of philosophical skepticism in the West”.219 Finally, in “Something Out 
of the Ordinary” from 1997 he asks “can the great literature of the West 
not have responded to whatever in history has caused this convulsion in 
the conditions of human existence?”220
Cavell says what he says about modernism presumably because he 
understands that an attempt to account for the changes in the ontol-
ogy of art that is conceptually divorced from the practices through 
which we articulate our understanding of those changes is tantamount 
to metaphysical realism about “the real nature of art”. It is incoherent 
because it requires that we strip ourselves of the very resources we rely 
on to articulate what it is we want to say and think. Unfortunately, he 
does not extend the same consideration to the modern understanding of 
the self. While Cavell acknowledges a relation between modernity and 
his understanding of skepticism, the nature of this relation is seriously 
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underdeveloped in his writings. Interpreted charitably, one could say that 
there is simply a fundamental tension in Cavell’s thought as to whether 
the possibility of skepticism is an essential part of the human condition 
or more historical in nature. But in the end, not only in terms of the 
sheer numbers of countervailing remarks, but more importantly in terms 
of their trenchant rhetoric and logical role in his overall presentations, 
the weight of the textual evidence strongly mitigates against anything on 
Cavell’s part like a consistent and robust historical understanding of the 
nature of skepticism.
I find little indication of an appreciation in Cavell’s work of the his-
torical horizon of skepticism, as a phenomenon caught up in a dialectic 
between, on the one hand, circumstances beyond human control, and 
on the other, historically particular forms of agency and articulations of 
valuations, which together shaped social reality. Lacking an acknowl-
edgement of the logical depth of practices for making sense of what it 
means to be a self, talk of our fundamental condition as being one of sep-
arateness and isolation is naïve at best, dogmatic at worst. While Cavell 
frequently mentions modernity as the period during which the Western 
understanding of selfhood underwent a fundamental shift, he seems to 
construe that shift as a case where certain budding intellectual and psy-
chological techniques for uncovering an entity already lying beneath 
the veil of traditional culture dovetailed with the social conditions that 
permitted those techniques’ successive refinement and application. The 
reception of the “results” were registered with approval (by the right 
people) in a way that reinforced the idea of a sharp separation between 
the contexts of discovery and justification, if you will, of what had been 
“found”. We thus read in The World Viewed:
So far as photography satisfied a wish, it satisfied a wish not confined 
to painters, but the human wish, intensifying in the West since the 
Reformation, to escape subjectivity and metaphysical isolation – a 
wish for the power to reach this world, having for so long tried, at 
last hopelessly, to manifest fidelity to another.221
We saw previously in the case of modernism that Cavell sometimes envis-
ages historical change without his invoking a need for such change to be 
underwritten or guided by something like a constant referential substrate 
(the nature of art). But when it comes to the self, for all his sophistica-
tion, he seems to imagine the matter as though one could speak of some 
brute bare particular underlying our mental life, with no accounting for 
how that ostensive trick is supposed to be pulled off. I am emphatically 
not saying that the modern self is a “social construct”, or that it was 
“created” by language. I am saying, however, that to regard its historical 
emergence on the model of a quasi-empirical discovery of an entity, inde-
pendently intelligible as already there apart from the broader cultural 
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context of moral and other social practices within which we speak and 
think of the self at all, is a profoundly dubious business.
B
We have seen not only that the ethnographic record reveals peoples for 
whom Cavell’s understanding of the self is alien, but also that there is 
no compelling philosophical reason for thinking that they are (or were) 
somehow wrong about the facts. In particular, in my analysis of Spiro’s 
criticisms of Geertz, I  tried to undercut the idea that there was any 
obvious basis for believing that a Cavellian-like take on metaphysical 
separateness could be grounded in the facts of our bodily separation.222 
Moreover, it is actually very far from obvious that a conceptual or inter-
pretative system with that particular self-understanding is somehow 
“truer to the facts” than are other systems that embody a different self-
understanding. In dealing with Cavell’s occasional references to history, 
I have also touched on the possibility that he regards a certain constella-
tion of modern cultural institutions such as Protestantism, science, and 
liberalism which emerged coevally with the modern self-understanding, 
as somehow most revealing and expressive of the human condition. Now 
Cavell would certainly be right to resist the suggestion that we could sim-
ply shrug off our modern understanding of the self (whether precisely his 
own or some related iteration), even if there were weighty considerations 
for wanting to do so. It might be held, for instance, that once the historic-
ity of our concept of the self (or any concept, for that matter) becomes 
known, then merely by agreeing to speak differently we could loosen its 
grip. This is naïve and unrealistic. The centrality in our thought of our 
concept what it is to be a self runs much deeper than can be accounted 
for by any mere agreements we could drop or adopt. Nevertheless, we 
are only required to regard skepticism as rooted in our biological nature 
if our conception of the role that historical ideas and practices, especially 
linguistic practices, play in shaping our self-understanding is a superfi-
cial and passive one. According to one such thin interpretation, before 
modernity took hold in the West, and still to this day in many societies, 
a metaphysically separate subject labors under the weight of arbitrary 
cultural baggage.
I mean to press hard here on a very real, even if implicit, difficulty at 
the heart of Cavell’s work, a difficulty which I can put in two questions: 
Should our modern understanding of the self be taken to represent a kind 
of uncovering of something already there? Or is it better understood as a 
historical phenomenon that inevitably developed out of the very logic of 
human thought? This is not a dilemma in the sense that these two ques-
tions comprise two mutually exclusive logical possibilities. (There is at 
least one even less plausible option remaining with which I will deal at 
the end of this part.) I believe, however, that the respective metaphysical 
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and epistemological thrusts of these two questions are most likely to 
capture the philosophical space in which Cavell operates. Consequently, 
negative answers to both questions reveal that there is a profound prob-
lem with Cavell’s view of skepticism. I will first address the ontologically 
inflected notion of the modern self as discovery because that expresses 
the assumption to which I suspect Cavell is actually committed.
What should we say about peoples for whom skepticism, as Cavell 
understands it, simply does not manifest, whether in art, music, philoso-
phy, or literature? We could reject the premise of the question, dig in our 
heels, and simply insist that the basis for skepticism must be found in all 
peoples in all times: separateness is, after all, supposed to be the human 
condition. On the other hand, we might accept that while it appears as 
though skepticism as Cavell understands it is not a ubiquitous anthropo-
logical phenomenon, all language users have a relation to the possibility 
of skepticism. The right response to this is to say, “yes and no”. In a 
purely formal sense, of course, all language users can be said to have such 
a relation, if only because, as I have already maintained in agreement 
with Cavell, no incommensurability thesis is forthcoming that would 
show that it is theoretically “impossible” to formulate skepticism within 
some mode of thought in which, as of yet, skepticism does not presently 
arise. There is, moreover, no logical guarantee that given enough time, 
we might also get them to be troubled by philosophical skepticism, in 
particular through arguing for (or “persuading” them of) the correct-
ness of the modern model of our epistemological predicament, and of the 
generally Cartesian understanding of selfhood implicit in that model. But 
what should we say about the fact that, as of now, many people do not 
seem to fall into epistemological quandaries of the sort characteristic of 
skepticism? Do we want to rest our whole case for universality on such 
a thin notion, that they have a relation to skepticism as a merely formal 
possibility (which really amounts to a lack of a formal impossibility)? 
Should we say that “their” possibility of skepticism is just like “ours”, 
but that we really do succumb to it on occasion, whereas it just so hap-
pens, as a matter of fact, that they don’t? Isn’t this difference significant? 
We could try to explain this difference by saying that the reason they 
don’t worry about the catastrophic failure of knowledge is that knowl-
edge is not important to them. That seems wrong to me. Maybe it would 
be better to say that their relationship to knowledge is a very different 
one from ours. But then how might we try to account for this? By view-
ing them as primitive, child-like, superstitious, or repressed because they 
do not act like we do and have difficulty understanding how and why 
someone could worry about such things? Strathern writes aptly here that
[A] disjunction between the ideal and the real or between ideology 
and practice is in the first place a disjunction between different types 
of data within the anthropological narrative. This differentiation is 
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taken as evidence for what might be judged as concealed or revealed 
in the culture. But again we have to be clear that we are talking 
about what the outsider would regard as concealed, and not about 
the relationships and structures that the actors deliberately conceal 
from themselves. To repeat on observation made earlier, people can-
not conceal from themselves what they do not know.223
But I  can already hear the objection: “Fair enough, but whether they 
know it (and repress it, or not) the human condition is as it is: sepa-
rate”. Such a dogmatic response would come close to maintaining that, 
the historical and ethnographic work be damned, the human self is just 
“there” like a natural kind, and our use of “I” has always referred to it, 
rigidly, as it were; as a group, we moderns just happened to be the first 
to catch on to this fact. How exactly we pulled off this miraculous feat 
of insight de novo, where others before and after had failed (or fled), is, 
well, pretty miraculous. Yet if we allow that historically specific prac-
tices were constitutive of what we are talking about when we speak of 
a self as we have commonly come to do, as a psychological entity logi-
cally walled off from the world, if, that is, we allow in the present case 
that ontological categories track cultural ones,224 then this self starts to 
look like a historically emergent entity (my avoidance of “socially con-
structed” is intentional).
Cavell’s thought seems merely to recapitulate the idea that there is 
an inevitable connection between the arrangements of modernity and 
human nature itself. For all of his brilliance and originality, he seems 
to be another in a long line of adherents to the implausible outlook that 
Taylor calls a “subtraction story”, whereby “we naturally come to think 
that we have selves the way we have heads or arms, and inner depths 
the way we have hearts or livers, as a matter of hard, interpretation-
free, fact”.225 Anticipating Taylor by several years, Geertz remarks on 
this widespread tendency to take for granted a common denominator of 
self-understanding:
In the Enlightenment case, the elements of this essential type were 
to be uncovered by stripping the trappings of culture away from 
actual men and seeing what then was left – natural man. In classical 
anthropology, it was to be uncovered by factoring out the common-
alities in culture and seeing what then appeared – consensual man. 
In either case, the result is the same as that which tends to emerge 
in all typological approaches to scientific problems generally: the 
differences among individuals and among groups of individuals are 
rendered secondary. Individuality comes to be seen as eccentric-
ity, distinctiveness as accidental deviation from the only legitimate 
object of study for the true scientist: the underlying, unchanging, 
normative type.226
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Although it would he highly misleading to attribute a standard Enlighten-
ment subtraction story to Cavell, according to which the stripping away 
of the conventional accretions of culture reveals us to be a disengaged 
Lockean shopkeeper, his corpus remains a subtraction story in the end, 
even if a labyrinthian one: it’s just that what was there all along waiting 
to be liberated from the oppressive bonds of tradition was not a rational 
soul, but a compulsive neurotic. The story that most philosophers have 
told themselves amounts to a final Victorian cover up of the awful truth: 
that deep down the whole time we were all Alvy Singer. So much for 
eschewing with explanations in philosophy.
C
Given the stark contrast between Taylor’s historical sensibility and what 
I take to be Cavell’s basically ahistorical attitude, it may be surprising to 
note that in one respect at least, Cavell’s view of the self may in fact be 
close to a position that Taylor has advocated in some of his earlier work 
on relativism in the social sciences. Taylor has criticized Peter Winch’s 
argument that the religious and magical practices of cultures such as that 
of the Azande are immune to external criticism, especially modern sci-
entific criticism. Winch accused those who would make such external 
critiques of committing a logical blunder rooted in ethnocentricity, by 
which he meant in part that religious and magical practices and scientific 
practices are conceptually heterogeneous.227
It should be clear by now that I have little sympathy for this sort of 
maneuver. Yet Taylor points out that Winch’s attempt to avoid ethnocen-
tricity betrays its own type of ahistorical thinking. Taylor contends that 
Winch’s taking for granted a purely expressivist symbolic view of religion 
and magic is in fact alien to the very cultures whose traditions he seeks to 
shield from scientific criticism. Winch’s point was that because religion 
and magic are purely expressive activities on the one hand, while science is 
in the business of getting things right about nature on the other, to attack 
the former by employing standards taken from the latter is to commit a 
category mistake.228 Taylor rightly objects to this move on the grounds 
that Winch’s own position actually depends on the anachronistic imposi-
tion of a modern sharp fact-value distinction onto systems of thought 
where the factual and expressive were not clearly distinguished.229
Taylor does not stop there, however. He goes on to claim that modern 
science can score “objective points” against the Azande or the Renais-
sance magus, since the modern scientist can clearly provide a superior 
account of disenchanted nature. I find it strange for Taylor to make this 
argument just here, since it involves a move that at least looks structurally 
identical to the one for which he criticizes Winch. This is because making 
the judgement that the modern scientific descriptions of nature are better 
simpliciter involves a prior commitment to the overall legitimacy of a fact 
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value distinction. Obviously, once that prior distinction is accepted, then 
certainly modern science can be judged to be superior to the enchanted 
understanding. In general, if one wishes to compare two substantially dif-
ferent conceptual systems in some respect, the more discontinuity that one 
can disregard, the easier it becomes to imagine the comparison between 
them as being truth apt; it is easier to articulate continuity and com-
mensurability if there already is some taken-for-granted continuity and 
commensurability.230 Yet as Taylor himself argues, fact and value were 
not understood as sharply separated before the modern period, and so 
his claim that modern science explains the world more successfully than 
could the Renaissance magician, while true, seems to presume that we 
can already see the disenchanted understanding of nature as implicit in 
and continuous with the renaissance worldview. And this in turn requires 
that we are able to see the two aspects for ourselves as already factored 
even before they became factorized for us. But this is in essence precisely 
what Taylor rejects in his criticism of Winch’s argument from incommen-
surability. More peculiar still, Taylor explicitly denies the very idea of the 
overall “global superiority” of the modern fact/value distinction over the 
pre-modern integrated view, which is precisely what assuming the objec-
tive superiority of the results of disenchantment would seem to require.231 
The upshot is that connecting Taylor’s articulation of realism in thinking 
about natural kinds across conceptual and historical differences won’t 
make the case for realism about the self in Cavell’s work any stronger.
Someone might object that my criticisms of Taylor on this point serve 
only to bring out that I am neglecting a relevant difference between the 
kind of cases he is addressing, which concern natural kinds in the “exter-
nal world”, and the present case of the emergence of the understanding 
of the modern punctual self. That is, someone might feel that the ques-
tion of continuity vs. discontinuity in our thinking about the modern self 
is somehow of a different order from the intelligibility of a purported 
natural kind claim made before and after a conceptual change, and that 
the significance of this difference in turn might undermine my problema-
tizing the presumption of continuity. After all, it might be argued, we 
are not merely discussing how to understand the conceptual relations 
between systems of statements made before and after Copernicus that 
refer to the heavens. Rather, we are discussing an indispensable condition 
of the possibility of modern scientific discourse at all: the punctual self of 
modern epistemology. Well, maybe. But I hardly think an indispensabil-
ity argument will help with this debate over the historical emergence of 
the modern self in a way that will aid a Cavellian articulation for realism 
here. Perhaps it’s true that the unity (separateness) of the Kantian (Cavel-
lian) self is a condition of the possibility for our scientific talk about 
natural kinds. (After all, “what is more obvious than that a [metaphysi-
cally separate] subject is related to [a scientifically intelligible] object and 
vice versa?”)232 Yet since realism of the type defended by Taylor against 
142 Skepticism and the Human Condition
Winch already depends on the inherently precarious status of modal 
claims about “what we would say or think” about some object in con-
texts like the one described in Hilary Putman’s “Twin Earth” thought 
experiment, I think we should be doubly careful if instead we are discuss-
ing something akin to an epistemological condition of the possibility of 
making statements about such natural kinds.233 Employing an indispen-
sability argument for maintaining realism about the self of (scientific) 
epistemology, involves trying to bolster one sort of modal claim, what 
we should say about the nature of the self, with the purported fact that it 
allows us to make another sort of modal claim, what we would say about 
natural kinds in science. It seems to me that the right response here is call 
for more caution, not less.234
I have been focusing thus far on a metaphysical interpretation of the 
modern self, as something understood on the order of a natural kind that 
was eventually uncovered. However implausible I believe this view is, it 
is the one that I think best captures Cavell’s actual commitments based 
on what he writes. Nevertheless, there are alternatives, which, though 
they actually have less textual basis, need to be addressed, particularly as 
they represent interpretations that I suspect many of Cavell’s sympathiz-
ers draw from his writings. That is, someone might take me to task and 
assert that my treatment of Cavell’s numerous pronouncements about 
separateness is ham-fisted. What look like Cavell’s conclusions are not 
really intended as full-throated quasi-empirical statements about what 
is the case with regard to our concept of the self, but are instead meant 
to change our perspective, to advocate for a certain grammar for talking 
about the human. This advocacy depends not so much on our appre-
hending the changeover from the porous self to the buffered self as a 
smoothly continuous and perhaps even inevitable process, so much as it 
relies on our coming to regard it as such. In this vein, consider this pas-
sage from the introduction to the Claim of Reason,
In reaching his decision, the judge is obliged, in faithfulness to his 
office, to be open to and to provide arguments of an institutionally 
recognizable character; and the point of such argument is to allow, 
if possible, a natural extension of the body of law, which is neither 
merely applying existent law nor simply making new law. The guid-
ing myth must be that it is not the judge but the case itself which 
extends the law.235
Given the centrality in his thought of the idea that criteria are never self-
applying, it’s unclear to me to what exactly Cavell means with “merely 
applying existent law”. Setting that issue aside, however, this passage 
might suggest that I have narrowed the possible space for articulation far 
too drastically. That is, Cavell’s description of the dynamics of a judge’s 
decision could be taken to indicate a way of seeing the change from 
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porous to buffered as neither a determinate process (“merely applying 
existent law”), nor as an arbitrary exercise of will (“simply making new 
law”). The point would be that with the right articulation we might come 
to regard the emergence of the modern separate self of skepticism as, in 
some sense at least, always having been part of the human condition (the 
“guiding myth”), and not as a fundamentally contingent, historical, and 
discontinuous phenomenon.
I see two ways that one might try to defend this view. Neither are 
convincing. First, Cavell (or Cavellians) may readily grant that the meta-
physical realist picture of the modern self as involving a type of discov-
ery is indeed far-fetched. That is, they could try to persuade critics that, 
while it is true that we lose our grip on the very idea of there being a 
separate self if we insist on regarding it as a practice independent onto-
logical matter of fact, the cultural development that has made talk of the 
emergence of the modern self comprehensible for us was itself somehow 
inevitable, and was not an historical turn that things happened to take in 
the modern West. The evolution of the idea of the self as buffered is built 
into the grammar of our language. Presumably this view also requires 
us to believe that the same is true, or will be true, if we just wait long 
enough for other societies who appear to be lagging behind us in interi-
ority. There are familiar and insurmountable epistemological problems 
with this Whiggish idea of inevitable development. Of course there was a 
change in the Western conception of the self. This is not in dispute. What 
is in dispute is what basis there could be for claiming we can discern an 
inevitable law of historical development from porous to buffered (or any 
other supposedly necessary historical development, for that matter).
The second interpretation is that Cavell’s real purpose is to shift our 
moral and aesthetic perspective; reasonable people simply should come 
to regard the emergence of the modern self as continuous with their more 
porous past (and perhaps to see that conception of the self as implicit in 
the non-buffered present of other present-day societies). In this case, there 
would be no pretense that Cavell provides an articulation such that, as 
some kind of independent matter of fact, it is continuous. Unfortunately, 
this charitable interpretation, a narrative in which Cavell attempts to 
foster a Gestalt-switch, is belied by most of his actual rhetoric. When he 
speaks about the genuine human predicament being one of metaphysi-
cal isolation, he doesn’t hedge his bets on subtle issues of “seeing-as”. 
One finds many more flat-out assertions in his corpus about separateness 
being the human condition per se, than one finds pleas for seeing this 
condition in one way rather than another. Now someone could propose 
that the explanation for why Cavell never makes his real strategy explicit 
is that his goal is to change his readers’ perspectives, not to announce 
that he is trying to do so; being open about this might be ineffective in 
convincing the recalcitrantly porous in the West and elsewhere, those 
many millions who still haven’t gotten the message that secular liberalism 
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née New England Unitarianism just obviously is the view of the human 
condition acceptable in polite company. But since most of these great 
unwashed are probably beyond hope anyway, it may also be the case that 
Cavell is neither trying to nor needs to change their perspective. What 
then? Well, I assume there will always be enough right-minded folks in 
respectable humanities departments who never tire of hearing their com-
mon sense views repeated back to them, even when, or perhaps, precisely 
when, the recounting takes the often convoluted guise of Cavell’s prose. 
Traversing these circuitous pathways may serve to reinforce the impres-
sion in the reader that he has actually discovered something (all over 
again). There is no harm in this per se, I suppose, but it could suggest an 
unflattering picture of Cavell as a kind of clever propagandist.236 When 
I imagine someone confidently asserting, “We can thus come to see that 
the modern self was, so to speak, continuous with the pre-modern past, 
even if not as a self-evident matter of fact”, I want to ask: Who is this 
“we”? What if some of us, me, don’t quite manage to see this continuity? 
What should we say then? Perhaps my inability to see the punctual self 
as continuous with the porous past could be taken as evidence of poor 
intellectual pedigree. I guess I should have held on to my 66’ Mustang 
and Aerosmith tapes after all. (Is this a Weltanschauung?)
XI
On Cavell’s picture, most of the ontological stage-setting for the tragedy 
of skepticism is already in place long before the philosopher, or actually 
any human agent, steps onto the scene of conscious life. The epistemolo-
gist’s elaborate theories are merely one intellectual form of evasion or 
diversion from the real problem, which is our finitude. As we have seen, 
moreover, Cavell believes that our finitude is coextensive with our intol-
erable separateness, our human condition of “metaphysical isolation”. 
Since I have gone to great lengths to undermine the universality of Cavell’s 
portrait of the human self, it might therefore seem as though I were deny-
ing that there is anything like a human condition at all or that there are 
genuine problems of human finitude. In truth, I am merely questioning 
whether a certain subset of these problems ought to be ascribed to the 
human condition. Although many modern Westerners and others 
whose formation has been substantially marked by Western modernity 
may respond to finitude by fleeing into skepticisms of various stripes, 
there is more than one manner of responding to human finitude. This, in 
fact, is one of the most important and fascinating lessons that studying 
the world’s cultures, especially their religions, teaches. It is simply not given 
that this includes living with a relationship to skepticism in anything but 
the thinnest of senses. Human finitude, I  want to say, reaches deeper 
into the human than the possibility of skepticism. As I  see it, it’s bet-
ter to think of “finitude” as working more like a proper name, whereas 
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“separateness” works only like a contingently associated description that 
indicates one mode of presentation for how finitude gets worked out or 
experienced, i.e. in the modern West and its cultural satellites.
If reflection on history and ethnography supports the idea that the self 
of skepticism is not part of our facticity, but rather one relatively recent 
interpretation of the human condition, then we are faced with a nor-
mative question about how we should relate to this interpretation. Yet 
this way of putting the matter makes it sound as though the key issue is 
whether we want to choose another such relation. Some no doubt would 
assume that if the self of epistemology is not necessary, then it must be 
a merely arbitrary social construct, which we can simply dispense with 
through an act of will, for example, by changing our vocabulary. But 
framing things in terms of choice makes our predicament appear far 
simpler than it is. Bringing to light that our modern self-understanding 
is fundamentally historical, and so in a certain sense conventional, cer-
tainly implies that we are not locked into this interpretation as a fact of 
nature, but it in no way implies that we collectively or individually could 
easily dispense with this interpretation. It lies too deep in our mode of 
thought for any philosophical or psychological act of cosmetic surgery 
to be credible.
But if it’s premature to talk about realizing concrete possibilities for 
change, it is still important to ask whether our assumed condition of 
necessary isolation comes at a price. Since I am enough of a traditionalist 
to believe that there is an inherent value in being clear about the truth of 
one’s predicament, whether or not there is anything obvious that can or 
should be done about it (and no, nothing I have said deprives me of the 
right to use “truth” here), anything that obstructs such clarity is already 
too high a price to pay. I believe the widespread uncritical acceptance of 
an interpretation of ourselves as metaphysically separate certainly satis-
fies that criterion. When it comes to professional philosophy, moreover, 
the sad fact is that the epistemological present remains so colonized by a 
buffered picture of the mind-world relationship, a sophisticated variant 
of which lies at the heart of Cavell’s work, that the effect of encountering 
an alternative articulation even remotely smacking of its rejection tends 
to elicit at best a polite smile of the sort one gives to a crazy person on the 
bus. Maybe one ought not be surprised if attempts to explicate the mean-
ing of a pronouncement such as “being-in-the-world is a unitary phe-
nomenon” are met with a certain amount of amused condescension.237 
But such reactions are not limited to the likes of Heidegger. Consider the 
following passage from the introduction to Mind and World:
Conceptual capacities, whose interrelations belong in the sui generis 
logical space of reasons, can be operative not only in judgements – 
results of a subject’s actively making up her mind about something – 
but already in the transactions in nature that are constituted by the 
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world’s impacts on the receptive capacities of a suitable subject; that 
is, one who possesses the relevant concepts.238
Given how entrenched the picture of the buffered self is in the intellec-
tual life of the West, it’s hardly surprising when words like these are met 
with a suspicion like that which modern philosophers once reserved for 
medieval obfuscation. There is also no doubt that some of the details of 
McDowell’s view as laid out in in Mind and World are disputable. But 
if we resist naturalist dogma while granting some demands for revisions 
in his story, what is the principled reason for excluding out of hand the 
idea that nature is not radically heterogeneous with the mind? I  think 
the tenacity of the traditional picture at our stage of intellectual history 
ought to be at least as questionable, given that it has led to one intellec-
tual cul-de-sac after another.
The next downside of our general lack of historical perspective on 
the modern understanding of the self relates to the socio-political plane. 
I  complained previously that Cavell, in practice at least, endorses the 
validity of a subtraction story according to which the modern buff-
ered self was always (and still is) there, if only we could strip away the 
inconvenient and usually illiberal camouflage of culture, religion, and 
history that smother it. Another way I  put this view is to say that he 
takes secularity for the human condition. By now it should be clear that 
I  consider such a position to be blatantly ahistorical and without any 
adequate backing. Against this, the historian and anthropologist Louis 
Dumont argued that Western secular modernity is uniquely characterized 
by the collapsing of an ancient distinction. Up through much of the Mid-
dle Ages, a person was understood in terms of two distinct hierarchies, 
or levels, of value: the divine and the mundane. At the divine level, all 
persons were equal individuals in the eyes of God. Dumont describes 
the person here as the “outwordly individual”. At the social level, how-
ever, persons were understood as fundamentally defined by their worldly 
relations and duties.239 According to the traditional hierarchy, therefore, 
while in everyday life a person was unintelligible apart from his or her 
nexus of social relations, the outworldly individual was conceived of as a 
singular spiritual entity in relation to God alone.
On Dumont’s account, however, what characterizes secular moder-
nity is that, while the divine level in the two-tiered value hierarchy is 
abandoned for a single-level plane of everyday life, the conception of the 
individual that formerly was valid only at that sacred level is retained 
and now comes to occupy the center stage of the now disenchanted 
world. The older mundane view of the person as constituted by social 
relations either fades to the background or disappears altogether.240 
Secularism is thus the view that there is only one world, consisting of 
“in-the-world” individuals. It is not my aim here to evaluate the relative 
merits of secular modernity, but I do think that the uncritical adoption 
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of this picture, however commonsensical for many, is not only intel-
lectually dubious, but practically disastrous when it gets unconsciously 
(or at this point is it willfully?) imposed on people who are not quite 
the buffered in-the-world individuals one takes them for. This confu-
sion often ends up either in self-flagellation on the one hand, blaming 
ourselves when “they” don’t display the common sense habits of good 
buffered moderns, or demonization on the other, viewing “them” as 
somehow inherently defective. It seems to me that no small amount 
of our current political strife is due to the inability or refusal to take 
culture seriously.
I have been using Taylor’s expressions “buffered self” or “punctual self” 
in ways that are meant to encompass Cavell’s conception of “separate-
ness”. In one way this could be misleading if only because Taylor usually 
has in mind perspectives inspired by rationalists like Descartes, Locke, 
and Kant and not those embodied by figures like Tracy Lord or Nora 
Helmer. Yet however different in complexity and motivational  structure 
these dramatic characters are from the wooden notions of human 
agency on offer from the philosophers, the metaphysical- epistemological 
predicaments of these two groupings remain fundamentally  comparable. 
I mention this because undoubtedly much of the difficulty with seriously 
contemplating the possibility of allowing a loosening of the grip that 
the buffered, separate picture exerts on our lives stems more from lived 
ethical rather than abstract metaphysical concerns; anyone who has 
read extensively in Cavell’s works recognizes in them a constant worry 
about the possibility of social and political oppression. He often seems 
less concerned with private language than with privacy. But while any 
fair assessment of what I have been arguing will conclude that its sole 
logical implications are the deflation of the metaphysical individualism 
we’ve inherited from our tradition, the usual intertwining of the ethico- 
politico with the ontological may leave some readers with an uneasy feel-
ing that I’ve paved a short path from release from metaphysical isolation 
to denying village atheists their rights. Well, perhaps there is a noticeable 
tendency toward intolerance and oppression among peoples where the 
dominant self-understanding is decidedly non-porous. But can we be so 
certain that any way of coming to terms with human finitude that does 
not foster a genuine relation to the possibility of skepticism is a recipe 
for oppression? What do we really know here? If it seems obvious that 
history suggests we should err on the side of caution, we should at least 
ask if that caution comes at a price. Refusing even to ask is the ethics of 
resignation.
Many years ago, I described the idea for this essay in a long e-mail 
to an acquaintance who is both philosopher and anthropologist. As 
I recall, she wrote back that the basic conception struck her as gener-
ally coherent, but she finished her response with a remark that made 
me uncertain. It ran something along the lines of, “It’s important to 
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remember, though, that the individual is very important for intimacy 
in relationships”. I  think one reason for my uncertainty was that the 
remark jumped ahead of anything I had actually said when I described 
the plan of the essay. In particular, nothing in my outline directly 
entailed any normative conclusion to the effect that the modern (Cavel-
lian) understanding of the self ought to be jettisoned once its contin-
gency had been uncovered. It is entirely possible that I had expressed 
my conclusions with such enthusiasm that it was natural for her infer 
that I thought that the historical contingency of the self of skepticism 
somehow entailed that we should dispense with that conception. People 
do sometimes argue that way. However it was that my acquaintance 
came to ascribe such a view to me, if indeed that is what she did, I hope 
that I have made it clear both that dispensing with the modern concep-
tion of the self is not something that can be achieved by an act of will-
power and that the normative questions surrounding how we ought to 
relate to its contingency are complex.
But undoubtedly what took me most by surprise in my acquaint-
ance’s remark was its confident declaration of a positive correlation 
between separateness and intimacy. It struck me as counterintuitive 
that intimacy and separateness should be complementary or mutually 
supporting phenomena, since on the surface at least the two seemed to 
be opposing forces. How can you be intimate with a metaphysically 
separate other? Yet, at the same time, part of me (the buried Roman-
tic?) also had a vague sense that there was something correct in the 
suggestion that intimacy and isolation were mutually reinforcing vec-
tors. It is only recently, when writing this essay, that I believe I grasped 
the significance of what my acquaintance wrote. If isolation is typi-
cal for our modern condition, then intimacy typically arises against a 
certain social imaginary, where separate souls sometimes find them-
selves drawn across an abyss to share their isolation. This Romantic 
pre-understanding allows for the emotional tectonics many have come 
to see as essential for genuine intimacy. In other words, I regard “The 
individual is important for intimacy in relationships” as a grammati-
cal remark characteristic of the culture of Western modernity. The 
remark simply recounts (for many at least) part of what is meant by 
“intimacy”. I  suspect there are still others, people whose sensibilities 
resonate with the likes of Young Werther or Holden Caulfield, who 
might insist that one can only be intimate with a metaphysically sepa-
rate other. However that may be, I  am confident that I  have shown 
that the Cavellian view of the human condition is only conditionally 
valid. I have not, however, addressed the more important question as 
to whether our quasi-addiction to its charms has become corrosive of 
other relations. Am I gesturing at a culture with no romantics? Heaven 
forbid. But better that than a culture dominated by politicized neurot-
ics. I guess that is a Weltanschauung.
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Hammer, Stanley Cavell: Skepticism, Subjectivity, and the Ordinary (Cam-
bridge: Polity, 2002).
 53. Cavell is responding to Austin’s paper “Other Minds”. See Philosophical 
Papers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), 76–116. For Cavell’s cri-
tique, See CR, especially 65–77, 132–37.
 54. The instrument clusters on the dashboard were also quite different and the 
gas caps were slightly different as well.
 55. CR, 52–53.
 56. Of course, it is not unthinkable, either, that someone has fitted a ‘66 Mustang 
with the grille and quarter panels of a ‘65.
 57. CR, 133, 135. Elsewhere he writes, “The logic of skepticism requires two 
things chiefly: that knowledge be discovered to fail in the best cases – in know-
ing, for example, that I am seated before my fire, or that two plus three is five; 
and that this failure be discovered in ways open to any normal human being, 
not something knowable only by experts.” Stanley Cavell, “What Becomes of 
Things on Film?” Philosophy and Literature 2, no. 2 (Fall 1978): 251.
 58. CR, 45. This passage comes from Cavell’s arguments against Albritton and 
Malcolm, but I think they are entirely appropriate in the present context as 
well (emphasis in original).
 59. This is adapted from the schema provided by Cavell on CR, 132. There, 
of course, he is discussing Austin’s goldfinch example. The references to the 
senses and the dream/hallucination possibility are mentioned at CR, 135.
 60. CR, 135.
 61. Ibid., 84. The original context for this phrase concerns other-minds, but 
I take it to hold generally for Cavell.
 62. CR, 94. This point is utterly central to Cavell’s entire project. Here I can only 
present it in its barest aspect.
 63. CR, 205.
 64. Ibid., 211.
 65. Ibid., 206.
 66. Ibid., 215.
 67. Ibid., 217.
 68. Ibid., 220.
 69. Ibid., 239 (emphasis in original). Compare this passage with the following 
one from a decade earlier: “One wants to say: What it envisions is unintelligi-
ble. But what is envisioned which is unintelligible? It looks as if to make out 
that it is unintelligible you have to do exactly what the person who claims to 
envision it has to do – say what is envisioned. But it is exactly your point that 
this cannot be done.” “Knowing and Acknowledging” in Cavell, Must We 
Mean, 249. In each of these passages one can hear clear anticipations of what 
has come to be known commonly as the “resolute” reading of Wittgenstein.
 70. See Stanley Cavell, “Declining Decline,” in This New Yet Unapproachable 
America: Lectures After Emerson After Wittgenstein (Albuquerque: Living 
Batch Press, 1989), 41. In this essay, Cavell broaches two ways of taking Witt-
genstein’s term of art “form of life” (Lebensform) as that term is employed 
in the Philosophical Investigations. What he says there about “ethnological” 
and “biological” senses of Lebensform suggests to me that he would resist a 
clean factorization of what I refer to here as the linguistic and the creaturely. 
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At the same time, I think Cavell’s description of the ethnological dimension of 
form of life in this essay as “conventionalistic” and so merely “horizontal”, 
as opposed to the “biological” and so “vertical” dimension of that unified 
whole is deeply misleading. In fact, it was my encounter many years ago with 
the claims made by Cavell in that essay that set me on the course to write the 
present work. My point here, however, is merely that there is some textual 
basis for believing Cavell would not object to my handling of the neologism 
“creature-with-language”.
 71. CR, 493. A decade prior to The Claim of Reason we see the same sentiment 
expressed: “(M)y powerlessness presents itself as ignorance – a metaphysical 
finitude as an intellectual lack.” Knowledge and Acknowledging in Cavell, 
Must We Mean, 263.
 72. The Availability of the Later Wittgenstein in Cavell, Must We Mean, 61–62.
 73. CR, 47.
 74. The Skeptical and the Metaphorical. Cavell, In Quest of the Ordinary, 148.
 75. Stanley Cavell, “Something Out of the Ordinary,” Proceedings and Addresses 
of the American Philosophical Association 71, no. 2 (1997): 28.
 76. Stanley Cavell, “Benjamin and Wittgenstein: Signals and Affinities,” Critical 
Inquiry 25, no. 2 (1999): 237.
 77. Cavell, “What Is the Scandal of Skepticism?,” 133 (emphasis in original).
 78. Stanley Cavell, The Senses of Walden (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1992), 146–47.
 79. CR, 109.
 80. Cavell, Disowning Knowledge, 11, See also Cavell, Disowning Knowledge, 
242.
 81. Cavell, In Quest of the Ordinary, 88. See also Cavell, In Quest of the Ordi-
nary, 4, 138.
 82. Cavell, This New Yet Unapproachable America, 38.
 83. Cavell, Contesting Tears, 94. In 2004 we read “it is human to wish to reject 
the human.” Cavell, Wittgenstein and Scepticism, 283.
 84. Cavell, This New Yet Unapproachable America, 54.
 85. Ibid., 57.
 86. Cavell, In Quest of the Ordinary, 138.
 87. The Argument from the Ordinary in Cavell, Conditions Handsome and 
Unhandsome, 92.
 88. Of course, Cavell doesn’t just think we will suffer sudden onsets of skeptical 
insanity. He also believes that skepticism might teach us some lessons about 
better ways to relate to the world and to each other. He writes that “Whereas 
skepticism suggests that since we cannot know the world exists, its present-
ness to us cannot be a function of knowing. The world is to be accepted; 
as the presentness of other minds is not to be known, but acknowledged.” 
“The Avoidance of Love” in Stanley Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say? 
A Book of Essays (New York: Scribner, 1969), 324. This passage touches on 
ideas that are central to Cavell’s views on how we might accommodate and 
cope with the threat of skepticism. But as they are posterior to the underlying 
ontology of skepticism that I want to examine here, they are not my focus.
 89. “The Availability of the Later Wittgenstein” in Cavell, Must We Mean, 52.
 90. CR, 45.
 91. On the unending problem of first coming to grips with the reality of this truth 
Cavell writes elsewhere that, “The answer does not consist in denying the 
conclusion of skepticism but in reconceiving its truth.” Cavell, The Senses of 
Walden, 133.
 92. CR, 140.
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 93. Ibid., 141–42.
 94. At the time he wrote The Claim of Reason, Cavell quite possibly interpreted 
his experience of “being sealed off” from the world as close to Heidegger’s 
descriptions of anxiety in Being and Time. Later in the book we read, “It is 
as though the philosopher, having begun in wonder, a modern wonder I char-
acterized as a feeling of being sealed off from the world . . . is left only with 
his eyes, or generally, the ability to sense.” CR, 224. And still later, “Why Is 
There Anything at All?”– the recording, again, of an experience I confess hav-
ing had, and which seems to me related to, even to express, the sense of the 
philosopher’s question “How do we know at all that anything exists?” CR, 
241. Now it is true that Heidegger connects anxiety and wonder in Being and 
Time and in the 1929 lecture “What Is Metaphysics” he explicitly connects 
both of these to the question “Why is there something instead of nothing?” 
But to insinuate any connection with Heidegger in the way I suspect Cavell 
is doing in these passages is just wrongheaded (or worse). Heidegger may 
say such things as that anxiety “individualizes” Dasein and thus reveals the 
world as offering nothing to Dasein, but this is precisely his way of bringing 
out how in anxiety what he calls the “worldhood-of-the-world” obtrudes 
itself. That is to say, in anxiety Dasein sees that it is in a world of publicly 
interpreted equipment and practices and that none of these can provide it 
with meaning for its own life. There is no question there of being “sealed 
in” or “sealed off”: “drowning” is perhaps more apt. Giving a Cartesian 
inflection to “anxiety” by speaking of “modern wonder” as Cavell does may 
elicit genuine affinities with early Sartre, but connecting it to Heidegger (or 
Wittgenstein for that matter) borders on philosophical malpractice. See Hei-
degger, Being and Time, 231. See also Martin Heidegger, “What Is Meta-
physics,” in Heidegger: Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1977), esp. 104–12.
 95. Cavell, Disowning Knowledge, 5–6.
 96. Stanley Cavell, The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film (New 
York: Viking, 1971), 117. Although Cavell’s perennial interest in modern-
ism is not a major topic for me here, the following groupings of quotation-
couplings also display that for him separateness is not merely a function of 
the content of the art forms on which he wrote, but also a subject of their 
very form. In The World Viewed, Cavell writes not only of “the ontological 
facts of our separateness” as themes for film, but also directs our attention 
to the way the very viewing of a film brings to light our separation: “the 
condition of privacy, of unknownness, of being viewed – the human condi-
tion – is itself the condition of martyrdom” (World Viewed, 144, 205–6). 
In his early essay on Beckett’s Endgame, we read how the play teaches not 
only that “the uniqueness of the human soul, held to be its greatest value, 
is its greatest curse. We are alone, separate”, but also that this message is 
conveyed by the very act of watching the play: “Theater becomes the brute 
metaphysical fact of separateness” (“Ending the Waiting Game” in Cavell, 
Must We Mean, 154, 160). Finally, in his breathtaking essay on King Lear, 
Cavell reveals the same sort of modernist sensibilities regarding form and 
content: “Lear and Gloucester are not tragic because they are isolated, sin-
gled out for suffering, but because they had covered their true isolation (the 
identity of their condition with the condition of other men) within hidden-
ness, silence, and position; the way people do.” “The Avoidance of Love” 
in Cavell, Must We Mean, 351. In another work, “what is revealed (in 
Shakespearean tragedy) is my separateness from what is happening to them; 
that I am I, and here, It is only in this perception of them as separate from 
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  me that I make them present.” “The Avoidance of Love” in Cavell, Must 
We Mean, 338. Naturally, these points about separateness are sometimes 
made independently of one another. In the Senses of Walden (54) Cavell 
writes that “the realization of our ‘infinite relations,’ our kinships, is an 
endless realization of our separateness”, while this next passage, taken 
from an essay on aesthetics from the late 1960s, makes no reference to the 
content of any particular work of art: a modern work of art “asks of us, 
not exactly more in the way of response, but one which is more personal. 
It promises us, not the re-assembly of community, but personal relation-
ship unsponsored by that community; not the overcoming of our isolation, 
but the sharing of that isolation” “A  Matter of Meaning It” in Cavell, 
Must We Mean, 229.
 97. Cavell, In Quest of the Ordinary, 5.
 98. CR, 369 (emphasis in original).
 99. Ibid.
 100. Although I am trying hard to avoid vexed issues in Wittgenstein interpreta-
tion, because I am on the subject of nonsense, I will say that while Cavell’s 
words are surely in some sense “elucidatory”, there is no hint as far as I can 
gather that we are to “throw away his sentences”, or those of Hamlet or 
Spencer Tracy for that matter, once we see that they have instructed us by 
drawing us into an utter illusion. And while there may be no claim context 
for Cavell to assert that he “knows” he (we) is (are) separate, he certainly 
asserts it often enough: Perhaps it “stands fast” for him.
 101. Clifford Geertz, “ ‘From the Native’s Point of View’: On the Nature of 
Anthropological Understanding,” Bulletin of the American Academy of 
Arts and Sciences 28, no. 1 (October 1974): 30–31.
 102. Geertz writes of the concept of the person here, whereas I speak primarily 
of the concept of the self. If by “person” we think mainly of a social identity 
as reflected in social status or in social roles, then my use here of the Geertz 
quote might seem questionable. I  think, however, that the context of the 
quotation makes clear that in contemporary parlance what is at issue is the 
self, considered as an entity and not as a nexus of social factors. Whatever 
the case, I would be suspicious of any claim that “person” and “self” can be 
understood in sharp separation from each other.
 103. See Taylor, Sources of the Self (Reference note 38). I should also mention 
here the ground-breaking work of Louis Dumont. See his Essays on Indi-
vidualism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983).
 104. Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2007). See also his The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1991); Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Reference note 3).
 105. More properties could be added on each side of the divide.
 106. Taylor, A Secular Age, 38.
 107. Charles Taylor, “Lichtung or Lebensform,” in Philosophical Arguments 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 63.
 108. This does not entail, naturally, that such conceptions are immune to revi-
sion brought about in part by theoretical considerations.
 109. Taylor, Sources of the Self, 111.
 110. Taylor, A Secular Age, 38.
 111. Ibid., 39.
 112. Ibid., 36.
 113. Ibid., 27.
 114. Ibid., 42.
 115. Ibid., 149. See also Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, 55.
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 116. Taylor, A Secular Age, 135. Taylor adds, “This agent is in a sense super-
buffered. He is not only not ‘got at’ by demons and spirits: he is also utterly 
unmoved by the aura of desire. In a mechanistic universe, and in a field of 
functionally understood passions, there is no more ontological room for 
such an aura.” Taylor, A Secular Age, 136. This may be true of what Taylor 
calls Locke’s “punctual self”, but it hardly fits Cavell’s modern neurotic. The 
difference is of course that for Cavell the demons are in us. See also Taylor, 
Sources of the Self, 171.
 117. See Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, 65.
 118. Taylor, A Secular Age, 136–37. Taylor mentions the work of Norbert Elias 
in this regard.
 119. Taylor, A Secular Age, 539.
 120. Ibid., 301.
 121. Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, 49.
 122. Taylor, A Secular Age, 26.
 123. Ibid.
 124. Ibid., 22. See also Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, 64.
 125. Taylor, Sources of the Self, 106.
 126. Ibid., 3.
 127. Taylor, A Secular Age, 105.
 128. Ibid., 262.
 129. This is of course a reference to Philosophical Investigations §122, a remark 
that Wittgenstein carried over from his Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough 
in which he attacks Sir James Frazer’s vulgar descriptions of magic as noth-
ing more than poor science.
 130. I am aware that I employ terms like “Western” and “modern” in ways that 
might offend certain sensibilities, in part because I have not circumscribed 
them with an essence by providing a definition. We all can admit that defini-
tions are of course sometimes useful. But I have in mind here a much more 
juvenile demand (arising from an equally juvenile political agenda) whereby 
failure to provide an essence-giving definition is thought to produce the 
“Gotcha!” moment in which the benighted writer, me in this case, is revealed 
as having missed something “complex” or “problematic” with (his?) use of 
the terms themselves. I suppose this strategy is preparatory for some sort of 
demonstration of “undecidability”, “play of signifiers”, or more likely in 
our current confusion, hidden “power relations” that the undefined terms 
are suspected to cloak. In response, I would first remark that Taylor is well 
aware of the dangers of an uncritical use of blanket terms such as “moder-
nity” as shown in passages like this one: “Modern social imaginaries have 
been differently refracted in the divergent media of the respective national 
histories, even in the West. This warns us against expecting a simple repeti-
tion of Western forms when these imaginaries are imposed on or adopted in 
other civilizations.” He also insists on our being open to the idea of “mul-
tiple modernities”. See Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, 154, 195. But 
second, and more importantly, as long as one is aware of what one is doing, 
there is no harm in using a term at one stage of a discourse in a way that can, 
if needed, be made more precise at a later stage. If one insists on defining 
everything at the outset of speech (or on defining everything at any stage, 
actually) one is reduced to either silence or jibberish, which I take to be a 
reductio ad absurdum of the demand itself.
 131. Rane Willerslev, Soul Hunters: Hunting, Animism, and Personhood Among 
the Siberian Yukaghirs (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007).
 132. Willerslev, Soul Hunters, 2, 8.
Skepticism and the Human Condition 157
 133. Ibid., 3.
 134. Ibid., 2.
 135. Ibid., 9.
 136. Ibid.
 137. Ibid., 19–20. This theme is familiar in the work of Evans-Pritchard, Witch-
craft, 222; Bourdieu, Outline, 9, 37, 171. See Chapter  2, notes 3, 7 for 
references.
 138. Willerslev, Soul Hunters, 11.
 139. Ibid. He adds later, “the very nature of hunting requires that the hunter 
identify with his prey and attempt to ascertain its mode of perception and 
action by imitating its bodily movements and smell”. Willerslev, Soul Hunt-
ers, 84.
 140. Willerslev, Soul Hunters, 26.
 141. Ibid., 50.
 142. Ibid., 55.
 143. Ibid., 55.
 144. Ibid., 57.
 145. Ibid., 57.
 146. Ibid., 58.
 147. Ibid., 60.
 148. Ibid., 58.
 149. This is reminiscent of something Evans-Pritchard claims about the Azande, 
namely that he found they had little or no theoretical interest in the ques-
tion whether the traveling “soul of witchcraft”, the “fireflies” that are the 
actual agents that afflict the victim, are emanations of, or identical with, 
the soul of the witch, or whether they are emanations from the witchcraft 
substance that inheres in the witch’s body. On this and related questions, 
Evans-Pritchard wrote “Zande have no theoretical interest in the subject, 
and those situations in which they express their beliefs in witchcraft do not 
force the problem upon them.” See Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft, Oracles, 
and Magic Among the Azande (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1937), 4.
 150. Willerslev, Soul Hunters, 25.
 151. Ibid., 53–54.
 152. Ibid., 87. See Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, “Cosmological Deixis and Amer-
indian Perspectivism,” The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 
4, no. 3 (September 1998): 469.
 153. Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, “Exchanging Perspectives: The Transforma-
tion of Objects into Subjects in Amerindian Ontologies,” Common Knowl-
edge 10, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 468–69.
 154. Ibid.
 155. Ibid., 466, 474.
 156. Willerslev, Soul Hunters, 12.
 157. Viveiros de Castro, “The Transformation of Objects,” 476.
 158. Willerslev, Soul Hunters, 63. See Marilyn Strathern, The Gender of the Gift 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). Strathern’s main focus here 
is on the Hagen in the Western Highlands Province of Papua New Guinea.
 159. Strathern, Gender of the Gift, 13.
 160. Ibid., 122.
 161. Ibid., 157.
 162. Ibid., 141. She adds later, “The Western concept of exploitation rests ulti-
mately on the idea that violence can be done to a supposed intrinsic relation 
between the self as subject and its realization in the objects of its activities. 
I have stressed that this entails a view of agents as single entities, as singular 
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authors of what they make and do. The partibility of persons under the 
regime of a gift economy is very different from the positive or negative, 
but either way “unnatural”, dividing of the “whole” self in a commodity 
regime.” Strathern, Gender of the Gift, 162.
 163. Strathern, Gender of the Gift, 131.
 164. Ibid., 165.
 165. Ibid., 273.
 166. Ibid.
 167. Ibid., 294.
 168. Ibid., 269.
 169. For an interesting comparison with Strathern, see Alan Rumsey, “The Per-
sonification of Social Totalities in the Pacific,” Journal of Pacific Studies 23, 
no. 1 (1999): 48–70. What Rumsey terms the “segmentary person” of the 
Ku Waru region of the New Guinea Highlands resembles Strathern’s “divid-
ual” in some respects, yet designates multiple identities across long spans of 
history. Nor is it restricted for use only by chiefs, as in Sahlins’ account of 
“heroic history” among Maori and Hawaiians.
 170. Perhaps Evans-Pritchard’s descriptions of the Azande encompass both 
aspects of the non-buffered self. On the one hand, witchcraft substance acti-
vated by evil thoughts harbored by the witch seems to be able to discreetly 
impact at a distance the soul of the victim with some malady. On the other 
hand, Evans-Pritchard also writes that witchcraft substance, like the ayibii, 
has a certain kind of independent physicality in that it can travel at night 
to attack its victims directly. Evans-Pritchard also notes in this regard that 
there is a lack of theoretical clarity as to whether this evil force, “the soul 
of witchcraft”, is the essence of the substance or the essence of the witch 
himself, in whom the substance resides. See Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft, 
10–11 and note 149 (see Chapter 2, note 3 for reference). Some of the con-
ceptual relations between Taylor’s “porous self” and Strathern’s “dividual” 
are discussed in Karl Smith, “From Dividual and Individual Selves to Porous 
Subjects,” The Australian Journal of Anthropology 23 (2012): 50–64.
 171. Willerslev, Soul Hunters, 2. This was in essence the heart of the dispute 
several years ago between Gananath Obeyeskere and Marshall Sahlins. In 
effect, Obeyesekere claimed that Sahlins’ interpretation of the events leading 
up to the death of Captain James Cook, an account which relied on reading 
Cook’s death as unfolding out of the internal logic of Hawaiian culture and 
religion, as amounting both to a denial of rationality to the Hawaiians and 
as based on a Western fetish for exoticism. See Gananath Obeyesekere, The 
Apotheosis of Captain Cook (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). 
Sahlins completely dismantled Obeyeskere’s charge in his How “Natives” 
Think: About Captain Cook, for Example (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1996).
 172. Sahlins, How “Natives” Think, 118.
 173. CR, 144.
 174. “Incommensurability” is Thomas Kuhn’s term. See his The Structures of 
Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 148–
49. Peter Winch employs the term “category mistake” in his argument. See 
“Understanding a Primitive Society,” American Philosophical Quarterly 1 
(1964): 314–15.
 175. Some readers will at once recognize that my discussion here touches on the 
so-called “New Wittgenstein Debate” that has taken place over the last few 
decades While I have some fairly strong ideas about that debate, they are 
not relevant in the present context. My discussion should not be taken as a 
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contribution to that debate, but rather as an application of the philosophy 
I believe to have learned from engaging in it. If such philosophy is not true 
to what Wittgenstein actually thought, that should have no consequence for 
my arguments here. For references, see Chapter 1, note 65.
 176. I will address the issue of repression next.
 177. Strathern, Gender of the Gift, 12.
 178. Ibid., 143.
 179. J. Prytz Johansen, The Maori and His Religion in Its Non-Ritualistic Aspects 
(Munksgaard: Copenhagen, 1954), 36. Quoted in Rumsey, “The Personi-
fication of Social Totalities,” 49 and in Marshall Sahlins, Historical Meta-
phors and Mythical Realities (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1981), 13–14.
 180. Ibid.
 181. While some of the considerations advanced in this last paragraph derive 
from my way of reading Wittgenstein’s famous remarks on the “wood-
sellers”, it is not my intention to enter into a scholarly debate here. See Lud-
wig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, ed. G. H. 
von Wright, R. Rhees and G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe 
(Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1956), §147–§50. Cavell discusses this example 
from Wittgenstein on CR, 115.
 182. I would like to thank Kristin Boyce for bringing this issue to my attention.
 183. Clifford Geertz, “The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the Concept of 
Man,” in The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 44.
 184. Willerslev, Soul Hunters, 70.
 185. Melford E. Spiro, “Is the Western Conception of the Self ‘Peculiar’ Within 
the Context of the World Cultures?,” Ethos 21, no. 2 (1993): 107–53. Inter-
estingly, we just saw Willerslev, publishing in 2007, speaking of the litera-
ture being “crammed” with such typologies, whereas Spiro writing in 1993, 
writes that little work has been done on the anthropology of the person or 
self outside of a few societies. Perhaps this discrepancy can be explained if 
much work was done on the subject in the intervening period.
 186. See Hazel Rose Markus and Shinobu Kitayama, “Culture and the Self: Impli-
cations for Cognition, Emotion, and Motivation,” Psychological Review 
98, no. 2 (1991): 224–53. Spiro also criticizes similar work by interpretivist 
social scientists Shweder and Bourne. See Richard Shweder and Edmund J. 
Bourne, “Does the Concept of a Person Vary Cross-Culturally,” in Culture 
Theory, ed. Richard A. Shweder and Robert A. Levine (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1984), 158–95.
 187. Spiro, “Is the Western Conception of the Self ‘Peculiar’?,” 107.
 188. Ibid., 108.
 189. But see Willerslev’s previous assertion that the literature is “crammed with 
typologies of this kind”.
 190. Spiro, “Is the Western Conception of the Self ‘Peculiar’?,” 117.
 191. Ibid., 114.
 192. Ibid., 117.
 193. Ibid.
 194. Ibid., 118–19.
 195. Ibid., 120.
 196. Ibid., 109.
 197. Ibid., 10.
 198. Ibid., 122.
 199. Geertz, “From the Native’s Point of View,” 35. Quoted in Spiro, “Is the 
Western Conception of the Self ‘Peculiar’?,”121.
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 200. Clifford Geertz, “Person, Time, and Conduct in Bali,” in The Interpretation 
of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 386.
 201. Ibid., 388–89.
 202. Ibid., 390.
 203. Spiro, “Is the Western Conception of the Self ‘Peculiar’?,” 127–28. See 
Unni Wikan, “Managing the Heart to Brighten Face and Soul: Emotions in 
Balinese Morality and Health Care,” American Ethnologist 16 (1989): 294, 
298, 300. See also Unni Wikan, “Public Grace and Private Fears: Gaiety, 
Offense, and Sorcery in Northern Bali,” Ethos 15 (1987): 337–65.
 204. Spiro, “Is the Western Conception of the Self ‘Peculiar’?,” 130.
 205. Ibid., 136.
 206. Ibid., 144–45.
 207. Sahlins writes, “ ‘Strange’ should be the beginning of anthropological wis-
dom rather than a way of putting an end to it.” How “Natives” Think, 62.
 208. Willerslev hints (Soul Hunters, 71) that many modern Westerners might in 
fact sense themselves as being less buffered than can be gleaned from the 
“ideal type” or cultural conception. He claims that the way in which we 
often speak of pain or stress as “getting” to us is an example that gives the 
lie to a universal commitment to a buffered self-understanding. In support 
of this one might add that many Westerners still fully embrace various self-
understandings where the “buffered self” seems remote. These are people 
who embrace various forms of traditional Christianity and more recently 
those embracing some Eastern forms of spirituality or New Age religions.
 209. I set aside here its partial diffusion since the colonial period.
 210. Taylor, Sources of the Self, 112.
 211. Ibid., 111. Taylor addresses this issue both more generally and in the con-
text of Bruno Snell’s writing on the Homeric understanding of agency. See 
Sources of the Self, 118.
 212. See Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New 
York: Washington Square Press, 1956), 66–69.
 213. CR, 119.
 214. Elsewhere, Cavell writes, “It is perfectly true that English might have devel-
oped differently than it has and therefore have imposed different categories 
on the world than it does; and if so, it would have enabled us to assert, 
describe, question, define, promise, appeal, etc., in ways other than we do.” 
Cavell, Must We Mean, 33. Apparently, these considerations do not apply 
to the cogito.
 215. Cavell, Must We Mean, 219–20. Cavell explains in the Acknowledgements 
to Must We Mean that this essay is a rejoinder to comments he received 
to “Music Discomposed”. See especially 188–89, where Cavell states that 
“modernism only makes explicit and bare what has always been true of 
art”. The passage from “A Matter of Meaning It” quoted previous is, I take 
it, intended precisely to clarify the earlier confusing statement.
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“Our form of government has no sense unless it is founded in a deeply felt 
religious faith, and I don’t care what it is.” Dwight Eisenhower, Address 
at the Freedoms Foundation, New York City, 12/22/52
I
Religion was a subject of great philosophical and personal significance 
for Wittgenstein, yet his relation to it is difficult to pin down. The ambi-
guity of the place of religion in Wittgenstein’s thought and his ambivalent 
attitude towards it comes out nowhere more succinctly than in Maurice 
O’Connor Drury’s oft discussed recounting of Wittgenstein’s telling him 
that “I am not a religious man but I cannot help seeing every problem 
from a religious point of view”.1 This appendix concerns Wittgenstein’s 
well-known respect for and tolerance of different religious traditions as 
well as his reticence, even revulsion, to render judgments of religious 
systems.
In her essay “Putnam and Wittgensteinian Baby-Throwing: Variations 
on a Theme,”2 Cora Diamond discusses a 1931 passage from Wittgen-
stein’s “Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough,” where his idea seems to 
be that the very idea of criticizing religions as containing errors at all is 
basically irrelevant or confused since they are not a theory.
Frazer’s account of the magical and religious views of mankind is 
unsatisfactory: it makes these views look like errors.
Was Augustine in error, then, when he called upon God on every 
page of the Confessions?
But – one might say – if he was not in error, surely the Buddhist 
holy man was – or anyone else – whose religion gives expression to 
completely different views. But none of them was in error, except 
when he set forth a theory.3
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Diamond goes on to describe Wittgenstein’s view here as having strong 
affinities to the religiously tolerant pagan view of antiquity according to 
which respect was accorded to diverse forms of worship.4
We seem to find this tolerant “pagan” view displayed in other com-
ments from around the same period of the late 1920s and early 1930s. 
For example, in December 1930 Friedrich Waismann recorded the fol-
lowing remark by Wittgenstein:
Obviously the essence of religion cannot have anything to do with 
the fact that there is talking, or rather: when people talk, then this 
itself is part of a religious act and not a theory. Thus it also does not 
matter at all if the words used are true or false or nonsense.5
An even more striking example of this tolerant attitude is found in Witt-
genstein’s recorded conversations with Drury around 1929:
The symbolisms of Catholicism are wonderful beyond words. But 
any attempt to make it into a philosophical system is offensive.
All the religions are wonderful, even those of the most primitive 
tribes. The ways in which people express their religious feelings differ 
enormously.6
One might wonder whether these remarks fundamentally bear the stamp 
of this (very turbulent) phase of Wittgenstein’s philosophical develop-
ment. But even after his understanding of philosophy had undergone 
substantial revision, when he returned to commenting on Frazer several 
years later (Rhees writes that this second set of remarks on Frazer are 
from “not earlier than 1936 and probably after 1948”) we find passages 
that seem to strike the same chord.7
The nonsense here is that Frazer represents these people as if they had 
a completely false (even insane) idea of the course of nature, whereas 
they only possess a peculiar interpretation of the phenomena. That 
is, if they were to write it down, their knowledge of nature would not 
differ fundamentally from ours. Only their magic is different.
As simple as it sounds: the distinction between magic and science 
can be expressed by saying that in science there is progress, but in 
magic there isn’t. Magic has no tendency within itself to develop.8
Diamond offers two ways of construing Wittgenstein’s 1931 remark as it 
relates to Augustine’s Manichean period, but she finds neither of them sat-
isfactory as a way for accounting for Augustine’s own self-understanding.9 
On the first construal, even if Wittgenstein considered Augustine’s 
 Manichaeism to be a kind of theory, it is possible that he did not  consider 
Augustine’s act of calling upon God as essentially connected to that 
Appendix 165
theory and so did not see the invocation itself, qua purely expressive act, 
as open to error. On the second construal, Wittgenstein did not consider 
Augustine’s Manichaeism to be a theory at all, and so the issue of his 
being in error when he calls upon God never arises. Diamond claims, 
however, that unless we arbitrarily limit our concepts of truth and error 
to the methods of the sciences, Wittgenstein seems on either construal 
simply to disregard Augustine’s own later ideas about what is true (what 
is not in error) about Christianity and what is false (in error) about Man-
ichaeism and other pagan religions. Wittgenstein thus seems to be over-
looking here the possibility that there are other ways of understanding 
truth than as scientific truth, and thus of understanding religious prac-
tices as embodying or leading to truth or falsehood.
Diamond stresses at one point how Wittgenstein hated Frazer’s treat-
ment of magic and religion.10 Yet I worry that her discussion of this par-
ticular remark by Wittgenstein about Augustine makes it seem as though 
his overall response to Frazer was merely an expression of this antipathy 
and so merely an expression of his “pagan” reluctance to criticize reli-
gious and magical practices. His open animus towards Frazer notwith-
standing, Wittgenstein thought that Frazer was not only arrogant, but 
deeply confused. In the broader context of these remarks, Wittgenstein 
is mainly concerned with criticizing Frazer for arbitrarily, if not inten-
tionally, imposing a misleading picture on the ethnographic record, viz., 
that scientific ways of relating to the world are really the only available 
options and so that ipso facto religion must necessarily be some crude 
attempt at scientific explanation. Given this context, where scientism was 
paramount in Wittgenstein’s mind, it seems most reasonable to read his 
particular comment on Augustine as meaning that there is nothing more 
to be said about error in relation to these practices, once one drops the 
assumption that they are proto-scientific theories. Wittgenstein’s point 
in this context relies, I think, on a narrow understanding of theory and 
error, even if these are not the only meanings these terms can have.11 Con-
sequently, the fact that what Wittgenstein wrote in a particular remark 
is ambiguous between the two possibly inadequate interpretations of 
Augustine that Diamond points out is not really to the point because 
it isn’t necessary to read him as concerned (and possibly failing) there 
to reconcile his critique of Frazer with every aspect of Augustine’s self-
understanding. He can still acknowledge that there are possibilities of 
error other than scientific error.
But quite apart from how one interprets this single remark, Wittgen-
stein was in general hostile to the idea that religions essentially involve 
truth claims in ways that would make them vulnerable to certain forms 
of criticism. Wittgenstein understood well of course that most religions 
involved the mixing of the expressive and the cosmological.12 He was 
obviously aware that different religious discourses are wrapped up in dif-
ferent ontic views and that when religious people get into disputes over 
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different aspects of the truth of these views they often take themselves to 
be fighting over real claims. In On Certainty, for example, he suggests 
the possibility that specific religious dogmas can even play a role that is 
close to grammar in shaping a discourse or world view. But while there is 
a place in his thought for the idea that the acceptance of particular facts 
can be essential to religion provided they are embedded logically deeply 
enough in the “riverbed” of a form of life, as so understood, these are not 
supported with evidence and so not believed to be true (or false).13 Thus 
Wittgenstein thought that even if the religious impulse becomes wrapped 
up with various ontic views, for him the truth or falsity of these views 
was really not what is basic about the religious impulse itself.14
Whether we understand Wittgenstein’s view to be that there is no such 
thing as a religion being true (or in error) or to be the weaker view that 
religion need not involve truth claims, there remains a question about 
whether either of these is really more than one person’s view about the 
essence of religion that carries no special philosophical weight. For exam-
ple, many traditional Christians might insist on the opposite view, that 
religion must be about truth, precisely because of the importance for 
them of the idea that only Christianity is true, and thus that all other 
religions are false. While the claim that religion must involve truth might 
have the odd consequence that certain practices ordinarily counted as 
religious would be excluded from that category, the assertion itself seems 
to be logically in order.15
Now someone could react to this claim by asking the following ques-
tion: if religion concerns truth, what are its methods? After all, it isn’t 
unreasonable to tie truth claims to some form of method, even if that is 
only a very informal common-sense method of confirming facts. It need 
not be a more formal method such as is found in medicine, the natural 
sciences, law, etc. It may seem that religion doesn’t really have anything 
like a method in any of these senses and this may cast suspicion on the 
idea that it concerns truth. Yet Diamond, for instance, might counter 
by arguing that within a particular tradition, religious practices such as 
prayer or reflection are sometimes themselves regarded as “methods” for 
finding truth; there is no obvious reason why this sense should have to 
be explicated with reference to everyday, legal, scientific, or historical, 
methods for finding truth. She might add further that although there is 
perhaps no way of specifying a particular religion’s conception of truth 
without reference to the very methods prescribed by that religion, this is 
no more damaging to that religion’s claim to truth than it would be to 
any other kind of pursuit: the demand for an explication of the “truth 
directedness” of a set of religious practices that is independent of those 
practices already begs the question against those in the tradition who 
maintain the centrality of their religion’s truth.16
At any rate, whether Wittgenstein thought that religion did not have to 
be concerned with truth and error or whether he thought that it essentially 
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did not involve these ideas, Diamond believes that either option is merely 
one way of thinking about religion, enjoying no philosophical superior-
ity over views insisting on robust uses of truth and error in a religious 
context. With her general view about the intelligibility of criticizing from 
outside of a system in place, Diamond can point out that however we 
choose to interpret Wittgenstein’s remark mentioning Augustine, there is 
an important distinction to be made between a generally tolerant pagan 
attitude towards other religions and a philosophical view that tries to 
ban criticisms of other religions, as though, for example, anti-pagan false 
god criticism was logically confused.17 Diamond ascribes only the first, 
tolerant, pagan-like view to Wittgenstein. And she concludes that while 
biographically interesting, this fact about him provides no support for 
a general philosophical claim to the effect that the anti-pagan false god 
view is conceptually off limits or that Wittgenstein thought it was. How 
tightly connected, then, are these views of his on religion to his overall 
philosophical outlook? Diamond thinks the answer is not very connected: 
“The fact that Wittgenstein was strongly attracted to the view opposed to 
Augustine’s is deeply interesting; but it leaves us just where we were”.18
II
While Diamond is correct about the consequences of Wittgenstein’s views 
on religion with regard to the possibility of criticism, providing a wider 
context for this issue will bring out that, while not exemplifying a gen-
eral philosophical position concerning the possibility of such criticism, 
behind his views lay an intellectual and spiritual framework that I think 
deserves to be described as broadly philosophical. There may be nothing 
like a general a priori argument about what is or is not philosophically 
confused with criticizing forms of religious life, but there is much at stake 
in how we think about these questions. At the very least, a fuller pic-
ture will help to make the case for thinking that Wittgenstein’s attitude 
towards religion formed an important part of the background for his 
philosophizing and so for understanding its full significance.
I have argued elsewhere that a fundamental thread running through 
Wittgenstein’s work and thought is a critique of modernity, in particular 
a critique of the pretensions of modern scientism and naturalism.19 His 
work attempts to engage the self-understanding of a reader who is likely 
to come to philosophy with a certain cast of mind that includes unex-
amined commitments from a particular cultural context. I have argued 
further that at least one, perhaps the most important, intended outcome 
of this critique is an enabling of a sense of humility and wonder at the 
fit between word and world, a fostering of a sense of reverence for how 
deeply language is interwoven with what is special about human life. 
So, while Wittgenstein’s views on religion were not derivable from his 
views on philosophy, they were of a piece with those views, as both were 
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fundamentally interwoven with his views on mind and world, on human 
life in the world and nature. The importance of wonder for understand-
ing Wittgenstein’s thought accounts for a great deal of what I take to be 
the relevance of his use of a “religious point of view” in his statement to 
Drury.20
This is why Wittgenstein believed that religion in its essence was not 
concerned with claims to historical truth or about the “furniture of real-
ity”. The religious impulse as he understood it is instead concerned with 
the mystery of there being an intelligible world at all, and he thought that 
this impulse finds its fullest expression when a religious symbol system 
becomes the grammar of one’s experience of the world.21
It appears to me that a religious belief could only be (something like) 
a passionate committing oneself to a system of coordinates. Hence 
although it’s belief, it’s really a way of living, or a way of judging life. 
It’s passionately taking up this interpretation. And so instruction in 
a religious faith would have to be portraying, describing that system 
of reference and at the same time appealing to the conscience. And 
these together would have to result finally in the one under instruc-
tion himself, of his own accord, passionately taking up that system 
of reference. It would be as though someone were on the one hand 
to let me see my hopeless situation, on the other depict the rescue-
anchor, until of my own accord, or at any rate not led by the hand of 
the instructor, I were to rush up and seize it.22
Apart from whether this correctly describes the way things look to par-
ticipants from within a religious practice, Wittgenstein saw religions as 
essentially grammars of wonder, and so as holding out the promise of 
sustaining an openness to wonder, not least by providing a vehicle for its 
expression. Religions were “systems of coordinates” for giving direction 
to a life fundamentally characterized previously all by reverence, which 
Wittgenstein felt was the highest kind of human life to lead.
III
On the question of the possibility of criticism of other religions, we are 
in one way still “just where we were,” as Diamond put it. But with the 
discussion of the prior section as background, I can now try to bring out 
more fully what I think is the philosophical significance of Wittgenstein’s 
attitude towards religion. I want to do this by discussing a particular case 
which Diamond mentions, that of a statement by Elizabeth Anscombe in 
a letter to Rush Rhees. Anscombe wrote,
An irreligious man rejects certain conceptions; he is not innocent 
of them. Don’t misunderstand me: there are forms which such 
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misconceptions can take, such that a man is better off if he rejects 
them than if he retains them in these forms. I would rather a man 
were like Bertrand Russell than that he were a worshipper of Durga. 
(I rather believe that Wittgenstein would not: he’d certainly have me 
up for thinking I could say anything about a worshipper of Durga.)23
There are two issues that the context of this letter does not make clear; 
I will take up each of them in turn.
First, the letter does not make clear in what capacity or from what 
standpoint Anscombe is stating her preference for Russell over Durga 
worship. In an earlier paper, “Wittgenstein on Religious Belief: The Gulfs 
Between Us,” Diamond discusses a remark made by Wittgenstein in the 
third lecture on religious belief in the notes published as Lectures and 
Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief.24 Witt-
genstein said there that in a given case of religious belief, a person may 
place the whole weight of his belief in a particular picture, for example 
in certain phrases expressing the idea of resurrection after death.25 Given 
certain well-known remarks Wittgenstein makes elsewhere about pictures 
in philosophy, it is perhaps easy to read him making a pejorative remark 
in the lecture about the relation between the use of a picture and the 
nature of religious belief.26 But Diamond makes clear that Wittgenstein 
isn’t using the idea of a picture pejoratively here at all. If I read her cor-
rectly, she thinks Wittgenstein’s point in the lecture is not that the use of 
a picture in this or that situation is automatically a reason for suspicion; 
it may in fact be essential. His point is simply that we need to be clear 
about different ways in which such pictures are used. Ignoring these dif-
ferences might lead, for example to our assuming that the sense of a form 
of words used in a religious context can simply be read off of the logic of 
everyday non-religious uses of the same form, without our paying atten-
tion to these particular contexts. Diamond suggests that Wittgenstein is 
trying to avoid an “overly strong” sense of the essentiality of a picture in 
which the sense and the context must go together, while at the same time 
he is trying to make space for a kind of essentiality that is robust enough 
to do justice to religious (and presumably other) contexts.27
Diamond discusses in some detail different ways in which there can 
be “detachable” or purportedly inessential uses of a picture in religious 
thinking as well as “non-detachable” uses.28 In the case of a detachable 
use, the picture may be thought to serve an important heuristic function 
for conveying a religious idea, but the same idea could at least in theory 
be paraphrased or conveyed without the picture. One of her main points 
is that although philosophers might assume that the use of a religious 
picture is in order only if it is used in the detachable sense, there is in fact 
no compelling reason for thinking this. According to Diamond (and on 
her interpretation of Wittgenstein here), there is nothing philosophically 
fishy if a person lets a religious picture be at the “bottom of all of her 
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thought” without being able to paraphrase her thought in a manner that 
is detachable, that is independently characterizable, of that very same 
picture. The demand for such a non-circular description of a religious 
picture simply begs the question about the legitimacy of its use.
At the same time, Diamond contends that there is no automatically 
given logical compartmentalization or “walling off” of language games 
irrespective of particular cases. What someone means with a particular 
expression drawn from religion might be shown in how she allows it to 
shape her thought and speech in certain contexts, but not in others. How 
someone else understands the same given expression might be shown 
in how it shapes her thought in a much more global sense. In this vein, 
Diamond claims that, for example, the idea of God intervening in his-
tory may be at the bottom of a person’s thought when she is engaged in 
more ostensibly secular activities, such as political philosophy, and not 
only when thinking about or discussing religion per se.29 This seems to 
make room for the idea of being a religious philosopher in a particularly 
strong sort of way. So as I understand her, Diamond could argue that the 
fact that a particular religious picture may lay at the basis of Anscombe’s 
judgment about Russell and Durga, a picture, furthermore the use of 
which as we just saw does not require any non-circular defense, provides 
no automatic philosophical argument for doubting that such a judgment 
is a perfectly intelligible example of religious criticism.
Assuming, then, that Anscombe was speaking as a Catholic philoso-
pher in the letter to Rhees, the second issue that the context of her remark 
does not make clear is what she means when she writes that she is sure 
that Wittgenstein would “have me up” for criticizing Durga worship. 
She may be indicating that Wittgenstein would think she is making a 
philosophical error in rendering her judgment. Alternatively, she may 
imagine that Wittgenstein would simply disagree with her because of his 
“pagan” tolerant attitude. Since, as I have already said, I basically agree 
with Diamond’s reading of Wittgenstein, according to which he did not 
find any philosophical arguments available that would ban such judg-
ments, I assume here that Anscombe too imagines him to be reacting out 
of a pagan responsiveness to religiosity. In this event, does Wittgenstein’s 
statement that all the world’s religions are wonderful simply gainsay a 
position like Anscombe’s?30 Is all of the weight being in a particular reli-
gious picture compatible with seeing all the world’s religions as wonder-
ful?31 Or are we still just where we were? This leads to my final question.
Even if there is no argument showing how Anscombe’s criticism of 
Durga worship can be rejected on some kind of “supergrammatical” 
grounds that demonstrates its logical confusion, Wittgenstein could have 
regarded her remark to Rhees as having missed something important 
anyway.32 A response to Anscombe’s statement about Russell being bet-
ter than Durga worship is that she might have been right in one way and 
wrong in another. To explain what I mean, I want to bring in an idea of 
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anthropologist Louis Dumont’s to which I  have already referred to in 
Chapter 3 (see p. 146). This is the idea of “hierarchical encompassment”. 
Dumont employs this idea to make sense of certain binary oppositions 
found in ethnographic and historical data that at first glance might 
appear to occupy the kind of simple one-dimensional horizontal oppo-
sition in relation to one another such as that of odd and even natural 
numbers. Dumont argues that this flattened out picture obscures how 
such binaries are sometimes not simply opposed to one another, but 
rather are often opposed along different hierarchical axes, which are 
crucial for understanding the different contexts where certain judgments 
are made.
Recall Dumont’s way of analyzing a binary aspect of medieval culture, 
the relationship between the sacred and the secular. In the sacred dimen-
sion, what Dumont calls the “outwordly individual” is equal to all oth-
ers in his or her standing before God. The “individual-in-the-world” on 
the other hand is bound up in a network of hierarchical social roles and 
identities. Yet a simple binary opposition between “equal” and “une-
qual” conceals the social fact that a sacred axis of comparison was itself 
regarded as superior in value to the secular one. This is shown by the 
relative positions of priest to king. “Priests are superior, for they are only 
inferior on an inferior level”.33
It will help to bring out an important point if we now consider Ans-
combe’s remark about Russell and Durga worship in terms of the schema 
provided by Dumont. Although I take it to be pretty unlikely, consider 
first the possibility that was Anscombe’s intention merely to compare 
Russell’s thought to Durga worship along an axis we could perhaps 
describe as modern common sense secular ethics. I don’t see any reason 
for Wittgenstein to have thought that this judgement would have posed 
any special philosophical difficulties. Things become more interesting, 
however, if we consider the possibility that Anscombe intended to com-
pare Russell and Durga worship as two religious systems. It may strike 
us as odd to even consider Russell’s thought on the religious plane. How-
ever that might be, it may seem fair to assume that this comparison too 
would strike Wittgenstein as posing no special logical problems, just as 
was the case with the comparison of Russell and Durga on the secular 
axis. After all, Wittgenstein never says anything to the effect that all reli-
gions are equally wonderful, only that they are all wonderful. But reading 
Anscombe’s remark this way would imply that she herself believed that 
Durga worship was so spiritually depraved that even the thought of a self-
consciously irreligious man like Russell was religiously superior. I think 
Wittgenstein would take Anscombe to have missed something impor-
tant here, but before I elaborate what that is, someone might preempt 
me by observing that whatever trouble I may imagine with Anscombe’s 
remark is probably just an artifact of my having imposed Dumont’s 
hierarchical schema on it in the first place. I have in fact provided no 
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reason for thinking that she would accept the conceptual regimentation 
that that schema imposes. It is moreover entirely plausible that even had 
Anscombe been made aware of the Dumontian schema, she would have 
insisted on the legitimacy of making her comparison across the two axes 
of the sacred and the secular anyway, which in effect demolishes the 
point of the schema itself. And there would be nothing logically prevent-
ing her from doing that. But in fact what I just described as Anscombe’s 
arriving at the judgement that Russell is superior to Durga worship by 
her crossing of the secular and sacred evaluative axes, or what I described 
previously as her judging Russell to be superior to Durga worship on the 
religious axis alone, really amount to the same thing. The first is asserting 
that Durga worship is so evil or depraved that even a system pertaining to 
a self-consciously non-religious order of value is preferable. The second 
amounts to claiming that Durga worship is so awful that Russell’s ethical 
thought defeats Durga worship as a religion, i.e. on Durga worship’s own 
home turf, so to speak. These two distinct claims are not really different.
Interestingly, after recounting Anscombe’s letter, Rhees’ recollection 
continues:
When I  said [Wittgenstein’s] view could lead to consequences that 
are hard to take, I meant that a form of worship like the worship 
of Durga should have the respect due to a form of worship, and 
should not be judged as though it were a depraved practice in our 
own community.34
I think Rhees’ reaction here is on the right track. I will now try to explain 
why and what it is I think Anscombe has failed to recognize. As I  just 
described, along an axis of what I termed “secular common sense ethics” 
Wittgenstein might have regarded men like Russell as superior to Durga 
worshipers (although given his assessments of Russell, one wonders). But 
along a religious axis of comparison, I believe he would have regarded 
Durga worship as superior to Russell precisely because of a connection 
between significance itself and the phenomenon of wonder. What is this 
connection? I  said previously that one intended outcome of Wittgen-
stein’s work was a (re)enabling of a sense of humility and wonder at the 
fit between word and world, a fostering of a sense of reverence for this 
uniqueness that typifies the human being. (Here I think is the connection 
between logic and ethics.) The element of humility implicit in wonder is 
a way of acknowledging that our being minded creatures is not a feature 
of life that we can fully objectify or control. We must rather accept that 
we are not only agents of the world’s intelligibility and significance, we 
are its creations.
With this goes the idea that for there to be an experience of something 
genuinely and authoritatively important, there must be some acknowl-
edgement of this affective dimension to experience. People and actions 
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must show up for us as significant, and not merely as made intelligi-
ble by us or as grasped by us as objects for manipulation. What I am 
trying to get at here concerns the hierarchical distinction between there 
being significance per se and the relative worth of different systems. Won-
der is important because it is a psychological “condition of the possibil-
ity” of there being an experience of genuine significance at all. And so 
Durga worship, though not necessarily equal or better than any other 
religion in particular, is, qua grammar of wonder, better than none at 
all. Culture and Value contains the following brief remark from 1929: 
“What is good is also divine. Queer as it sounds, that sums up my ethics. 
Only something supernatural can express the Supernatural”.35 As much 
as many of us may insist today on hearing this remark as a paean to what 
is independently identifiable by us as good, something which only then 
deserves our reverence, this idea was alien to Wittgenstein.36 Durga wor-
ship is better than Russell because, at a higher level, something is better 
than nothing. Views like Russell’s are ultimately nihilistic, destructive of 
significance itself.
I think a strong case can be made that a genuine understanding of 
what it means to be committed to one’s own particular religious picture 
requires a high degree of respect and tolerance for other traditions. Sup-
pose, however, that someone insisted that the only genuine value can be 
found in her specific tradition, and, moreover, that this value is essen-
tially located in the exclusively true character of the claims made in this 
tradition. She might claim, then, that the particular features of Durga 
worship, even though it is a religion, make it crucially at odds with the 
kind of truth claims of her picture, in fact even more at odds with these 
truths than Russell’s wholly anti-religious attitude. She might think this 
because she regards Durga worship and systems like it as blocking the 
spiritual routes to the truths of her own religious tradition, and doing so 
in ways that Russell’s outlook does not undermine, or at least does not 
undermine as badly. At any rate, there would be no violation of any sup-
posed conditions of meaningful speech in standing by such a comparative 
claim.37 “Paganism” as I’ve been calling it here cannot claim superiority 
as a general critical position over this dogmatic view. But I am suggest-
ing nevertheless that we see the difference between the dogmatic view 
just described and Wittgenstein’s view as constituting a deep issue. The 
meaning of our words is bound up with the point we want to make with 
them. And so, the meaning of Wittgenstein’s teaching should be a point 
beyond the purely diagnostic and critical tools he employs to dismantle 
metaphysics. Quite possibly part of that point was intellectual clarity for 
its own sake. But that alone doesn’t seem to me to be an adequate moti-
vation for his work, the philosophy behind the philosophizing as it were. 
Wittgenstein thought that our culture’s obsession with progress left in its 
wake nothing more than an “unimposing spectacle” where “the strength 
of the individual is wasted through overcoming of opposing forces and 
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frictional resistances”.38 His views on religion ran along similar tracks. 
He was certainly neither the first nor the only thinker to regard a par-
ticular kind of obsession with truth, whether in religion or philosophy, 
as ultimately inimical to significance (including perhaps the significance 
of truth). This observation alone does not definitively answer whether he 
was right. But does it leave us just where we were?
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